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Abstract 
The subject of this dissertation is the problem of mental causation: the problem 
of how the mental is able to causally interact with the physical. I show that the 
problem of mental causation, as it is presented in contemporary philosophy of 
mind, is a pseudo-problem. My claim is that contemporary philosophy of mind 
has misidentified what it is about mental causation that we need, but struggle, to 
understand. This is because contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a 
misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. 
In most discussions of the problem of mental causation, mental causation 
is presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. I call 
this understanding of mental causation the relational understanding of mental 
causation: 
Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a 
matter of mental items (events, processes or states) standing in causal 
relations to physical events, e.g. bodily movements.   
The relational understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed largely 
because it is thought essential to our conception of ourselves as agents who act 
intentionally and who bear moral responsibility. I argue that while intentional 
action does entail the existence of causation which involves mentality – 
something which is worthy of the name ‘mental causation’ – the mental 
causation intentional action presupposes ought not to be understood in 
relational terms. When we say that someone acted intentionally because of what 
she believed, desired or intended, the concepts belief, desire and intention do not 
refer to items which stand in causal relations to bodily movements. I will defend 
this thesis by examining metaphysics of action and the nature of agency.  
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1 
The Problem of Mental Causation 
1.1 The Relational Understanding of Mental Causation 
The problem of mental causation is the problem of how that which is mental is 
able to causally interact with that which is physical. In this dissertation, I will 
show that the problem of mental causation, as it is presented in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, is a pseudo-problem. This is not to say that there aren’t 
aspects of mental causation which are very hard to understand. Rather, my claim 
is that contemporary philosophy of mind has misidentified what it is about 
mental causation that we need, but struggle, to understand. This is because 
contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what 
mental causation is supposed to be, or so I contend.  
The problem of mental causation is usually presented as a ‘how possibly’ 
question, that is, a question about how mental causation could exist. It is usually 
accepted as prima facie true that mental causation does exist; the difficulties 
arise only when we try to understand how this could be, given certain 
assumptions about the fundamental nature of reality. As Peter Menzies states, 
‘philosophical questions about mental causation revolve around […] how it is 
possible in the first place in the light of certain metaphysical assumptions and 
principles’ (2013, p.58). The metaphysical assumptions and principles which 
seem to make the existence of mental causation puzzling concern the apparent 
physicality of the causal world. For example, Jaegwon Kim tells us that the 
problem of mental causation is ‘to explain how mentality can have a causal role 
in a world that is fundamentally physical’ (2005, p.1). The existence of mental 
causation is thought to be especially difficult to reconcile with the principle of 
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the causal closure of the physical world, which says that ‘at every time at which 
a physical effect has a cause it has a sufficient physical cause’ (Gibb, 2013, p.2).1  
Few are willing to deny the existence of mental causation. This is because 
mental causation is thought to be essential to our conception of ourselves as 
agents who act intentionally and bear moral responsibility. Consequently, much 
contemporary philosophy of mind is devoted to showing how the existence of 
mental causation can be reconciled with the principles that seem at first to 
forbid its existence. Modern metaphysics of mind are often judged according to 
how well they deal with the problem of mental causation.  
For example, much attention has been paid to establishing whether views 
which fall under the broad epithet ‘non-reductive physicalism’ can avoid the 
mental causation problem. The most popular kind of non-reductive physicalism 
grants that there are events, processes and states which are mental, but insists 
that mental events, processes and states are ‘nothing over and above’ certain 
physical events, processes and states. Exactly what it is for one entity to be 
‘nothing over and above’ another is a matter of debate. For some, it is enough 
for mental entities to be nothing over and above physical entities if the former 
 
 
 
1 There are many alternative formulations of the principle of causal closure. For example: ‘any 
physical state or change, if it has a cause or explanation, has a physical cause or explanation’ 
(Hopkins, 1978, p.223); ‘For all physical events and states there are necessary and sufficient 
physical conditions, their “explanations” or “causes”’ (Skillen, 1984, p.514); ‘Every physical 
effect has its chance fully determined by physical events alone’ (Noordhof, 1999, p.430); ‘All 
physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical occurrences’ (Papineau, 2001, p.9). 
These various formulations are obviously not equivalent. Furthermore, the principle of causal 
closure is supposed to be derived from, and supported by, the findings of scientific investigations 
into causal processes, but it is a contentious question which, if any, of the various formulations 
of causal closure enjoy such support. I will set such issues aside in this dissertation. See Lowe 
(2000) for a discussion of issues relating to the principle of causal closure, and see Papineau 
(2001) for a defence of the principle.  
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supervene on the latter (Hellman and Thompson, 1975; Haugeland, 1982). For 
others, the nothing-over-and-above relation must be something stronger than 
supervenience (Horgan, 1993; Wilson, 2005). And some have suggested this 
relation is one of composition or constitution, or an analogue of composition or 
constitution (Pettit, 1993). Regardless of how the nothing-over-and-above 
relation should be spelled out, several philosophers have argued that non-
reductive physicalist views are unable to explain how there can be causation by 
mental entities.2 Non-reductive physicalists have offered many 
counterarguments.3 
The existence of mental causation is also used as a core premise in a 
number of arguments which seek to establish some form of physicalist identity 
theory about mentality. Three such arguments are the ‘causal argument for 
physicalism’ championed by David Papineau (1993, 2001, 2002), 4 Donald 
Davidson’s (1970) argument for Anomalous Monism, and Kim’s (1993, 1998, 
2001) ‘causal exclusion argument’.  
As Papineau (2001, p.9) presents it, the causal argument for physicalism 
has three premises:  
1. ‘All mental occurrences have physical effects’  
2. ‘All physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical occurrences’ 
(this is Papineau’s formulation of the principle of causal closure) 
3.  ‘The physical effects of mental causes are not all overdetermined’ 
From these three premises, it is concluded that ‘Mental occurrences must be 
identical with physical occurrences’ (p.9). (The causal argument is used to 
establish a physicalist identity theory about mental occurrences or events. 
However, proponents of the causal argument typically assume that events, 
 
 
 
2 For example, Kim (1989, 2005), Crane (1995) and Heil (2013). 
3 For example, Bennett (2003), Árnadóttir and Crane (2013), Shoemaker (2013) and List and 
Menzies (2009).  
4 This argument is also known ‘the causal overdetermination argument’ (Crane, 1995; Gibb, 
2013) and ‘the overdetermination argument’ (Sturgeon, 1998; Noordhof, 1999). 
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processes and states are not significantly different in nature, and so what goes 
for mental events goes for mental processes and mental states (or at least ‘token 
states’) as well.) Importantly, the first premise is understood by proponents of 
the causal argument as simply equivalent to the claim that mental causation 
exists. 
Davidson’s argument for Anomalous Monism is another example of an 
argument for identifying mental events with physical events which takes the 
existence of mental causation as a premise. Anomalous Monism asserts that 
every individual mental event is identical with some physical event, but mental 
kinds are distinct from physical kinds. Davidson’s (1970/2001, p.208) argument 
for this view involves three premises:  
1. ‘At least some mental events interact causally with physical events’ (The 
‘Principle of Causal Interaction’) 
2. ‘Where there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect 
fall under strict deterministic laws’ (The ‘Principle of the Nomological Character 
of Causality’) 
3. ‘There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can 
be predicted and explained’ (The ‘Anomalism of the Mental’) 
Again, the first premise of this argument is typically understood as an assertion 
that mental causation exists. 
Kim objects to Davidson’s Anomalous Monism on the grounds that ‘on 
anomalous monism, events are causes or effects only as they instantiate physical 
laws, and this means that an event’s mental properties make no causal 
difference’ (1989, pp.34-35). In other words, Kim thinks that Anomalous 
Monism suffers a mental causation problem. On Kim’s view, events are causes in 
virtue of the properties they involve, and not every property of an event involves 
causally matters, unless there is causal overdetermination. Kim argues that the 
Nomological Character of Causality and Anomalism of the Mental imply that it is 
always an event’s physical nature which is causally relevant; whatever mental 
properties an event may involve are excluded from being causally relevant by 
physical properties which enjoy superior candidacy for this status. This is Kim’s 
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‘causal exclusion argument’, which is yet another example of an argument for a 
particular metaphysics of mind – this time a physicalist identity theory which 
identifies mental properties with physical properties – which focuses on the 
problem of mental causation.  
The problem of mental causation is thus central to many debates in 
philosophy of mind. However, philosophers of mind rarely question whether the 
conception of mental causation that gets these debates started in the first place 
is the right way to think about the place of mentality in causation. I agree that 
some form of mental causation is essential to our conception of ourselves as 
agents who act intentionally and bear moral responsibility. I agree that where 
there is intentional action there is causation that somehow involves mentality. 
However, I think it is less clear that this mental causation should be thought of 
in the way prescribed by the literature on the problem of mental causation in 
contemporary philosophy of mind.  
In most discussions of the problem of mental causation, mental causation 
is presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities; 
mentality and physicality are presented as two sides of a causal exchange. As 
Jenifer Hornsby puts it, mental causation, as it is discussed in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, is something ‘we are supposed to think of as causation by 
the mental’ (2015, p.129). Or as Tim Crane puts it, ‘the arguments for 
physicalism must assume that the labels “mental” and “physical” as applied to 
causation are really transferred epithets – what is mental and physical are the 
relata of causation, not the causation itself’ (1995, p.219).  
In many cases, mental causation is presented as a causal relation between 
mental and physical events. Recall Davidson’s Principle of Causal Interaction: ‘at 
least some mental events interact causally with physical events’. Consider also 
the following formulations of the first premise of the causal argument: ‘all 
mental occurrences have physical effects’ (Papineau, 2001, p.9); ‘we think of 
mental and physical events as causally related’ (Hopkins, 1978, p.223); ‘Mental 
events have physical effects’ (Noordhof, 1999, p.430). Sometimes mental 
causation is presented as a causal relation that can hold between states, as well 
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as events. For example, consider Anthony Skillen’s formulation of the first 
premise of the causal argument:  
Of some physical events and states, mental events and states are causes. For 
example, because of my desire to give an example I move a pen – a physical 
object moves in space, a change which would not have occurred but for that 
desire. (1984, p.514) 
Often, events, states and processes are thought of as being very similar in 
nature, so that there is no need to treat mental events, mental states and mental 
processes differently when considering their candidacy as causal relata. For 
example, when David Armstrong proposes that mental states are states which 
are ‘apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour’, he notes that his use of 
the word ‘state’ is ‘not meant to rule out “process” or “event”’ (1968, p.82). In 
most discussions of mental causation, events, states and processes are thought of 
as three sub-classes of the same general ontological category. Members of this 
general ontological category – I will call them items – are typically thought of as 
particulars, where particulars are unrepeatable, concrete individuals. So, even 
where mental causation is not presented as a causal relation between events – or 
not only between events – it is still presented as a causal relation between items 
which are mental and items which are physical. I call this understanding of 
mental causation the relational understanding of mental causation.  
Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a 
matter of mental items (events, processes or states which are conceived of as 
particulars) standing in causal relations to physical events, e.g. bodily 
movements.   
Central to the relational understanding of mental causation is the idea that the 
mental causation is a cause-effect relation between mental and physical items – 
mental phenomena are thought of as links in causal chains.  
This understanding of mental causation has become the standard way of 
thinking about mental causation because it is widely thought that intentional or 
voluntary human action is possible only if mental items stand in causal relations 
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to physical events such as bodily movements. For example, consider Kim’s 
remarks on why it is important that mental causation is real:  
First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral 
practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal effects in the 
physical world. In voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions 
and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways, 
thereby causing the objects around us to be rearranged. (2005, p.9) 
Here Kim endorses the idea that the possibility of voluntary action depends on 
beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, standing in causal relations to 
bodily movements. Kim also states that:  
[…] it seems plain that the possibility of psychology as a science capable of 
generating law-based explanations of human behaviour depends on the 
reality of mental causation: mental phenomena must be capable of 
functioning as indispensable links in causal chains leading to physical 
behaviour, like movements of the limbs and vibrations of the vocal cord. A 
science that invokes mental phenomena in its explanations is presumptively 
committed to their causal efficacy; if a phenomenon is to have an 
explanatory role, its presence or absence must make a difference – a causal 
difference. (2005, p.10)  
I agree that the worth of psychology as a science and as a means by which we 
can predict, explain and control each other’s behaviour requires that people’s 
behaviour can be causally explained by what they think, feel, believe and want. 
However, this claim is much weaker than the claim Kim makes. Kim claims that 
the possibility of psychological explanations of human behaviour requires that 
‘mental phenomena must be capable of functioning as indispensable links in 
causal chains leading to physical behaviour, like movements of the limbs and 
vibrations of the vocal cord’. Thus, Kim thinks that the possibility of voluntary 
action and psychological explanation presupposes that mental phenomena, like 
believing that one ought to brush one’s teeth, or wanting to make a cup of tea, 
are links in causal chains. I disagree.  
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1.2 Mental Causation in the Philosophy of Action 
I accept that when we act intentionally, there is mental causation. However, I 
deny that the mental causation on display here should be relationally 
understood. This is the thesis that I shall be arguing for in this dissertation.  
This thesis does not entail that mental items never stand in causal 
relations to physical events. The following examples seem to be cases where a 
mental event stands to a physical event as cause to effect:  
i. A football fan witnesses his team score a goal, and this seeing event causes the 
football fan to cheer. 
ii. I suddenly remember that I need to put the bins out for collection, and this 
recollection causes me to get up and go outside.  
iii. I imagine a frightening scene, and this successful exercise of my imagination 
causes the hairs on the back of my neck to rise.   
I am not seeking to show that these instances of mental causation should not be 
understood relationally (although I think that even these sorts of cases are often 
misunderstood in contemporary philosophy of mind.) The focus of this 
dissertation is the mental causation that is on display when human agents act 
intentionally. It is precisely this sort of mental causation which I want to argue 
should not be understood relationally. The aim of this dissertation is to show 
that Kim is wrong to claim that ‘In voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or 
intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate 
ways’ (2005, p.9). When we say that someone acted intentionally because of 
what she believed, desired, intended or decided, the concepts belief, desire, 
intention, perhaps even decision, do not refer to items which stand in causal 
relations to limb movements.  
The view I will be arguing for has much in common with a view put 
forward by Gilbert Ryle. Ryle rejects the ‘para-mechanical theory of the mind’ 
(1949, pp.19-23, p.64), where to say that someone did something intentionally 
is to say that some ‘mental thrust’ caused some muscular movements. Ryle 
argues against the idea that ‘mental conduct verbs’ – like ‘knowing’, ‘believing’, 
‘intending’ and ‘desiring’ – signify or denote episodes in a person’s ‘secret history’ 
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or ‘stream of consciousness’ (1949, pp.16-17). In Ryle’s view, mental conduct 
verbs do not denote inner causal events. So, when such verbs are employed to 
explain why an agent acted as she did they do not designate inner causes of the 
actions they explain.  
Some philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein 1958, Anscombe 2000, Tanney, 
2009) who are sympathetic to Ryle’s view, have sought to reject the idea that 
beliefs and desires stand to actions as causes to effects by arguing that 
explanations of intentional actions are not usually causal explanations. These 
philosophers, whom I shall call ‘non-causalists’, argue that rationalising 
explanations of intentional actions, i.e. explanations which work by showing 
why what the agent did seemed, to the agent, like a rational or sensible or good 
thing for the agent to do, are not causal explanations. Non-causalists assume 
that to show that the mental concepts employed in explanations of intentional 
actions do not signify items which are causes of the actions they explain just is to 
show that these explanations are not causal. Non-causalists reject the view that 
as-a-cause is how we should understand the place of mentality in intentional 
action, but they also reject the idea that when we say that an agent acted as she 
did because of what she believed or desired we are giving causal information. In 
other words, non-causalists deny that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, every 
instance of intentional action is an instance of mental causation relationally 
understood, but they also deny that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, every 
instance of intentional action is an instance of mental causation simpliciter.  
In this dissertation, I hope to arrive at the same destination – namely 
concluding that concepts like belief, desire and intention, do not refer to items 
which can stand in causal relations to actions – via a different route, one that 
does not require denying that there is anything worthy of the name ‘mental 
causation’ necessarily on display when human agents act intentionally. The route 
I will take involves examining the metaphysics of action and the nature of 
agency.  
To act is to bring about change, to affect the world. In short, there’s 
causation – which the agent is somehow involved in – wherever there is action. 
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This much seems to be implied by the causative nature of the verbs we use to 
report actions. The verb ‘raise’, for example, is causative: to raise my arm is to 
cause it to rise. An important metaphysical theory of action is the causal theory 
of action. The causal theory of action holds that actions are events, namely 
certain bodily movements, and bodily movements count as actions when and 
only when they are caused, in the right way, by certain mental states of the 
agent or mental events involving the agent.5 Proponents of the causal theory of 
action typically do not regard the distinction between states and events to be 
relevant to the plausibility of their theory. The mental causes of actions are 
typically said to be (the onset of) beliefs, or (the onset of) desires, or (the onset 
of) intentions – i.e. (the onset of) the kind of states which the concepts 
employed in rationalising explanations are taken to refer to.  
The fundamental ontological claim of this theory is that the agent’s 
involvement in the causality of her action can be reduced to the involvement of 
her mental states in the causation of her action. In other words, what it is for an 
agent to affect the world is for certain event-event causal relations to obtain: 
agent-causation can be reduced to event-causation. Part of what motivates 
causal theorists to propose this reduction is certain presuppositions about the 
metaphysics of causation. Causal theorists, implicitly or explicitly, assume that 
causation is always, everywhere a relation between events. I call the 
understanding of causation assumed by causal theorists the Humean approach to 
causation.6 I will argue that agency cannot be located within a worldview that 
assumes a Humean metaphysics of causation. This is because agency is 
misconstrued when it is taken to be something that can be identified with a 
certain kind of event-causation. I will argue that to properly understand agency 
 
 
 
5 See Bishop (1989, pp.40-44), Davidson (1963/2001, pp.3-21 and 1971/2001pp.43-63), and 
Smith (2012).  
6 It should be noted that it is unclear whether Hume himself endorsed the view I’m calling the 
Humean approach to causation. See chapter 3. 
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one must accept what the causal theory of action denies, namely that the 
exercise of agential power cannot be reduced to a special kind of event-
causation.  
Hornsby (2004a, 2012) has argued that what’s needed to properly 
understand agency is a metaphysical framework which provides intellectual 
space for thinking of causation as something other than a relation between 
events. Without such a framework, it is impossible to see how the causality of 
action might be something other than a causal relation between mental event 
and action, as the causal theory of action supposes. In line with this directive, I 
will present a non-Humean way of thinking about causation, which denies that 
causation is always a relation, and holds instead that causation can be a 
determinable process which substances engage in. This non-Humean theory of 
causation depends upon a novel ontology which denies that processes belong in 
the same ontological category as events, and instead takes processes to be a 
special kind of universal. I suggest that engaging in a process is analogous to 
instantiating a property, and that events are related to processes by an 
instancing relation – or to put it more naturally, events are instances of 
processes. I believe that this radically non-Humean theory of causation, and its 
associated process ontology, has several advantages, but my aim in this 
dissertation is to show how this new approach enables us to put together a more 
successful account of agency, one which does not take the causality of action to 
consist in any sort of cause-effect relation.  
A key part of this account is the thesis that to exercise power is to engage 
in a process. I argue that to understand the concept of agency it is vital to 
distinguish between the different sorts of power a substance can exercise. I think 
there are two distinctions crucial to our concept of agency: the distinction 
between active and passive powers; and the distinction between one-way and 
two-way powers. As I will show, agency does not reduce to the exercise of active 
power, nor does it reduce to the exercise of two-way power. My view is that 
agency is a complex concept which incorporates both distinctions. Some 
substances’ agential powers are one-way; these substances manifest their agency 
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when they are active, but not when they are passive. Other substances’ agential 
powers are two-way; these substances manifest their agency when they are 
active, but also sometimes when they are passive.  
The views on causation and agency I advance allow me to argue that even 
though it should not be understood relationally, there is something worthy of 
the name ‘mental causation’ which is necessarily on display when human agents 
act intentionally. I will argue that to act intentionally is to engage in a process, 
and as such is to exercise a power – but a power of a special sort. I will suggest 
that to act intentionally is to exercise one’s two-way powers in accordance with 
some form, structure or pattern. In other words, the power to act intentionally is 
a power to structure one’s own activities so that they demonstrate a pattern – a 
pattern which is revealed by attributing mental states to the agent. So, when an 
agent acts intentionally, they engage in the process of causation. I will suggest 
that the process they engage in counts as mental causation in virtue of the fact 
that in engaging in this process the agent is manifesting a special power, namely 
a power to organise their activities into a pattern that can be made sense of by 
appeal to mental concepts. 
In this way, I hope to show that even if our concept of intentional action 
entails that there is mental causation, there is no reason to think that this mental 
causation should be relationally understood. The mental causation that is 
entailed by the existence of intentional action is not causation by mental items. 
It is no part of our concept of intentional action that causal relations between 
mental items and physical events obtain. Consequently, the usual way of 
presenting the problem of mental causation, as a question of how it could 
possibly be that mental items could stand in causal relations to physical events, 
is misconceived. We have no a priori reason to think that mental items do stand 
in causal relations to physical events. The real mystery of mental causation is not 
how mental-physical causal relations are possible, but how it is that we – that is, 
human beings – have the unique capacities we do, in particular our capacity to 
act for reasons. How have such capacities evolved? From what simpler powers 
do such capacities emerge? I will not have much to say in answer to these 
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questions – indeed, I do not think they are purely philosophical questions – my 
aim is rather to demonstrate that the real problem of mental causation should be 
articulated in terms of these questions, and not in terms of how causal relations 
between mental items and physical events are possible.  
1.3 Summary of Remaining Chapters 
In chapter 2, I examine the causal theory of action. I put forward my reasons for 
thinking that the main thesis of the causal theory of action, that agency is 
nothing over and above some special kind of event-causation, cannot be right. I 
argue that any attempt to reduce agency to special sort of event-causation 
misconceives agency by failing to accommodate two basic facts about agency: 1) 
that the agency concept covers the doings of inanimate objects and animals as 
well as the intentional doings of human beings, and 2) that, for some agents, 
their agential power can be demonstrated in passivity as well as in activity (for 
example, I can demonstrate my agential power when I deliberately refrain from 
doing something I am capable of doing). I argue that to explain how these two 
facts about agency can be true, one must accept that the exercise of agential 
power cannot be reduced to a special kind of event-causation.   
In chapter 3, I articulate the Humean metaphysics of causation 
presupposed by the causal theory of action. I will explain what the key 
commitments of this Humean approach to causation are, and outline an 
alternative, non-Humean, approach which rejects these commitments. According 
to my preferred non-Humean approach, causation can be a process rather than a 
relation, of which processes like breaking, crushing, bending etc are more 
determinate species. My proposal will be that causation is on display not only 
when events make the difference to the occurrence of other events, but also 
when substances exercise causal powers. What it is for a substance to exercise 
causal power is for there to be an entity, i.e. process, in which the substance 
engages.  
In chapter 4, I explain what a process is. I propose a novel ontology which 
denies that processes belong in the same ontological category as events, and 
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instead holds that processes are a special kind of universal. I suggest that 
engaging in a process is analogous to instantiating a property, and that events 
are instances of processes. On this proposal, a substance’s engagement in a 
process is a special sort of state of affairs, namely a dynamic state of affairs. 
In chapter 5, I argue that my alternative, non-Humean, way of thinking 
about causation, and the ontology that permits it, allows us to put together a 
more successful theory of agency, one that avoids the problems facing the causal 
theory of action. I also compare my account of agency with some other 
alternatives to the causal theory of action, namely agent-causation-based 
theories of action, and argue that my account has advantages over these 
theories.  
In chapter 6, I turn to intentional action, and specifically the question of 
whether our concept of intentional action presupposes that mental items stand 
in causal relations to actions, or physical events. I outline Davidson’s (1963) 
argument that rationalising explanations are causal explanations and consider 
objections to the idea that explanations of intentional actions which cite reasons 
are made true by mental events or states standing in causal relations to actions. I 
will focus on Julia Tanney’s (2009) argument	which aims to show that the 
mental concepts employed in rationalising explanations do not discharge their 
explanatory role by designating causes of the actions they explain. 	
In chapter 7, I argue against an assumption made by both Davidson and 
his opponents, namely the assumption that	causal explanations are precisely 
those explanations whose explanandum designates an effect and whose 
explanans designates an item which is the cause of that effect. I will discuss 
counterexamples to this view. And, in line with the non-Humean theory of 
causation advanced in chapters 3 and 4, I will suggest that some causal 
explanations may be made true by facts about dynamic states of affairs. I will 
also investigate the proposal that rationalising explanations are a special kind of 
disposition-citing explanations and outline what this means for our 
understanding of intentional action.  
Chapter 8 concludes. 	
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2 
The Causal Theory of Action 
The causal theory of action holds that actions are events, namely certain bodily 
movements, and bodily movements count as actions when and only when they 
are caused, in the right way, by certain mental states of the agent or mental 
events involving the agent. This theory has its roots in Davidson’s (1963) 
argument that rationalising explanations of actions – explanations which explain 
why an agent acted as she did by giving the agent’s reason for acting as she did – 
are causal explanations. Davidson claimed that the explanantia of rationalising 
explanations are facts about what the agent wants to do (or what the agent has 
an urge to do, or what the agent has an ambition to do) and facts about what 
the agent believes about how to do it.7 Davidson calls the composite of a desire 
to perform some type of action and a belief about how performance of that 
action may be achieved ‘the primary reason why the agent performed the action’ 
(1963/2001, p.4). Davidson argued that when we say the agent acted as she did 
because she wanted to do something, or because she believed that something was 
the case, this ‘because’ implies causality. From this, Davidson concluded that 
states of desiring and states of believing – or, at least, events suitably related to 
states of desiring and states of believing, such as the onset of the desire or the 
onset of the belief – are causes of the actions they explain.8 Causal theorists 
 
 
 
7 I think that Davidson is broadly correct on this point, however, I will consider issues facing this 
understanding of rationalising explanation in chapter 6.  
8 I will examine this argument, and objections to it, in more detail in chapter 6. The argument in 
this chapter does not depend on refuting Davidson’s (1963) argument.  
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assume that an adequate account of what it is to act can be extracted from 
Davidson’s anatomisation of rationalising explanations. On the basis of 
Davidson’s argument, causal theorists, like Michael Smith, have proposed that:  
[…] actions are those bodily movements that are caused and rationalised by 
a pair of mental states: a desire for some end, where ends can be thought of 
as ways the world could be, and a belief that something the agent can just 
do, namely move her body in the way to be explained, has some suitable 
chance of making the world the relevant way. Bodily movements that occur 
otherwise aren’t actions, they are mere happenings (Smith, 2004, p.165) 
Famously, attempts to analyse intentional action in terms of causation by 
certain mental states have been impeded by the existence of counterexamples 
which involve ‘deviant causal chains’. Davidson himself doubted that a reductive 
analysis of intentional action could be developed from the idea that states of 
desiring and states of believing are causes of the actions they explain because of 
deviant causal chain cases. The example Davidson uses to illustrate this problem 
is that of a mountain climber holding another man by a rope, whose desire to rid 
himself of the weight, and belief that he can do so by letting go, causes him to 
become so nervous that he lets go of the rope:  
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding 
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on 
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want 
might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be 
the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. 
(Davidson, 1973/2001, p.79) 
In this example, the climber has an end he wants to achieve, namely to rid 
himself of the weight and danger of holding the other man, and the climber 
reasons that loosening his hold is the best means to achieve this end. This belief-
desire pair causes a bodily movement of a type that is rationalised by the belief-
desire pair, just as causal theorists allege it would in an ordinary case of 
intentional action. But in this case the causal route from belief-desire pair to 
bodily movement involves an intermediary state of nervousness which ‘robs the 
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climber of control’, as John Bishop (1989, p.134) puts it. In this example, the 
climber didn’t let go intentionally.  
Many have argued that a reductive causal analysis of intentional action is 
still possible, Davidson’s nervous climber example notwithstanding. Davidson’s 
example shows that the original causal theory failed to specify jointly sufficient 
necessary conditions for intentional action, but this doesn’t mean that a more 
sophisticated version of the causal theory will also fail.9 However, even if we 
cannot specify, in neutral terms, jointly sufficient necessary conditions for 
intentional action, this doesn’t mean that the ontological component of the 
causal theory of action – that action is nothing over and above some special kind 
of event-causation – is false (although it might weaken the case for thinking that 
it is true). The fact that intentional action cannot be analysed in terms of 
causation by mental events does not refute the claim that intentional actions are 
really nothing over and above events caused to happen, in the right way 
(whatever that may be), by certain mental events. Indeed, Torbjörn Tännsjö 
(2009) has argued that because the set of intentional actions is very diverse, we 
should not expect to be able to say, in completely general terms, what causal 
requirements are needed for intentional action to take place. But this doesn’t 
matter, because ‘in relation to specified actions types we can distinguish between 
right and deviant causal chains’ (p.473), and that is enough reason to be 
confident in the causal theory of action’s ontological thesis is correct.  
It is the ontological element of the causal theory of action that I am 
interested in. So, for my purposes here, it does not matter whether the problem 
of causal deviance can be solved or not. I will attempt, in this chapter, to explain 
why I think the idea that action is nothing over and above some special kind of 
event-causation cannot be right. My target is the claim that actions are bodily 
 
 
 
9 More sophisticated versions of the causal analysis of intentional action have been offered by 
Peacocke (1979), Bishop (1989), Mele (2003) and McDonnell (2015). 
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movements which are caused, in the right way (whatever that may be), by 
certain mental states of the agent or mental events involving the agent. I will 
argue that any attempt to reduce agency to a special sort of event-causation 
misconceives agency by failing to accommodate two basic facts about agency.  
My argument will proceed as follows. In section 2.1, I will outline two 
distinctions which I believe are crucial to our concept of agency. In section 2.2, I 
will show why the causal theory of action wrongly implies that the agency 
concept does not cover the ‘doings’ of inanimate objects and animals. I will 
suggest that this error isn’t considered as devastating to the causal theory of 
action as it should be because the causal theory of action fails to keep the two 
distinctions outlined in section 2.1 apart. In section 2.3, I will show why the 
causal theory of action cannot accommodate the fact that, for some agents, their 
agential power can be demonstrated in passivity as well as in activity (for 
example, I can demonstrate my agential power when I deliberately refrain from 
doing something I am capable of doing). In section 2.4, I will explain why the 
source of these two errors is the causal theory of action’s reductive ambitions. I 
will argue that to explain how it can be that a) the agency concept covers the 
‘doings’ of inanimate objects and animals as well as the ‘doings’ of human beings 
and b) some agents’ agential powers can be demonstrated in passivity as well as 
in activity, one must accept that the exercise of agential power cannot be 
reduced to a special kind of event-causation.   
2.1 Two Distinctions Crucial to our Concept of Agency 
The causal theory of action is sometimes presented as a theory of what marks 
the difference between things that one does, and things that befall one. This way 
of presenting the question a theory of agency is supposed to answer is 
problematic, as the verb ‘do’ is very imprecise. There are many things that I can 
be said to do which are not actions of mine, but are instead things that I undergo 
or suffer. It is perfectly legitimate, in certain contexts, to speak of forgetting or 
falling over as things that one has done, even though forgetting and falling over 
are not, in any sense, actions of mine. Reflex behaviours, like blinking or 
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sneezing or ducking to avoid a projectile, are also commonly said to be things 
that we do, but are not usually considered to be appropriate targets of the causal 
theory of action.  
The ‘doings’ of inanimate objects, like the stove’s heating the soup or the 
acid’s melting the beaker, are also not typically seen as targets of the causal 
theory of action. Some proponents of the causal theory of action also deny that 
the ‘doings’ of animals, like the casting of a web by a spider, or the pouncing of a 
cat, are targets of the causal theory of action.10 The ‘doings’ of inanimate objects 
and the ‘doings’ of animals are not actions in the required sense, the causal 
theorist might say. Even though we might describe these examples as things that 
are done (by us, or inanimate objects or animals), and even though we might 
not ordinarily describe these examples as things that are suffered, the causal 
theorist would insist that these ‘doings’ are not sufficiently different from 
suffering change to qualify as targets of the causal theory of action. The target of 
the causal theory of action is something that involves a greater, more 
sophisticated kind of agential control. Davidson also indicates that not every 
case where it would be correct to use a verb of action to describe what is going 
on qualify as targets of the causal theory of action. Davidson uses as his example 
a case where I spill my coffee because you jiggle my hand (1971/2001, p.45) – 
even though I spill my coffee in this example (‘spill’ being a verb of action), this 
sort of case is not the proper target of the causal theory of action. If this case 
describes an action of spilling at all, then it is an action only in a weak sense. 
Whatever agency is on display in this case, it is not sufficiently distinct from 
passivity to qualify as the target of the causal theory of action. 
 
 
 
10 For example, Velleman (1992) distinguishes between ‘full-blooded human action’ and animal 
behaviour and thinks that only the former ‘[provides] the philosophy of action with its distinctive 
subject matter’ (p.465). Similarly, Bratman (2001) thinks there is a distinction between ‘merely 
motivated behaviour’, which animals may be able to demonstrate, and ‘full-blown agency’, and it 
is the latter that we are seeking an account of.  
  
27 
So, what ‘doings’ are legitimate targets of the causal theory of action? 
Davidson claims that cases where I spill my coffee intentionally – perhaps I hate 
coffee and want to indicate my disgust – are legitimate targets of the causal 
theory of action. Cases where I spill my coffee unintentionally, but only because 
I have made a certain kind of mistake – for instance, when I mistakenly think my 
coffee is tea and spill it to express my disgust for tea – also qualify as targets of 
the causal theory of action. This is because, in the latter example, even though I 
do not spill the coffee intentionally, I intentionally do something, namely, spill 
the contents of my cup (Davidson 1971/2001, p.46). In this thought lies a way 
of delineating the target of the causal theory of action. When an agent does 
something which can be ‘described under an aspect that makes it intentional’ 
(Davidson 1971/2001, p.46), then we have the sort of thing the causal theory of 
action aims to give an account of. In my view, this way of navigating through the 
various contrasts that have something to do with agency to get to the proper 
target of the causal theory of action represents a confusion of two different 
distinctions, both of which are crucial aspects of our concept of agency.  
2.1.1 Activity and Passivity 
The first distinction is the distinction between activity and passivity. Activity is 
the exercise of an active power, i.e. a power to wreak change. Passivity is the 
manifestation of a passive power, or a liability, i.e. a power to undergo or suffer 
change. Active powers are powers to change, and passive powers are powers to 
be changed. Substances which exercise active powers are agents, and substances 
which manifest passive powers are patients. An instance of an exercise of active 
power is an action. An instance of a manifestation of passive power could be 
called a passion. As John Hyman points out, the difference between agent and 
patient is not a difference between two different kinds of substance, it is rather a 
difference between two different roles substances can adopt (2015, p.35). This is 
demonstrated by the fact that one and the same substance can be an agent at 
one time, and a patient at another time – for example, when I push you, I am the 
agent, when you push me back, I am the patient. It is also possible for one and 
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the same substance to be both agent and patient at the same time – for example, 
as Hyman notes, a victim of suicide is both agent and patient.   
The active–passive distinction is thrown into doubt when we consider the 
fact that in many cases when an intuitively active power is manifested, the 
manifestation of this power involves the possessor of the power suffering change 
as well as producing it. For example, when salt is dissolved in water, we may 
intuitively class the power of the water to dissolve the salt as active: the water is 
producing change in the salt. However, the water is also changed by the 
dissolution process, and necessarily so – if the water were not liable to become 
uniformly salty when salt was added to it, then it wouldn’t be possible to 
dissolve salt in water. So, it seems that the intuitively active power of water to 
dissolve salt is also passive. It seems like the distinction between the exercise of 
active power and the manifestation of passive power, and hence the distinction 
between activity and passivity is spurious. At best, the distinction is a matter of 
there being two alternative ways to describe the very same sort of eventuality.  
The solution to this problem is, I think, to reject the idea that for a 
substance to exercise an active power the substance must, in exercising this 
active power, be ‘purely active’, that is, suffer no change at all. Similarly, it is not 
the case that a substance exercising a passive power needs to be ‘purely passive’. 
Erasmus Mayr suggests that ‘the distinction between active and passive powers is 
one of degree, with all powers situated on a more or less continuous spectrum of 
more or less active and passive powers’ (2011, p.204). What this means is that 
some powers are such that when they are exercised the substance in possession 
of the power produces much more change than it undergoes. For example, when 
I squash a grape, the grape is drastically changed, whereas I remain much the 
same. Other powers are such that when they are exercised the substance in 
possession of the power undergoes as much change as it produces – as in the 
case of the water dissolving the salt. The power of the water to dissolve salt is, as 
it were, less active than my power to squash a grape.  
The danger with this solution is that it means that the distinction between 
activity and passivity is not absolute; it also makes the activity-passivity 
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distinction less than fully objective. Whether what a substance is doing is activity 
or passivity is relative to the degree of change it is wreaking and/or undergoing, 
and assessing how much change a substance is wreaking and/or undergoing 
may not be a fully objective matter. How much change one thinks the water 
undergoes when salt dissolves into it may depend on one’s views about the 
nature of water. How big an issue this is depends on what work the activity–
passivity distinction is put to. I will be putting the distinction to work in this 
dissertation when I come to articulate my own view on what agency is in chapter 
5, so I will address this issue in due course.  
2.1.2 Settling and Non-Settling 
The second distinction is more controversial than the first. The second 
distinction is a distinction between two kinds of agency. On the one hand, we 
have the agency of substances which are in control over what is going on. The 
first kind of agency I will call ‘self-movement’, and the substances involved in 
self-movement ‘self-movers’. On the other hand, we have the agency of 
substances which are not in control over what is going on. I will call these 
substances ‘moved-movers’. The former sort of agency I will call ‘settling’ and the 
latter I will call ‘non-settling’.   
I am borrowing the semi-technical term ‘settling’ from Helen Steward 
(2012). For Steward, when an agent acts, certain open questions, like whether 
the agent will φ, how the agent will φ, where the agent will φ, when the agent 
will φ etc, come to have answers. This is settling. In Steward’s view action is 
settling; what it is to act is to settle some matter. Furthermore, Steward argues, 
the existence of settling is inconsistent with universal determinism. I do not 
claim that action is settling, or that settling is incompatible with universal causal 
determinism. However, the concept ‘settling’ is still suitable for my purposes. I 
intend the term ‘settling’ to capture the idea of something’s being left up to the 
agent. Agents capable of settling, i.e. self-movers, are agents for whom some of 
what goes on with them is up to them.  
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To help illustrate the distinction, consider the following examples. When 
a stone is thrown at a window with sufficient force, there is no sense in which it 
is up to the stone whether or not it breaks the window. If the conditions are 
right, i.e. the stone is heavy enough and the glass is thin enough, the stone will 
break the window (provided nothing comes along and interferes, e.g. no-one 
snatches the stone out of the air before it hits the window). The stone may well 
be the thing that is breaking the window, in this way the stone is a ‘mover’ (or 
more precisely, a ‘breaker’), but the stone was ‘moved’ to do so, that is, the stone 
was directed to break the window by some other thing (whatever threw it). A 
robot like Honda’s ASIMO is also, in my opinion, a moved-mover and not a self-
mover. This might seem counterintuitive because, unlike a stone, ASIMO can 
move around and perform various tasks without human intervention. However, 
ASIMO’s movements are strictly governed by his construction and programming. 
To illustrate: ASIMO has two cameras, a laser sensor, an infrared sensor and an 
ultrasound sensor. When information recorded by these sensors conflicts with 
information in ASIMO’s pre-loaded map of navigable paths (e.g. by signalling 
that there is an obstacle in one of these paths) ASIMO cannot but move around 
the obstacle (American Honda Motor Co. Inc. 2017). ASIMO is moved to move 
around the obstacle by his component parts. It is not up to ASIMO what goes on 
with his legs.11 
Often when human beings and many (perhaps all) animals act, there is a 
sense in which what they do is up to them. To help make the idea vivid, imagine 
my friend Amy really wants me to get up and make tea, so she makes sure I’m 
thirsty by giving me something salty to eat, puts a cup and some teabags nicely 
in view, then says “why don’t you have some tea?”. The conditions are right for 
me to get up and make tea. But, Amy’s plan might not come to fruition because, 
 
 
 
11 Although ASIMO is, in my opinion, a moved-mover and not a self-mover, there may be (or 
might be in the future) other robots which are self-movers.  
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even though the conditions are right, I don’t have to get up, I could still stay 
seated. Amy might install some clever machinery to manipulate my brain and 
nervous system and use that to make me get up (in the manner of the character 
Black from Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) thought experiment), but in that case, I 
would cease to be a self-mover and I would become a moved-mover. Amy would 
be taking control over what goes on with me; it would no longer be up to me 
what happens with my body.  
I believe that the distinction between settling and non-settling should be 
spelled out in terms of two-way and one-way powers. I endorse Kim Frost’s 
definition of a two-way power as one which has ‘two fundamental, mutually 
exclusive kinds of exercise’, whereas a one-way power has only one fundamental 
kind of exercise (2013, p.612). The easiest way to spell out this idea is by means 
of an example. In the right circumstances my power to get up is two-way.12 What 
this means is that if I do end up getting up, I am manifesting my two-way 
power; but if I end up not getting up (which might involve actively doing 
something else, but might not – it might involve continuing an activity already in 
progress, or letting something happen to me), I am also manifesting my two-way 
power. Thus, my power to get up, because it is two-way, is sometimes 
manifested by getting up, and sometimes manifested by not getting up. The 
 
 
 
12 While I do not think it is possible to give necessary and sufficient conditions for possession of a 
two-way power, it is possible to say something about what must be the case for an agent to 
possess a two-way power. A necessary condition for having a two-way power to j at a time t, is 
to be able both to j and not j at t, and to have the opportunity both to j and not j at t (Alvarez, 
2013, p.108). If agent A has the ability to j, then she has the right attributes for jing and knows 
how to j (for example, A only has the ability to wave her arms if she has arms and knows how to 
wave them). If A has the opportunity to j, then there is nothing preventing her from jing (for 
example, she is not tied up or injured) – c.f. Kenny (1975, p.133). 
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power has two mutually exclusive kinds of exercise, which I will call positive and 
negative, and only one of these (the positive) is the activity the power is 
specified as a power to do. In the case of one-way powers, when the conditions 
are right for the manifestation of a one-way power, the activity the power is a 
power to do will be engaged in; whereas in the case of two-way powers, when 
the conditions are right for the positive manifestation of a two-way power, the 
two-way power may not be exercised positively – it may be exercised negatively 
– and thus the activity the power is a power to do may not be engaged in. 13 It is 
important to note that while one-way powers can be distinguished into those 
which are active and those which are passive, the active-passive distinction does 
not have application in the case of two-way powers. This is because two-way 
powers are powers to act or refrain, so they are all powers to be active in a 
certain way, or not (which might be to be active in a different way, or might be 
to be passive). 
Steward (2013b) finds the conception of two-way powers as powers with 
two distinct fundamental kinds of manifestation problematic. For Steward, a 
power to j is two-way just in case the agent who possesses the power to j also 
possesses the power not to exercise their power to j (2013b, p.691). Steward 
argues that a conception of two-way powers like mine (and Frost’s) has 
 
 
 
13 I believe possession of a two-way power is compatible with universal causal determinism, 
where universal causal determinism is the thesis that ‘every event is necessitated by antecedent 
events and conditions together with the laws of nature’ (Hoefer, 2016). Compatibilism of two-
way powers and determinism can be established by distinguishing between two sorts of 
possibility: physical possibility and agential possibility. Once physical and agential possibility are 
distinguished, one can argue that while causal determinism entails that past events (perhaps 
together with the laws of nature) close off alternative physical possibilities, they leave open 
alternative agential possibilities, and the latter is all that is entailed by the claim that some 
substance has a two-way power. If agent A has the two-way power to j then both jing and not 
jing must be open agential possibilities for her, but this doesn’t mean that it must be both 
physically possible that the future contains a jing and physically possible that the future does 
not contain a jing. Common to most compatibilist arguments of this type is the idea that facts 
pertinent to what is an agential possibility for some agent are not the same as facts pertinent to 
what is a physical possibility in that situation. C.f. Kenny (1975), Campbell (2005), Kapitan 
(2011), Berofsky (2011), Frost (2013) and List (2014). 
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counterintuitive consequences (2013b, p.691). As Steward notes, it seems to 
entail that in not singing right now while I’m working on this chapter, I am 
exercising my power to sing, albeit negatively. I accept that it is counterintuitive 
to think that in not singing right now, I am exercising my power to sing. It is 
more intuitive to think that my power to sing is dormant while I am working on 
this chapter: it is not being exercised at all. I thus acknowledge that not every 
case where an agent does not j counts as a negative exercise of a two-way 
power to j; not every case of not doing something is a case of refraining from 
doing it. However, I think a conception of two-way powers as powers with two 
mutually exclusive kinds of exercise is compatible with the fact that not every 
case of not doing something is a case of refraining from doing it.  
As long as one can say something about how to distinguish cases where a 
two-way power to act is exercised negatively from cases where the power to act 
is just not exercised at all, then one is permitted to claim that there’s more to 
exercising a two-way power to j negatively than simply not jing. I doubt that 
there is a completely general way to distinguish cases where an agent exercises 
her two-way power to j negatively from cases where an agent’s not jing does 
not count as a negative exercise of her two-way power to j. This is because what 
it takes for some instance of not acting in a certain way to count as refraining 
from acting in that way might depend on the type of action in question. For 
example, the fact that I am consciously aware of my cup of coffee might be 
sufficient for my not reaching for the cup to count as a negative exercise of two-
way power to reach for it. But for my not singing right now to count as a 
negative exercise of two-way power to sing, I may need indexical knowledge 
that the circumstances I am in are circumstances in which I could (or should) be 
singing. In all cases of refrainment, I think some sort of awareness of what one 
could be doing is required, but precisely what sort of awareness is required 
differs depending on the type of action in question. 
These two distinctions – between activity and passivity, and between 
settling and non-settling – are, I believe, fundamental to our conception of 
agency. Competence with the agency concept demands that one have some 
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grasp of these two distinctions. The agency concept has something to do with 
the idea of agents as things which intervene, as determiners of what goes on, as 
bringers-about of change. It seems to me that the concept agent is kindred with 
causation, production, activity, and action. The activity–passivity distinction is 
also a way of clarifying the distinction between what one does and what 
happens to one, which is the most mundane and common way to expressing the 
distinction between actions and ‘mere happenings’. At the same time, it seems to 
me that one hasn’t really mastered the concept of agency until one has 
recognised the difference between things that just lie there until something else 
comes along and prods them into action, and things which, sometimes with 
effort, move themselves about. This is because, as well as being kindred with 
concepts like causation, agent is associated with ethical concepts like 
responsibility and blameworthiness. As Hyman (2015) puts it, some instantiations 
of agency have an ‘ethical dimension’ as well as a ‘physical dimension’. It is of 
great ethical significance that some things are, as it were, victims of their 
circumstances: their actions are not up to them, whereas other things are 
somewhat independent from their circumstances. I do not think the settling–
non-setting distinction is one and the same as the free–unfree distinction, 
because I think it takes a lot more for an action to be free than for it to be up to 
one. If a mugger threatens to kill me unless I hand over my wallet, then, when I 
acquiesce, I am not acting freely, even though I had the ability and opportunity 
not to hand over my wallet and face the dire consequences. But having a two-
way power to j is a necessary condition for jing freely: if the movements of 
your body are being controlled by some other substance, then you are not freely 
making them. It is therefore very important to us that the settling–non-settling 
distinction is real.  
The causal theory of action fails to keep these two distinctions apart. It 
confuses settling with activity, and non-settling with passivity. In conflating 
these two distinctions, the causal theory of action ends up failing as an account 
of agency, a failure which is demonstrated by two key errors made by the 
theory. Firstly, the core claim of the causal theory of action entails that some 
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examples of activity fail to count as agency at all, thus the link between agency 
and activity is broken. Secondly, the theory cannot accommodate the fact that 
self-movers can exercise their agential powers by remaining passive, thus the 
link between agency and settling is also broken.  
2.2 Not All Agents Are Human  
The fundamental claim of the causal theory of action is that the agent’s 
involvement in the causality of action can be reduced to the agent’s mental 
state’s involvement in the causation of an action. Proponents of the causal theory 
of action can grant that to be an agent is to be something which brings about 
change, they only insist that for an agent to be something which brings about 
change is for the mental states of that agent – or mental events involving that 
agent – to cause an event. The causal theory of action thus ties agency to 
mentality. However, there seem to be cases of agency which do not involve 
causation by a mental state or mental event, or at least not by the kind of mental 
state which could rationalise the action it supposedly causes. These cases fall 
into three inexact groups: actions of inanimate objects, actions of animals and 
human actions which are either ‘sub-intentional’ or spontaneous expressions of 
emotion.  
2.2.1 Actions of Inanimate Objects 
If what it is to act is for one’s mental states to cause a bodily movement, then 
substances which do not possess mental states cannot be agents. This means that 
inanimate objects cannot be agents. So, for example, when the stove heats the 
soup, its heating of the soup is not really an action. As Hyman points out, 
denying that inanimate objects can act is at odds with the language we use to 
report actions. We typically report actions by means of causative verbs like 
‘melt’, ‘burn’, and ‘pump’. But we say things like ‘the acid melted the beaker’ or 
‘the poker burnt the cloth’, ‘his heart pumped blood’, just as readily as we say 
‘the cook melted the butter’, or ‘the criminal burnt the evidence’, or ‘the man 
pumped the water’. And, as Hyman (2015, pp.30-31) has argued, it is 
implausible to think that these verbs have different meanings when they are 
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used to report what inanimate things have done and when they are used to 
report what human beings have done.   
2.2.2 Actions of Animals 
The causal theory of action’s focus on mentality may also rule out animal 
agency. Since the causal theory of action is motivated by Davidson’s (1963) 
argument that rationalising explanations are causal explanations, if the causal 
theory is correct, then the possibility of animal agency would seem to depend on 
whether animals’ bodily movements can be causally attributed to mental states 
such as believing or desiring – mental states whose contents could rationalise the 
kind of bodily movement the animal performs. However, it is not obvious that 
animals possess mental states sophisticated enough to serve as rationalisations 
of their actions. If it is not true that an animal acts because it wants to achieve 
something and believes that so acting is a way to achieve its aims, then we have 
no basis on which to conclude that the animal’s action was caused by its belief or 
desire. Perhaps such scepticism about the rational capacities of animals is 
unwarranted. However, the important point here is that while we might be 
unsure about whether animals can act on beliefs and desires, it is a much greater 
test of credibility to deny that animals act at all.  
2.2.3 Sub-intentional Action and Expressions of Emotion 
Brian O’Shaughnessy delineates a class of actions he calls ‘sub-intentional’. Sub-
intentional actions include actions like ‘tapping my feet to the music’ and ‘idly 
moving my tongue in my mouth’ (1980, p.61). Other examples may include 
shifting one’s position, automatically scratching an itch, or fiddling with one’s 
hair. Whether such examples can really be regarded as lacking intentionality is 
open to question. However, what does seem right is that actions like 
unthinkingly tapping one’s foot to music, or shifting one’s position, or fiddling 
with one’s hair do not seem to be preceded by or accompanied by (and hence 
not caused by) an intentional state such as believing that performing the action 
is a good idea, or wanting to achieve something by means of the action. 
O’Shaughnessy acknowledges, rightly I think, that sub-intentional actions are 
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subject to psychological explanations. For example, O’Shaughnessy suggests that 
sub-intentional actions might be explained in terms of feelings of restlessness 
(p.61). When I shift my position, it is usually because I feel uncomfortable – my 
action can thus be explained in terms of a feeling. Nevertheless, sub-intentional 
actions are not performed to achieve any thought-of goal. They cannot be 
rationalised by facts about what the agent wants to do and what the agent 
believes about how to do it, because they are not actions which seem, to the 
agent at the time of performing them, like sensible, or rational or good things to 
do. At the time of the performing a sub-intentional action, the agent is often not 
aware that she is performing the action at all. Because sub-intentional actions 
are not accompanied by an intentional state, and cannot be rationalised, they 
will not count as actions at all according to the causal theory of action.  
Another class of human actions which are potential counterexamples to 
the causal theory of action are spontaneous expressions of emotion (Hursthouse, 
1991). Like sub-intentional actions, it is doubtful that spontaneous expressions 
of emotion can be rationalised: when we embrace a loved-one, or cry upon 
hearing bad news, we do not do these things because it is sensible, or rational, 
or good to do so. Such actions do not seem to be accompanied by a mental state 
which could be considered a Davidsonian ‘primary reason’. However, 
spontaneous expressions of emotion are certainly actions. 
2.2.4 Weakening the Conditions  
There are three sorts of reply a causal theorist could offer in response to the 
three sorts of counterexample I have just described. First, the causal theorist 
might weaken the conditions which must be met for a bodily movement to count 
as an action. The causal theorist might suggest that rather than require that a 
bodily movement be caused by a mental state of the sort that could rationalise 
the bodily movement, a bodily movement only needs to be caused by some 
mental state or other to count as an action. This strategy works best in response 
to the third class of counterexamples: sub-intentional actions and spontaneous 
expressions of emotion. This is because both sub-intentional action and 
spontaneous expressions of emotion are (plausibly) subject to psychological 
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explanation, if not rationalising explanation. It is plausible to suggest that even 
though sub-intentional actions and spontaneous expressions of emotion are not 
accompanied by (and hence not caused by) intentional states, they are 
accompanied by (and hence possibly caused by) other sorts of psychological 
state.  
However, for this response to be viable, we need a new argument for the 
conclusion that sub-intentional actions and spontaneous expressions of emotion 
are not only explained by psychological states but are also stand to such states as 
effect to cause. Davidson’s (1963) argument provided reason to think that 
actions subject to rationalising explanations are caused by the mental states 
whose contents rationalise the action.14 But Davidson’s (1963) argument 
concerned rationalising explanations specifically – not psychological 
explanations more generally. Someone who wants to hold that sub-intentional 
actions and expressions of emotion are actions because they are caused by 
psychological states must provide a new argument showing that the existence of 
sub-intentional actions or expressions of emotion conceptually entails the 
existence of causation of a bodily movement by a psychological state. This 
cannot be simply assumed. Steward suggests that one might be tempted to 
assume that sub-intentional actions and spontaneous expressions of emotion, if 
they really are actions at all, stand to mental states as effect to cause, because 
one thinks that ‘unless there is some reason to suppose that a movement is in 
some sense the product of something mental, there can be no reason to think it 
should be associated in any special way with the self, with the agent’ (2009, 
p.303). But reducing the agent’s involvement in the causality of their action to 
the agent’s mentality’s involvement is the core thesis of the causal theory of 
action, hence it must be argued for.   
 
 
 
14 Again, this is not to say that Davidson’s argument is sound – see chapter 6.  
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Another problem with this type of reply is that even after weakening the 
conditions for action so that bodily movements count as actions just in case they 
are caused (in the right way) by some psychological state or other, actions by 
inanimate objects will still constitute counterexamples to the causal theory of 
action as these actions are not subject to psychological explanation. Animal 
actions may also still constitute counterexamples, as long as it remains plausible 
to argue that the actions of animals are not subject to psychological explanation.  
2.2.5 Rejecting the Counterexamples 
A second sort of reply available to the causal theorist is to deny that the 
behaviours described in my counterexamples qualify as actions – or at least not 
‘full-blooded actions’. If such behaviours count as actions at all, then they are 
‘actions’ of a lesser kind, and not the sort of actions which the causal theory of 
action seeks to give an account of (c.f. Velleman, 1992 and Bratman, 2001). 
Adherents of the causal theory of action may deny that the examples given in 
sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 are cases where we have an action that nevertheless fails 
to satisfy the conditions for action proposed by the causal theory, because they 
will deny that these examples are actions at all. This reply is most intuitively 
plausible in response to the first sort of counterexample, and so I will assume 
that if it can be shown that causal theorists are wrong to deny that inanimate 
objects can act, one can take it for granted that it is wrong to deny that animals 
can act, and wrong to deny that sub-intentional actions and spontaneous 
expressions of emotion are real actions.  
To show that it is wrong to deny that inanimate objects can act, let me 
first point out that if the behaviours of inanimate objects are not really actions, 
then our everyday practice of extending the agency concept to them must be 
anthropomorphic or metaphorical or careless. I do not think it is 
anthropomorphic or metaphorical or careless to speak of inanimate objects as 
agents. I shall argue in this section that the actions of inanimate objects only 
seem like they are not real actions when the activity-passivity distinction is 
confused with the settling-non-settling distinction, or more precisely, when the 
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exercise of one-way power is confused with passivity and exercise of two-way 
power is confused with activity.  
Many philosophers have confused activity and settling. For example, 
Locke argued that the origin of our idea of passive power comes from our 
observations of bodies undergoing change. Passion, i.e. the exercise of passive 
power, is something we can directly perceive, but action, which Locke rightly 
took to be the exercise of active power, couldn’t be perceived. Locke thought 
that we couldn’t directly observe the active production of change. According to 
Locke, the idea of active power comes from our experience of bringing things 
about because we choose to. However, for Locke, the power we discover only by 
observing it at work in ourselves is ‘the power to begin or forbear’: 
This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a Power to begin or 
forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motion of our 
Bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were 
commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. (1975, 
p.236) 
It seems from this passage that it is in fact a two-way power, or a power to settle 
what one does, which Locke is claiming can only be observed in ourselves when 
we act voluntarily, and cannot be observed in material bodies.  
Locke may be right to think that our concept of two-way power is not a 
concept that can be gained from perception alone – acquisition of this concept 
may well require ‘reflection on what passes in ourselves’ (1975, p.235). Consider 
again the case where I get up to make tea of my own accord, as compared with 
the case where Amy uses her brain-manipulation device to remotely control the 
movements of my body: it is possible to imagine that Amy’s device is so 
sophisticated that the case where she controls my body is perceptually 
indistinguishable from the case where I get up of my own accord. This shows 
that exercises of two-way power do not come with a distinctive perceptual 
marker (which is not to say that, in most cases, there aren’t perceptual clues, or 
rules of thumb, which enable us to work out whether a two-way power is 
exercised or not). On the other hand, there is certainly a phenomenological 
  
41 
difference between cases where I move my body voluntarily and cases where my 
body moves due to some involuntary spasm – this phenomenological difference 
may be the source of our idea of two-way power.  
However, even if Locke was right to think that acquisition of the concept 
of two-way power requires ‘reflection on what passes in ourselves’, Locke was 
wrong to conclude from this that we cannot directly perceive active powers being 
exercised by material bodies. Active power and two-way power are not the same 
thing. Furthermore, activity and passivity are two sides of the same coin: a 
substance cannot manifest a passive power or liability unless some substance is 
manifesting an active power or ability. It is plausible to think that if we can 
directly perceive one, we can directly perceive the other. It seems that Locke 
confused active power with two-way power.  
In my opinion, it is not only seventeenth century philosophers who make 
this confusion. Many twentieth century philosophers assume that substances 
which are ‘moved to move’ are not really active. In other words, they assume 
that when a substance is directed to cause some change by some other substance 
acting upon it, as the stone is when someone throws it, this substance is not 
active, but passive.  
Agent-causationists, who maintain that an irreducible notion of agent 
causation is essential for understanding agency, explicitly make this assumption. 
For example, Richard Taylor commits himself to the view that inanimate objects 
are never truly active and are never agents: ‘a man is sometimes an agent who 
originates a change, and is not, like a match, merely a passive object which 
undergoes change in response to other changes’ (1966, p.122). Taylor denies 
that a match can be an agent because a match cannot ‘wreak changes in itself’, 
what a match does is always a response to the circumstances it is in and what’s 
acting upon it. A man, in contrast, ‘can bring about such a change as a motion of 
his arm quite by himself’ (p.122). I think the notion of ‘wreaking changes in 
oneself’ is parallel to the notion of self-movement. So, Taylor is claiming, rightly, 
that inanimate objects like matches are not self-movers. However, Taylor takes 
this to imply that inanimate objects are not agents and are not active.  
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Furthermore, Hyman (2015) suggests that twentieth century philosophers 
have confused activity with voluntariness. For example, Hyman quotes Ryle:  
Very often we oppose things done voluntarily to things suffered under 
compulsion. Some soldiers are volunteers, others are conscripts; some 
yachtsmen go out to sea voluntarily, others are carried out to sea by the 
wind and tide. […] So sometimes the question ‘Voluntary or involuntary?’ 
means ‘Did the person do it or was it done to him?’ (Ryle, 1949, pp.73-74) 
Granted, an action’s being voluntary is not the same as an action’s being an 
exercise of two-way power. Hyman defines voluntariness in the following way: 
‘an act is voluntary if it is due to choice as opposed to ignorance or compulsion’ 
(2015, p.7). So, ignorance and compulsion cancel voluntariness. However, 
ignorance and compulsion may not strip an agent of two-way power. Whether 
ignorance or compulsion strips an agent of two-way power depends on the 
nature of the ignorance or compulsion. For example, if I kick off the covers in my 
sleep, I do not do so knowingly, but in this case, my total lack of awareness 
strips me of a two-way power to kick off the covers – if my leg moves the right 
way I will kick off the covers, if it doesn’t, I won’t; in either case, it won’t be up 
to me. However, if I do not realise I am tapping my foot because I am not paying 
attention, it is less clear that this ignorance strips me of two-way power to tap 
my foot even though it does render my tapping non-voluntary. Similarly, if I am 
compelled to spill my coffee because you jiggle my hand, you strip me of the 
power not to spill my coffee – this kind of compulsion robs me of my two-way 
power. However, when a mugger compels me to give me his wallet by 
threatening to kill me, I do not lose my two-way power, even though when I 
hand over my wallet, I do not do so voluntarily. So, an action can be an example 
of settling without being an example of voluntariness. However, voluntariness is 
not always distinguished from settling: sometimes ‘voluntary’ is taken to be 
synonymous with ‘up to the agent’. When Ryle states that ‘sometimes the 
question ‘Voluntary or involuntary?’ means ‘Did the person do it or was it done 
to him?’’ the sense of ‘voluntary’ he has in mind is supposed to mean ‘not forced 
to’ in the way that a yachtsman might be forced out to sea, and not in the way a 
conscript is forced to join the army (p.74). So, it is plausible that, at least 
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sometimes, when philosophers contrast voluntariness with passivity, they are 
also contrasting settling with passivity, and hence presupposing that anything 
that is not up to us is something we undergo.  
Evidence that causal theorists also assume that substances which are 
‘moved to move’ are not really active can be found in their claim that actions are 
bodily movements. Causal theorists, following Davidson, take actions to be 
movements of one’s body. Agential power is, first and foremost, a power to move 
one’s body. If ‘one’ and ‘one’s body’ are taken to be one and the same, then 
defining actions as movements of one’s body already assumes that all action is 
self-movement. And even if ‘one’ and ‘one’s body’ are distinguished – for 
example, if ‘one’ is taken to be a person considered as something which has a 
body but which is not identical with it – assuming that action is movement of 
one’s body rules out the possibility that substances which cannot be said to have 
bodies can act. So, implicit in the causalist’s claim that actions are bodily 
movements, is the assumption that activity is self-movement, and moved-
movement is passivity.  
If one thinks that only two-way powers are active powers, and non-
settling action is really passivity, then one will naturally suppose that the target 
of theory of action will not include actions by inanimate objects, and hence, one 
will not think these examples are counterexamples to the causal theory of action. 
However, it is a fallacy to conclude from the fact that some substance in certain 
circumstances cannot exercise two-way powers that this substance cannot 
exercise active powers. The causal theory of action assumes from the outset that 
the target of a theory of agency, or action as such, needs to be delineated via the 
concept of intention, or ‘intentional under a description’, because the actions of 
inanimate objects, animals, and (perhaps) some sub-intentional action and 
spontaneous expressions of emotion are not sufficiently distinct from passivity to 
qualify as the target of a theory of action. But it is wrong to presuppose that 
when a substance does not personally control what goes on with them this is not 
activity, and hence it is wrong to exclude the examples given in sections 2.2.1 to 
2.2.3 as targets of a theory of action.  
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2.2.6 Limiting the Scope of the Causal Theory of Action  
A third way a causal theorist might respond to the three sorts of counterexample 
described above is to accept the counterexamples but deny that the causal theory 
of action was ever meant to be a theory of action in its most general sense. 
Causal theorists can claim that the causal theory of action is meant only as a 
metaphysical account of a special kind of action. Indeed, the causal theory of 
action is usually presented as a theory of specifically intentional action.15 
According to this response, the causal theory of action does not seek to answer 
the question ‘what makes an event an instance of agency?’, rather it seeks to 
answer the more specific question ‘what makes an event an instance of 
intentional agency?’. The causal theory of action claims only that intentional 
agency is nothing over and above some special kind of event-causation, and the 
agent’s involvement in the causality of intentional action can be reduced to the 
agent’s mental state’s involvement in the causation of an (intentional) action.  
Insisting that it is only intentional agency, and not agency more generally, 
which reduces to a special kind of event-causation (namely the kind that involves 
mental events and states), is not necessarily to give up on the idea that agency in 
general is nothing over and above event-causation. I have already noted that the 
fact that the agency concept cannot be analysed in terms of event-causation 
doesn’t rule out the possibility that the worldly phenomenon covered by the 
agency concept is nothing over and above event-causation. It is possible for 
adherents of the causal theory of action to maintain that, ontologically speaking, 
all agency is nothing over and above event-causation, but conceptually speaking, 
agency-in-general is a primitive notion. That is, causal theorists could maintain 
that agency as such is not associated with any special kind of event-causation, 
 
 
 
15 As indicated by its title, Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior, Mele’s 1992 
book on the causal theory of action specifically concerns intentional activity. In his 2003 book, 
Motivation and Agency, Mele seeks only to defend ‘a popular causal perspective on intentional 
action’, not action more generally (p.5).  
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even though every instance of agency is nothing but some sort of event-
causation or other. The concept of agency cannot be understood in terms of any 
special kind of event-causation – but whenever agency is demonstrated, that 
eventuality is nothing more than some form of event-causation.  
The trouble with this response is that it weakens the case for thinking that 
agency reduces to event-causation. If there is just no saying what sort of event-
causation is agency and what sort is not, why should we believe that agency 
reduces to event-causation at all? One reason might be to avoid ontologically 
profligate metaphysical theories. However, in this case ontological economy 
comes with a significant explanatory cost, which is that we are forced to concede 
that agency is a primitive concept, that is, we can say nothing about what it is 
for something to be an agent.   
2.3 Intentional and Voluntary Passivity  
The second error of the causal theory of action is its failure to accommodate the 
fact that, for some agents, their agential power can be demonstrated in passivity 
as well as in activity. The agents who can demonstrate their agential power in 
passivity as well as in activity are self-movers, i.e. agents who possess two-way 
powers to act. As stated above, two-way powers are powers with both a positive 
and negative manifestation. A two-way power to j is manifested positively when 
the agent j’s and is manifested negatively when the agent does not j. This 
means that two-way powers can be manifested by agents who remain passive. As 
mentioned above, not every case where an agent does not j counts as a negative 
exercise of her two-way power to j. Some important examples of failures to act 
which do count however are cases of intentionally refraining from performing 
some action, and voluntarily allowing something to be done to one.  
Hornsby and Hyman have noted the importance of intentional 
refrainment and voluntary passivity. Hornsby has also suggested that intentional 
refrainment fits poorly within the causal theory of action’s account of agency. 
Hornsby uses examples of intentional refrainment to show that agency can be 
demonstrated even when there is no action:  
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But someone can do something intentionally without there being any action 
that is their doing the thing. Consider A who decides she shouldn’t take a 
chocolate, and refrains from moving her arm towards the box; or B who 
doesn’t want to be disturbed by answering calls, and lets the telephone carry 
on ringing; or C who, being irritated by someone, pays that person no 
attention. Imagining that each of these things is intentionally done ensures 
that we have examples of agency in a sense that Davidson’s claim brought 
out. But since in these cases, A, B and C don’t move their bodies, we have 
examples which the standard story doesn’t speak to. (2004a, p.5) 
In these three cases, the agent’s demonstration of agential power is not an action 
in the sense of a ‘positive performance’. In these examples, there is no action, so 
what makes these cases demonstrations of agency cannot be expressed in terms 
of the mental causation of an action. This means that the causal theory of action 
is unable to explain what makes these cases examples of agency.  
Hyman (2015, pp.10-11) uses an example of a child being picked up by a 
parent to show that sometimes passivity is voluntary – with respect to being 
picked up, the child is passive, but being picked up is voluntary for the child. I 
think that this example is also an example of a two-way power being manifested 
negatively: specifically, the child is manifesting her two-way power to resist 
being picked up (e.g. by pushing away the parent) negatively. So, even though 
the child is, so to speak, not doing anything, but rather, letting something 
happen to her, she is demonstrating an agential power. In this case, there is an 
action, but it is the action of the parent not the child. So, it seems impossible to 
explain how this action is an exercise of the child’s agential powers by pointing to 
the action’s standing in a causal relation to the child’s mental states, as the 
causal theory of action would have one do, while at the same acknowledging 
that the action is not an action of the child. The correct way to describe the 
agency of this example is, I think, as follows: a single event, the child’s being 
picked up by its parent, is an instance of an exercise of active power on the part 
of the parent, and of passive power on the part of the child, and it is an instance 
of the parent’s two-way power to pick a child up, and of the child’s two-way 
power to resist being picked up. In other words, to correctly describe the agency 
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demonstrated in this example, one needs to talk about the various causal powers 
which are exercised by the two substances involved; one cannot only talk about 
what events are causally related to what other events.  
Cases like Hornsby’s and Hymans’s are not counterexamples to the causal 
theory of action, rather, they are examples which indicate that the causal theory 
of action cannot possibly tell the whole story about agency in terms of causation 
of an action by a mental event. As Hornsby puts it, ‘perhaps that view – of 
causality operating through items linked in causal chains – is the correct view of 
causal truths in some areas’, but examples of agency where there is no ‘positive 
performance’ suggest that ‘the truths that make up the phenomenon of agency 
seem not to belong in a world in which causality operates only in such a manner’ 
(2004a, p.10). The basic point here is that by attempting to reduce the agent’s 
involvement in the causality of action to the agent’s mental state’s involvement 
in the causation of an action, the causal theory of action cannot accommodate 
the fact that self-movers can exercise their agential powers by remaining passive, 
and hence by not bringing about an action.  
A causal theorist might respond to this objection by once again limiting 
the scope of their theory. They may claim that the causal theory of action is only 
an account of action, and not voluntary passivity or intentional refrainment. 
However, as Hornsby points out, this response will not work as long as the 
adherent of the causal theory of action takes agency to be delineated by its 
appropriateness for receiving rationalising explanations. This is because: ‘A’s, B’s 
and C’s cases count as agency on this reckoning, because one can construct tales 
of what each of them believed and desired which will appropriately explain their 
doing their things – not moving, letting the phone ring, not paying attention to 
X’ (2004a, pp.6-7). And, it would do no good to insist that rationalising 
explanations of actions come in two sorts, because ‘when we ask why someone 
did something, expecting to learn about what they thought or wanted, we don’t 
always need to consider whether or not there was a positive performance on 
their part; explanation can carry on in the same vein, whether there was or not’ 
(p.7).   
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2.4 The Disappearing Agent 
I have argued that the causal theory of action cannot accommodate two facts 
about agency. First, the causal theory of action wrongly entails that inanimate 
objects, and animals, and human beings when their actions cannot be causally 
traced back to any intentional state, do not act. I argued that causal theorists 
have failed to see this as an error of their theory, because they have confused 
activity with self-movement – that is, with the agency of substances which 
personally control what is going on with them – and taken the agency of 
substances which do not personally control what they do to be no different from 
passivity. Second, the causal theory of action cannot accommodate the fact that, 
some agents, namely agents who possess two-way powers to act, can exercise 
their agential power by remaining passive. In this section, I will explain why the 
source of these two errors is the causal theory of action’s reductive ambitions. To 
explain how it can be that the agency concept covers the ‘doings’ of inanimate 
objects and animals as well as the ‘doings’ of human beings and that for some 
agents, their agential power can be demonstrated in passivity as well as in 
activity, one must accept what the causal theory of action denies, namely that 
the exercise of agential power cannot be reduced to a special kind of event-
causation.  
Several philosophers have raised an objection against the causal theory of 
action which has come to be known as ‘the disappearing agent problem’. 
According to this objection, it is an essential part of our concept of agency is 
that, in acting, the agent herself brings about changes, but on the causal theory 
of action the agent is merely the area within which mental states or events cause 
bodily movements. In other words, in the causal theory of action’s metaphysical 
articulation of the causality of action, the agent herself ‘disappears’, and this 
cannot be right, because a world where agents themselves play no causal role in 
bringing about the results of their actions is a world where there are no actions. 
For example, Abraham Melden complained that:  
It is futile to attempt to explain conduct through the causal efficacy of desire 
– all that can explain is further happenings, not actions performed by agents. 
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The agent confronting the causal nexus in which such happenings occur is a 
helpless victim of all that occurs in and to him. There is no place in this 
picture of the proceedings either for rational appetite or desires, or even for 
the conduct that was to have been explained by reference to them. (1961, 
pp.128-129)  
Thomas Nagel suggested that when causal reality is viewed as nothing but 
chains of causally related events, ‘everything I do or that anyone else does is part 
of a larger course of events that no one “does” but that happens’ (1986, p.113), 
and ‘the agent and everything about him seems to be swallowed up by the 
circumstances of action; nothing of him is left to intervene in those 
circumstances’ (1986, p.114). And Hornsby has argued that ‘agency cannot be 
portrayed in a picture containing only psychological states and occurrences and 
no agent making any difference to anything’ (2004a, p.12). As she puts it 
elsewhere: 
The role of agents in a world of events is evident only when it is appreciated 
that agents cause things – things that ensue from their actions. It seems 
unthinkable that agency should be manifest from any point of view from 
which it is impossible to locate agents. (2004b, p.176)  
It might seem to an adherent of the causal theory of action that the 
disappearing agent problem is begging the question. The core proposal of the 
causal theory of action is that agency can be located in a world where causal 
reality consists of nothing but chains of causally related events. Causalists 
theorise that for an agent to be something which brings about change is for the 
mental states or events of that agent to cause an event. The disappearing agent 
problem can seem like a straightforward denial of the causal theory of action’s 
core proposal.  
However, I do not think that the disappearing agent problem begs the 
question against the causal theory of action. Rather, the disappearing agent 
problem is the correct diagnosis of the difficulties the causal theory of action 
faces, such as wrongly entailing that agency cannot be found where 
  
50 
intentionality is lacking, and being unable to accommodate the fact that some 
agential powers can be manifested in passivity.  
If one assumes that causal reality is nothing more than a chain of causally 
related events, and therefore that the causal truths about agency are truths 
concerning causation of and by certain events, then any distinction crucial to our 
conception of agency must be a distinction between different types of event-
causation. This is why the distinction between intentional actions and other 
events becomes very important, because there is some plausibility to the idea 
that causation by mental states or events is key to understanding this 
distinction.16 But even if the distinction between intentional action and non-
intentional action is best understood via the notion of causation by mental states 
or events, it is a mistake to think that understanding this distinction is to 
understand the distinction between what is agency and what is not – because 
not all agency is intentional. However, if agency is not understood in terms of 
event-causation of a special kind, then the causal theorist, because of his 
metaphysical commitments, is forced to say that the agency concept cannot be 
understood in other terms at all. The metaphysics of causation presupposed by 
the causal theory of action compels an action theorist to seek to either 
understand agency in terms of a distinction between different types of event-
causation or to admit that agency is a primitive concept which cannot be 
understood in other terms at all.  
Furthermore, if one assumes that for a substance to be something which 
exercises agential power is for the mental states or events of that substance to 
cause an event, then there appears to be no way to explain how it can be that 
sometimes substances exert personal control over what goes on even while they 
remain passive. If being a substance capable of agency is just to possess mental 
state which cause actions to happen, then how can we account for the fact that 
 
 
 
16 Although I will question this proposal in chapter 7.  
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some substances demonstrate their agency even when they do not perform an 
action, but instead allow things to be done to them?  
To understand how it can be that the agency concept covers the ‘doings’ 
of inanimate objects and animals as well as the ‘doings’ of human beings, and 
that for some agents their agential power can be demonstrated in passivity as 
well as in activity, it is necessary to make the two distinctions I described in 
section 2.1. To understand how it can be that both the stove, when it heats the 
soup, and the child, when his parent picks him up, are demonstrating agential 
power, one must distinguish between active and passive powers and between 
one-way and two-way powers. The idea that understanding agency requires 
making multiple distinctions between different types of power fits poorly with 
the causal theory of action’s ambition to understand agency via a single divide: 
between event-causal sequences that involve intentional states and those which 
do not.  
What this suggests is that seeking to understand agency in terms of a 
distinction between different types of event-causation cannot be done without 
misconstruing the agency concept. To avoid misconstruing the agency concept 
one must accept that the exercise of agential power cannot be reduced to a 
special kind of event-causation. Instead, one must accept that, as Hornsby puts 
it, ‘human beings are actually ineliminable from an account of their agency’ 
(2004b, p.182). One must acknowledge that, in acting, the agent herself plays a 
causal role and attempting to reduce the agent’s involvement in the causality of 
her action to her mental states’ involvement in the causation of her action is to 
render the agent merely the setting for events to cause other events.  
Hornsby (2004a, 2012) has argued that what’s needed to properly 
understand the causality of agency – and in particular to recognise the essential 
role of the agent in the causality of action – is a metaphysical framework which 
provides intellectual space for thinking of causation as something other than a 
relation between events. Without such a framework, it is impossible to see how 
the causality of action might be something other than a causal relation between 
mental event and action, and instead something that casts the agent as a causal 
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player, rather than merely the setting for events to cause other events. In other 
words, Hornsby suggests that to properly understand agency we must make a 
radical departure from the Humean approach to causation which the causal 
theory of action presupposes. I agree, and it will be the aim of chapters 2-5 to 
outline an alternative to the Humean approach to causation and show how this 
enables a more successful understanding of agency.  
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3  
The Humean Approach to Causation  
The causal theory of action presupposes a metaphysics where causation is 
always, everywhere a relation between events. This approach to causation 
compels the causal theorist to seek to understand agency in terms of a 
distinction between different types of event-causation. However, I argued in the 
previous chapter that the causal theory of action misconceives agency. I 
suggested that an adequate theory of agency would have to accept what the 
causal theory of action denies, namely that the exercise of agential power cannot 
be reduced to a special kind of event-causation. In other words, presupposing 
that causal reality is nothing more than a chain of causally related events, and 
then trying to locate agency within this worldview, will not succeed; a 
worldview where causal reality is nothing more than a chain of causally related 
events is one which eliminates agency.  
The purpose of this chapter is to articulate the approach to causation 
presupposed by the causal theory of action. I call this approach to causation the 
‘Humean’ approach because it can be seen as inspired by Hume’s discussion of 
causation. In section 3.1, I will describe three essential commitments of the 
Humean approach, and show how two theories often described as Humean, the 
regularity theory of causation and David Lewis’s counterfactual theory of 
causation, abide by these commitments. In section 3.2, I will discuss some 
prominent theories of causation which reject some, but not all, of the 
commitments which characterise the Humean approach. In section 3.3, I will 
outline my preferred non-Humean view, which rejects all three commitments of 
the Humean approach.  
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3.1 The Humean Approach 
A theory of causation follows what I’m calling ‘the Humean approach to 
causation’ if and only if the theory incorporates and embraces commitment to 
the following three theses:  
i. Reductivism – causation, as it exists in the world independently of our thinking 
about it or knowledge of it, is exhaustively constituted by non-causal states of 
affairs. 
ii. Denial of Powers – a primitive concept of power (that is, one that cannot be 
analysed or understood in other terms) is not needed to understand the nature 
of causation.  
iii. Relationalism – causation is always and everywhere a relation; the worldly 
phenomenon which is referred to by our concept ‘causation’ is not ontologically 
diverse.   
Although I have called the approach to causation characterised by 
commitment to these three theses ‘Humean’, it is actually unclear whether Hume 
himself really subscribed to them. For example, Galen Strawson (1989) argues 
that Hume was not a reductivist about causation. This interpretation of Hume is 
controversial,17 but it is worth remembering that, although I’m calling the 
approach to causation characterised by commitment to Reductionism, Denial of 
Powers and Relationalism ‘Humean’, Hume himself might not have endorsed a 
‘Humean’ theory. 
Hume thought that the proper aim of empirical science was to systematise 
and codify observable events by devising laws which summarise general 
patterns. However, Hume doubted that this system of laws provided a basis for 
even probable conjectures about how events will play out in the future. Laws of 
nature do not provide us with any kind of insight which might tell us why 
certain events regularly follow on from others, which we could use to predict 
 
 
 
17 See Millican (2007) and Beebee (2007). 
  
55 
how unobserved events will unfold. Hume acknowledged that we instinctively 
think unobserved cases will be like observed cases, but he argued that this 
thought has no rational basis – it is just a psychological habit of ours. In 
particular, Hume denied that we have knowledge of any underlying powers 
possessed by things, which might explain why certain events must follow from 
certain others.   
The idea that there are necessitating connections in nature, whereby an 
object with certain powers ‘must’ behave in certain ways in certain conditions, is 
not ‘in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori’ (1975, p.27) because, as 
Hume rightly recognised, it is never logically or metaphysically necessary that an 
object with certain powers will behave in certain ways, even when the 
conditions are right for the object’s powers to be manifested, because it is always 
possible that something could intervene and prevent the object from producing 
its usual effect. For example, it is not logically or metaphysically necessary that 
when I drop my pen it will hit the ground, even though that is what I expect will 
happen, because, as unlikely as it may be, a sudden gust of wind could pick the 
pen up and deposit it on the table, or my cat might run to it and catch it before it 
hit the ground. Interventions are always possible, so we cannot deduce a priori 
what an object will do from what the object is like.  
Hume also argued that efficacy, or power, or necessitation between cause 
and effect, is not an aspect of the external world which we can experience. 
Powers which actuate the operation of things are never directly experienced, 
according to Hume. We can perceive a thing’s properties, what it is like, but not 
what it is capable of doing. The necessary connections the operation of such 
powers would give rise to are also never perceived. According to Hume: ‘one 
event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They 
seem conjoined, but never connected’ (1975, p.74).  Knowledge of ‘ties’ in 
nature, if it is to be had at all, is not derived from experience. Hume concluded 
that the idea of power or ‘necessary connexion’ comes neither from ‘outward 
sense’ nor the ‘mere operation of thought’. Instead, Hume suggested that when 
we repeatedly experience events of one type being followed by events of another 
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type, we come to expect an event of the second type when we experience an 
event of the first, and this internal feeling of expectation is the impression from 
which this idea of necessitation between cause and effect arises.  
Hume’s argument that we can have no knowledge of things’ underlying 
powers, which might explain why events unfold in regular ways, is questionable. 
Nevertheless, powers and natural necessity have long been regarded as 
epistemically suspicious and ineffable. In response to Hume’s arguments, 
philosophers with empiricist sympathies have either denied that causation exists 
in the external world, independently of our thinking of it (e.g. Russell, 1912), or 
they have claimed that even if causation does exist in the external world, we can 
have no knowledge of it, or they have sought to reduce causation, as it exists in 
the external world, to something more empirically respectable. As Helen Beebee 
puts it, empiricists have sought to ‘show that in using the term ‘causation’ we are 
not claiming to be referring to some mysterious, ineffable, empirically 
unrespectable feature of the world at all, but to something that passes the 
empiricist credibility test (whatever that might be)’ (2006, p.510). So, we find in 
Hume inspiration for Reductivism, the view that all causal facts are translatable 
(perhaps with the aid of a posteriori identities, or metaphysical reductions) into 
facts about non-causal states of affairs, and Denial of Powers, the view that a 
primitive concept of power is not needed to understand the nature of causation.  
Hume also spoke of ‘cause and effect’ as a ‘relation’ or a ‘connexion’ 
(1975, pp.26-27), so here we find inspiration for Relationalism. Most 
philosophers working on causation, not only those with empiricist or Humean 
sympathies, accept Relationalism, at least implicitly. Most have assumed that 
providing a theory of causation is a matter of explaining what a relation must be 
like to be a causal relation. The possibility that causation may not fit into a 
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single ontological category is rarely taken seriously.18 So, few have recognised 
that there is anything particularly ‘Humean’ about Relationalism.  
In the remainder of this section, I will present two examples of a Humean 
theory of causation: the regularity theory of causation and Lewis’s counterfactual 
theory of causation.  
3.1.1 The Regularity Theory of Causation 
The paradigm example of a theory of causation which follows the Humean 
approach is the regularity theory of causation. The regularity theory holds that 
causation, as it exists in the world independently of our thinking about it or 
knowledge of it, is exhaustively constituted by certain relations of 
spatiotemporal contiguity which obtain with regularity. More specifically, the 
regularity theory holds that causation is a relation of spatiotemporal contiguity 
between two events, c and e, where c occurs before e, and where all events of the 
same type as c are regularly followed by events of the same type as e. The 
regularity theory as stated above faces problems and in response more 
sophisticated versions of the regularity theory have been proposed.19 However, 
for my purposes here, I do not need to examine these more sophisticated 
versions of the regularity theory – the most basic version will suffice as a 
demonstration of a theory of causation which observes the three Humean 
commitments.   
The regularity theory is a reductive theory of causation, and so embraces 
Reductivism. As Stathis Psillos puts it:   
[The regularity theory] is typically seen as offering a reductive account of 
causation. As with all reductive accounts, causal talk becomes legitimate, 
but it does not imply the existence of a special realm of causal facts that 
 
 
 
18 Notable exception: Steward (2012, see especially pp.212-216). 
19 For example, Mill (1843), Mackie (1974), and Baumgartner (2008) have all offered more 
sophisticated versions of the regularity theory.   
  
58 
make causal talk true, since its truth conditions are specified in non-causal 
terms, that is, in terms of spatiotemporal relations and actual regularities. 
(2002, p.4) 
Indeed, the regularity theory’s promise to offer a reductive account of causation 
is part of its appeal. The main argument for adopting a regularity theory is that 
the theory accounts for causation while at the same time avoiding ontological 
commitment to anything ineffable, or otherwise empirically suspect, like natural 
necessitation or power. The idea is that the regularity theory of causation – or at 
least a suitable worked-up version of it – provides everything we would want 
from a theory of causation, without positing the existence or powers or a sui 
generis kind of necessity, and as the best metaphysical theories are the theories 
which serve our explanatory aims without bestowing unnecessary ontological 
burdens, this is reason enough to prefer the regularity theory.  
According to the regularity theory, what ascriptions of power, or 
statements about what a thing can do, actually mean (if they are not false or 
nonsense) is that the behaviour of the object to which the ‘power’ is attributed is 
regular in a certain way. That is, it might be true to say some object has a power, 
but what makes such a statement true will be some fact about the arrangement 
of the spatiotemporal mosaic of instantiations of intrinsic, qualitative, categorical 
properties. Thus, the regularity theory denies that power is a primitive concept, 
i.e. it accepts Denial of Powers. 
The mosaic metaphor is David Lewis’s means of describing the Humean 
metaphysics presupposed by the regularity theory. In more detail this 
metaphysics says:  
[...] in a world like ours, the fundamental relations are exactly the 
spatiotemporal relations: distance relations, both spacelike and timelike, and 
perhaps also occupancy relations between point-sized things and spacetime 
points. And it says that in a world like ours, the fundamental properties are 
local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties of points, or of point-
sized occupants of points. Therefore it says that all else supervenes on the 
spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities throughout all of history, past 
and present and future. (Lewis, 1994, p.474) 
  
59 
As Lewis puts it in the introduction to his Philosophical Papers (vol. II) ‘all there 
is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little 
thing and then another (1986, p.ix). Jonathan Schaffer describes the Humean 
worldview slightly differently: Schaffer writes that, for the Humean, the world is 
‘history’ i.e. ‘the fusion of all events throughout space-time’ (2007, p.83).   
Lewis’s metaphysics, which he calls ‘Humean Supervenience’, is, as 
Beebee puts it, ‘extraordinarily austere’ (2006, p.513). It admits very little as 
fundamental. Just points, the properties instantiated by (at?) those points and 
the relations between those points (and for Lewis properties and relations are 
themselves nothing more than classes of points). On Lewis’s picture, even facts 
about what substances exist are supervenient on the mosaic, because, on Lewis’s 
view, substances are four-dimensional objects composed of temporal parts, 
which are each themselves collections of space-time points. Schaffer’s version of 
the Humean worldview seems, at first, to be a little less austere than Lewis’s, as 
Schaffer seems to admit that there are such things as events, i.e. things that 
occur, and not just instantiations of properties by points. As Schaffer puts it:  
Each individual event is a concrete particular with an intrinsic nature – what 
occurs in some region of space-time. History is the whole of this – it is what 
occurs in all of space-time. History is the total pattern of events. Each event 
is like a bit of a frame in the movie, and history is the whole picture. (2007, 
p.83) 
However, Schaffer uses, as an example of an event, ‘an instance of red’ (2007, 
p.88) – so it is not clear that Schaffer thinks there is a significant metaphysical 
distinction between events and property instances or property instantiations.  
The regularity theory can also be assumed to be committed to 
Relationalism, if the regularity theory is intended to be a comprehensive and 
complete account of causation, since the regularity theory proposes that 
causation is a relation, namely a relation of spatiotemporal contiguity which 
obtains with regularity. Most proponents of the regularity theory do not 
explicitly claim that their theory is supposed to be comprehensive and complete, 
but similarly, they do not explicitly claim that it is not. In a way, the regularity 
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theory is committed to Relationalism by default because proponents of the 
regularity theory simply do not consider whether causation might not be a 
relation.  
3.1.2 Counterfactual Theory of Causation 
Another example of a Humean approach to causation is Lewis’s (1973a, 1973b) 
counterfactual theory of causation. Lewis’s theory of causation analyses 
causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. This theory exploits the 
intuition that causes are that which made the difference to the occurrence of the 
effect; that is, had the cause not occurred the effect wouldn’t have occurred 
either. Lewis developed this idea by analysing the causal relation as the ancestral 
of a counterfactual dependence relation. So, an event c stands in a causal 
relation to another event e if and only if e counterfactually depends on c, or e 
counterfactually depends on an event which counterfactually depends on c, or e 
counterfactually depends on an event which counterfactually depends on an 
event which counterfactually depends on c, etc. As with the regularity theory, 
Lewis’s counterfactual theory has been modified in light of objections raised 
against the original version of the theory.20 However, again, I do not need to 
consider the more sophisticated versions of the theory for my purposes here.  
Lewis’s counterfactual theory’s status as Humean depends, in part, on 
Lewis’s theory of modality. Lewis opts for a possible world semantics for 
counterfactuals. So, a counterfactual like ‘if c had not occurred, then e would not 
have occurred’ is true if and only if e does not occur at the closest possible world 
where c does not occur. How ‘close’ a possible world is to the actual world 
depends on how similar that world is to the actual world. For Lewis, similarity 
 
 
 
20 See, for example, Lewis (2000), McDermott (2002), Ganeri, Noordhof and Ramachandran 
(1996), and Sartorio (2005). 
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between two possible worlds is determined by what particular states of affairs 
obtain at the two worlds and what the laws of two worlds are. So, world w1 is 
more similar to world w2 the more states of affairs w1 has in common with w2 
and the more laws w1 has in common with w2.  
If one went along thus far with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, but 
thought that laws of nature were brute facts about what powers things have, or 
facts about primitive ‘necessitation’ relations holding between universals, then 
even if one opted for an account of causation where causation is reduced to 
counterfactual dependence, the resultant theory of causation would not be 
Humean. This is because, on such a view, the truth of counterfactual 
conditionals depends on similarity rankings of possible worlds which in turn 
depends on brute facts about powers, or a sui generis form of necessity. Such a 
view would thus seem to contravene Denial of Powers.  
However, Lewis gives an account of laws of nature which does not 
presuppose the existence of powers or anything over and above the 
spatiotemporal mosaic of instantiations of intrinsic, qualitative, categorical 
properties. For Lewis, laws of nature are simply regularities which are deducible 
from axioms in an explanatory system that best balances simplicity and strength. 
An explanatory system picks as few general truths as possible to serve as axioms 
– the fewer, the simpler – then deductively derives further general truths from 
these. The more general truths the system deductively entails, the stronger the 
system.   
As Beebee (2006) points out, because Lewis seeks to analyse causation 
without assuming the existence of any kind of worldly necessitation, and ends 
up turning to regularities in order to fulfil that mandate, Lewis’s counterfactual 
theory of causation has a lot in common, metaphysically speaking, with the 
regularity theory. On both theories, the worldly structures that make true causal 
claims are, in the end, regularities. And, just like the regularity theory, Lewis’s 
counterfactual theory does not posit any kind of entity, or deeper fact (like facts 
about what powers things have or what is a natural necessity), which grounds or 
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explains why regularities hold, or why certain counterfactual conditionals are 
true. 
Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation, insofar as it attempts to reduce 
causation to counterfactual dependence, and provides a semantics of 
counterfactuals which does not at any point appeal to irreducibly modal or 
causal facts, embraces Reductionism. It also embraces Denial of Powers, as only 
the concept of counterfactual dependence is needed to understand causation, 
and counterfactual dependence in its turn can be understood without a primitive 
concept of power. What about Relationalism? Again, Lewis’s counterfactual 
theory endorses Relationalism by default as Lewis analyses causation in terms of 
a relation, and seems neither to confirm nor deny that his theory is intended as 
comprehensive.  
There are, I suspect, other theories of causation which adhere to the three 
Humean statutes which I have not discussed,21 but I hope my brief discussion of 
the regularity theory and counterfactual theory of causation has been sufficient 
to make clear what a Humean account of causation is.  
3.2 Partially Non-Humean Approaches 
I will call a theory of causation ‘partially non-Humean’ if the theory, explicitly or 
implicitly, rejects some but not all of the three Humean theses. I have already 
mentioned one partially non-Humean approach: a kind of counterfactual theory 
of causation, which attempts to reduce causation to counterfactual dependence, 
but then maintains that counterfactual conditionals depend for their truth on 
brute facts about what powers things have, or a sui generis form of necessity. 
This theory would observe Reductionism and Relationalism, but not Denial of 
Powers. A similar kind of partially non-Humean approach which observes 
 
 
 
21 For example, Davidson’s (1967) nomological account and versions of the probability account 
of causation (Pearl, 2000; Hitchcock 1993).  
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Reductionism and Relationalism, but not Denial of Powers, is a theory which 
reduces causation to a relation of spatiotemporal contiguity that is an instance of 
a law-backed regularity, but which gives an account of laws that makes essential 
reference to power or necessitation (e.g. Armstrong, 1999). However, most 
partially non-Humean theories of causation defended in the literature on 
causation are theories which reject Reductionism.  
3.3.1 Manipulability Theories of Causation 
Manipulability accounts of causation are partially non-Humean. However, 
precisely which of the three Humean theses manipulability accounts reject 
depends on the type of manipulability account.  
Take, for instance, Georg Henrik von Wright’s agency-based account of 
causation. Von Wright believed that an event c is the cause of event e if and only 
if bringing about c is a way for an agent to bring about e, that is only if e can be 
considered the result of the action of bringing about c:  
[…] to think of a relation between events as causal is to think of it under the 
aspect of (possible) action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little 
misleading to say that if p is a (sufficient) cause of q, then if I could produce 
p I could bring about q. For that p is the cause of q, I have endeavoured to 
say here, means that I could bring about q, if I could do (so that) p. (1971, 
p.74) 
An important objection to von Wright’s theory is that it is problematically 
circular because agency is a causal notion: producing and bringing about are 
causal concepts, hence agency-based theories purport to analyse causation in 
terms of causation. Von Wright denied that this account of the causal relation is 
circular, because he held that the relation between an action (e.g. cutting of the 
cake) and its result (the cake’s coming to be cut) is not a causal relation, it is 
rather a logical one (if the cake doesn’t come to be cut, then no-one cut it – the 
cutting-of-the-cake action did not take place):  
I am anxious to separate agency from causation. Causal relations exist 
between natural events, not between agents and events. When by doing p we 
bring about q, it is the happening of p which causes q to come. And p has this 
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effect quite independently of whether it happens as a result of action or not. 
(1974, p.49) 
Insofar as von Wright takes himself to be providing an analysis of causation, 
understood as a relation, in terms of a non-causal relation (between an action 
and its result), he is committed to Reductivism.  
However, even though von Wright denies that action is itself causation, 
his account of causation relies on the modal concept: what an agent could bring 
about. Understanding causation also requires that we possess a concept of how 
things would have been had no person intervened. On von Wright’s account, 
causation exists where and when human beings ‘interfere with the course of the 
world thereby making true something which would not otherwise (i.e., had it 
not been for this interference) come to be true of the world at that stage of 
history’ (1974, p.39). In acting, we switch the world from the course it would 
have followed to another course. So, von Wright’s account helps itself to modal 
concepts such as how things would have been (had no-one interfered) and how 
things can be (if someone interferes), and doesn’t appear to offer any analysis of 
these modal concepts. As J.L. Mackie puts it, ‘the natural necessity, the power, 
the counterfactuality which are among the most puzzling aspects of causation – 
especially if we start with atomic states or events – are being accepted, without 
analysis, as located partly in human action, partly in the non-causal persistence 
of “normal” states of affairs’ (1976, p.215, emphasis added). So, von Wright’s 
view seems to reject Denial of Powers, in that his account of causation appeals to 
a primitive concept of how things can be. 
I think von Wright is correct to insist that the relation between an action 
and its result is logical and not causal. I also think von Wright is right to sharply 
distinguish between agency on the one hand and causal relations on the other – 
von Wright is correct to claim that to demonstrate agency is not for an agent to 
stand in a causal relation to an event. However, I do not think, as von Wright 
does, that this entails that agency is not a causal phenomenon. Von Wright does 
not recognise this because he subscribes to Relationalism: the view that 
causation is always, everywhere a relation. Von Wright’s view can be thought of 
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as abiding by the following reasoning: causation is the relation between cause 
and effect, agency is not a relation between cause and effect, therefore, agency is 
not causation. This argument is sound only if Relationalism is true. So, von 
Wright accepts Reductionism and Relationalism, but rejects Denial of Powers.  
Another kind of agency-based manipulability account of causation was 
put forward by Peter Menzies and Huw Price: ‘an event [c] is cause of distinct 
event [e] just in case bringing about the occurrence of [c] would be an effective 
means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of [e]’ (1993, 
p.187). And an event c is an effective means by which a free agent could bring 
about occurrence of e, just in case the probability of e occurring given that c was 
brought about by a free agent is greater than the unconditional probability of e 
occurring.  
The circularity objection that von Wright faced can be directed against 
Menzies and Price’s view as well. Menzies and Price respond to the circularity 
objection in the following way:   
The basic premise is that from an early age, we all have direct experience of 
acting as agents. That is, we have direct experience not merely of the 
Humean succession of events in the external world, but of a very special 
class of such successions: those in which the earlier event is an action of our 
own, performed in circumstances in which we both desire the later event, 
and believe that it is more probable given the act in question than it would 
be otherwise. To put it more simply, we all have direct personal experience 
of doing one thing and thence achieving another. […] It is this common and 
commonplace experience that licenses what amounts to an ostensive 
definition of the notion of ‘bringing about’. In other words, these cases 
provide direct non-linguistic acquaintance with the concept of bringing 
about an event; acquaintance which does not depend on prior acquisition of 
any causal notion. An agency theory thus escapes the threat of circularity. 
(1993, pp.194-195) 
Unlike von Wright, Menzies and Price do not deny that agency is a causal 
phenomenon. What they deny is that acquiring the agency concept requires that 
one has already acquired the concept of causation. For Menzies and Price, even 
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though agency itself is an essentially causal phenomenon, the concept of agency 
is one that can be understood and grasped independently of the concept of 
causation, and because it can be independently understood, it can be used to 
analyse causation.  
So, unlike von Wright, Menzies and Price do not intend to show how 
causation, as it exists in reality, is exhaustively constituted by non-causal states 
of affairs. Price (2017) claims that Menzies and Price (1993) aren’t seeking to 
tell us what real structure in the world causation ought to be identified with, 
instead their aim is to tell us how our concept of causation is pieced together. 
Menzies and Price’s theory thus appears to reject the Humean thesis of 
Reductionism. But in some respects, their account is still quite Humean: like 
Hume, Menzies and Price offer a psychological story about where our concept of 
causation comes from, and are at best agnostic about whether there is any 
structure existing in reality, independently of our thinking of it, to which our 
causation concept refers.  
James Woodward (2003) argues that Menzies and Price’s view is 
unacceptably anthropomorphic and subjectivist.22 Because Menzies and Price 
invoke a concept of agency which we grasp via direct experience of our own 
agency at work, their theory faces a difficult problem concerning causes which 
cannot be manipulated by human agents. To take an example from Menzies and 
Price (1993, p.195), it seems to be true that movement of tectonic plates caused 
the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake, but it is not true that movement of tectonic 
plates was an event which could have been an effective means by which a 
human agent could have brought about the earthquake. Manipulating tectonic 
plates is just not within our power.  
Woodward (2003) offers his own manipulability theory of causation 
which avoids this problem by using the concept of an intervention to analyse the 
 
 
 
22 See especially pp.124-125.  
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causal relation, rather than manipulation by a human agent. Woodward 
contends that a variable c is causally related to a variable e if and only if 
intervention on c leaves the relationship between c and e invariant but changes 
the value of e. An intervention is any event which ‘surgically’ causes the value of 
c to change, that is, by blocking all causal influence over the value of c the usual 
causal antecedents of c have and without causally influencing the value of e 
except through c. An intervention is any event which has certain causal 
characteristics; an intervention need not involve human agency at all (although 
no doubt many interventions do involve human agency).  
Because Woodward’s account of what it is for c to cause e involves appeal 
to a causal relation between an intervention and c, Woodward’s account does 
not attempt to reduce causation to non-causal state of affairs. So, Woodward 
rejects Reductionism. But Woodward argues that this is not problematic, as 
although his account of causation is not reductive, it is still illuminating. 
Furthermore, it is not circular because the causal relationships to which one 
appeals to explain what it is for c to cause e, are not the causal relationships that 
explain what it is for an intervention to cause c to take on a certain value.  
Woodward’s theory is a kind of counterfactual theory of causation: 
whether two variables are causally related to each other depends on how the 
relationship between those variables would change if certain interventions were 
made. However, there are key differences between Woodward and Lewis when 
it comes to the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. The most important 
difference is that in Lewis’s account of how we should evaluate counterfactual 
conditionals in causal contexts it is never necessary to appeal to causal facts. By 
contrast, in Woodward’s account of how we should evaluate counterfactual 
conditionals in causal contexts we are supposed to imagine that the antecedent 
of the counterfactual is made true by the occurrence of an intervention, which 
presupposes that certain causal facts obtain.  
To illustrate this point with an example, suppose event c caused e1 and e2, 
and e1 and e2 are not causally related to each other. Because counterfactual 
  
68 
dependence is sufficient for causation, we would want the following 
counterfactual to come out false: 
(a) If e1 had not occurred, e2 would not have occurred  
But in a world where e1 does not occur, we might suppose that this was because 
it was not caused by c, i.e. because c did not occur – but in that case, e2 would 
not have occurred either. This world – where e1 does not occur because c does 
not occur – is therefore the wrong world to turn to when evaluating the truth of 
the counterfactual in a causal context. Lewis recommends that when we 
evaluate counterfactuals in a causal context we forbid ‘backtracking’ – i.e. we are 
forbidden from imagining that prior events and circumstances were also 
changed so as to cause the antecedent of our target counterfactual to be true. 
When we evaluate (a) we must imagine that a small miracle makes it the case 
that e1 does not occur. So, the world we should use to evaluate the truth of (a) is 
a world where c still happens, but then, miraculously, e1 does not occur – in such 
a world e2 would still occur (because c would still cause it), and therefore (a) 
comes out false.  
Woodward achieves this same result using the notion of an intervention, 
rather than the notion of a ‘small miracle’. For Woodward, when we evaluate (a) 
we are supposed to imagine that an intervention occurred to make it the case 
that e1 did not occur – and such an intervention, by definition, leaves all causal 
relationships, except those which have e1 as effect, unchanged. Evaluating the 
truth of (a) thus requires assuming certain other causal relations in the situation 
under discussion obtain.   
Even though Woodward’s and Lewis’s theories differ in this important 
way, it is not part of Woodward’s theory that the truth of counterfactual 
conditionals depends on brute facts about powers, or a sui generis form of 
necessity. Thus, Woodward’s theory is consistent with the view that 
counterfactual dependence can be understood without a primitive concept of 
power, and is therefore consistent with Denial of Powers. As for Relationalism, 
just as with the regularity theory and Lewis’s counterfactual theory, Woodward’s 
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theory appears to embrace Relationalism by default, as the question of whether 
causation could be something other than a relation is not considered.  
3.3.2 Realist Theories of Causation 
Strawson articulates a conception of causation which he calls Causation with a 
capital ‘C’. To believe in the existence of Causation is to believe: ‘a) that there is 
something about the fundamental nature of the world in virtue of which the 
world is regular in its behaviour; and b) that that something is what causation is, 
or rather it is at least an essential part of what causation is’ (1989, pp.84–85). 
Strawson thus advocates a view which takes causation to be an entity which 
grounds the world’s regularities, but cannot be reduced to regularities, or indeed 
any aspect of the Humean ‘mosaic’. Strawson therefore rejects Reductionism. 
Michael Tooley (1990a) also rejects Reductionism about causation. More 
precisely, Tooley argues against views which hold that ‘causal relations are […] 
logically supervenient upon non-causal properties and relations’ (1990a, p.217).  
The point I wish to emphasise is that Tooley is arguing specifically against 
attempts to reduce the causal relation to some non-causal relation. Furthermore, 
when Tooley discusses alternatives to Reductionism, it is specifically ‘realism 
with regard to causal relations’ which he considers (1990a, p.233). Similarly, 
Strawson (1989) is concerned to show that we should believe there is something 
more to the relation between cause and effect that regular succession. 
Elsewhere, Strawson (1987) argues that realism with respect to the external 
world rationally requires belief in the existence of ‘Producing Causation’, and 
Strawson takes Producing Causation to be a view about what it means to say 
that ‘some object-involving event A caused other object-involving event B’ (1987, 
pp.254-255). So, both Strawson and Tooley seem to be committed to 
Relationalism.  
Tooley outlines two different sorts of realism with regard to causal 
relations. The first sort of realism takes causal relations to be directly observable 
‘not only in the everyday sense of that term, but in a much stronger sense which 
entails that concepts of causal relations are analytically basic’ (1990a, pp.233-
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234). This sort of realism would maintain, in contradiction to Hume, that 
causation cannot be reduced to non-causal states of affairs, but it is nevertheless 
something in the external world which we can observe. Tooley cites Elizabeth 
Anscombe as a philosopher who upholds a view like this. Anscombe (1971) 
suggested that we come by our primary knowledge of causality when we learn to 
speak and come to associate the linguistic representation of a causal concept 
with its correct application. An example of such a causal concept which 
Anscombe provides is ‘infect’. Others include ‘scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, 
burn…’ (1971, p.9). She suggests that causal activities like scraping and pushing 
(though perhaps not infecting) are activities which we can directly perceive. 
Tooley argues that the fact that we know by perceptual observation that, for 
example, something is pushing something else, ‘would not seem to provide 
adequate grounds for concluding that the relevant concepts are analytically 
basic’ (1990a, p.234). Tooley’s thought is that even if Anscombe is right that we 
know by observation that one thing is pushing another (for example), this 
doesn’t show that what it is about the events we’re seeing, which makes it the 
case that they are causally related, is something irreducible which we can 
nevertheless observe – it might be that we infer, from what we perceive, that 
causation is there.  
I think that Tooley has misconstrued what Anscombe is claiming in her 
1971 lecture Causation and Determination from which Tooley cites. What 
Anscombe suggests we directly perceive is not a special relation between cause 
and effect, but substances exerting causal power over other substances. We do 
not observe a cause causing an effect, we observe an agent acting on a patient. 
Anscombe is suggesting that an agent acting on a patient is causation, and this is 
in spite of the obvious truth that agent and patient are not related to each other 
as cause and effect. Anscombe’s point is that we come by knowledge of causality 
when we directly perceive agents pushing patients and correctly associate what 
we see with the inherently causal concept pushing. Tooley might be right that 
the fact that we directly perceive agents pushing patients (for example) may not 
be enough to show that we directly perceive a connection between the events 
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which makes it the case that they are causally related. But why can’t the fact that 
we directly perceive an interaction, like an agent pushing a patient, be enough 
to show that we directly perceive causation? Tooley construes Anscombe’s claim 
incorrectly, I think, because of his commitment to a version of Relationalism 
which says that causation is a relation between events.  
The sort of causal realism which Tooley endorses, treats ‘causal concepts 
as theoretical concepts, so that causal relations can only be characterised, 
indirectly, as those relations that satisfy some appropriate theory’ (1990a, 
p.234). The appropriate theory, Tooley (1990b) proposes, is one which includes 
claims about the formal properties of causal relations, and which tells us what a 
law must be like to be a causal law. Causal relations are thus relations which 
have the right formal properties and ‘whose presence in a law makes that law a 
causal one’ (1990b, p.303). Tooley shares Armstrong’s view about laws of nature 
(of which causal laws are a subset), that is, he thinks that laws are necessitation 
relations between universals. So, it would seem that Tooley’s account of 
causation, in virtue of its appeal to causal laws, makes use of a sui generis form 
of necessity. In this way, Tooley’s view can be seen as rejecting Denial of Powers.   
Although Strawson (1989) argues that causation, as it is in reality, is 
regular succession plus something extra, which explains why events unfold in a 
regular way, he is non-committal on what this extra element is. According to 
Strawson’s Hume, we can attain no contentful conception of what this extra 
element is, although we can be sure that it is there. Strawson (1987) suggests 
that this additional element could be the presence of ‘objective forces – e.g. the 
“fundamental forces” postulated by physics’ which ‘govern the way objects 
behave and interact’ (p.254), and adds: 
I will avoid speaking of “natural necessity”, or of “laws of nature” 
(understood in a strong, non-Regularity-theory sense), or of the “causal 
powers” of objects. It is very difficult to keep control of these rival 
terminologies. But here the notion of objective forces is being understood in 
such a way that accounts of causation given in terms of these other notions 
may be supposed to reduce naturally to the account in terms of forces. For 
example: (1) if objects have causal powers, they have the powers they do 
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wholly in virtue of the nature of the forces informing (and so governing) the 
matter of which they are constituted. (1987, p.255) 
It is possible, therefore, that one could be a Strawsonian realist about causation 
without thinking that a primitive concept of power was necessary for 
understanding causation (and so without rejecting Denial of Powers).  
3.3.3 Powers-based Theories of Causation  
The starting point of powers-based approaches to causation is rejection of Denial 
of Powers. On a powers-based theory of causation, a primitive concept of power 
is essential for understanding the nature of causation. Facts about what powers 
things have, or what things can do, cannot be analysed as claims about what 
events regularly follow on from what others. On powers-based theories of 
causation, just like on realist theories of causation, causation is something in 
nature which constrains the ways in which events can unfold, and which 
therefore grounds regularity. In other words, worldly events unfold in a regular 
way because causation exists. On a powers-based theory, causation is the 
exercise of power, and worldly events unfold in a regular way because what can 
occur is limited by what powers entities possess: an entity with certain powers 
must behave in certain ways when the conditions for the manifestation of the 
power arise, provided there is nothing interfering with the entity and thereby 
blocking the manifestation.  
Steven Mumford (2009) argues that no powers-based account of 
causation can be reductive, because power is a causal notion. For example, it is 
impossible to understand what it is to have the power to intoxicate, without 
having some grasp of the phenomenon of intoxication, which is a causal process. 
Thus, powers-based theories deny Reductivism. However, Mumford (like 
Woodward) insists that an account of causation can be informative without 
being reductive. That is, an account of causation can give some insight into the 
nature of causation without telling us what non-causal structures exhaustively 
constitute causation. However, given that the powers-based theory takes 
causation to be the exercise of power, without saying more about what an 
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exercise of power is, this account is in danger of seeming uninformative, perhaps 
even circular. What is missing from powers-based theories of causation is a 
suitable ontology which tells us what an exercise of a power is, what sorts of 
entities possess and exercise powers, and what sorts of relations those things 
stand in when they exercise their powers. There is no consensus regarding how 
these questions should be answered.  
Steven Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have proposed a powers-based 
theory of causation which is premised on the idea that ‘the world is a world 
containing real powers’ (2011, p.4). In other words, Mumford and Anjum 
hypothesise that powers are real entities, and causation is powers tending 
towards their manifestations. In slightly more detail, Mumford and Anjum hold 
that ‘causation happens when powers do their work’ (2011, p.30). What’s more, 
powers do not work alone (except in exceptional cases). Most effects are the 
upshot of multiple powers manifesting themselves. For example, for a light bulb 
to burn me, the filament needs to be manifesting its power to get hot, the glass 
needs to be manifesting its power to propagate this heat, and my hand needs to 
be manifesting its liability to be burnt. Each power has a contribution to make to 
the coming-about-of the effect. Each power, in its own way, pushes towards an 
effect. When many powers make their contributions, these contributions add 
together, and after they reach a certain threshold the effect has been produced. 
(It is this contribution towards the coming-about-of some effect, not the effect 
that eventually comes about, which Mumford and Anjum take to be the power’s 
manifestation. This is because Mumford and Anjum want to maintain that 
powers are individuated by their manifestations, so distinct powers cannot have 
the same manifestation, and one and the same power cannot have a different 
manifestation in different contexts, so Mumford and Anjum distinguish a 
power’s manifestation from the effect of the power’s manifesting itself.) 
Does this make causation a relation between a power and the effect it 
makes a contribution towards producing? Or between the set of powers which 
have accumulated and the effect their accumulation has produced? Or between 
the power and its manifestation, i.e. the contribution it makes towards an effect? 
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Mumford (2009) indicates that causation is ‘the whole process going from power 
to exercise and from contribution to event’ (p. 108): 
The dispositionalist, instead of seeing causation as a matter of clearly 
distinguishable cause and effect, with the appropriate relation between 
them, sees causation as almost always complex, involving multiple powers 
combining to produce something together through a process. Only in the 
idealised laboratory conditions would we theoretically have an event 
produced just by one power acting alone. Instead of discrete, externally 
related causal relata, we have a process of interconnected powers. Given 
that a manifestation is a part of the essence and identity of a power, then if 
the power and its manifestation exists, any such causation would be an 
internal relation. (2009, pp.108-109) 
Elsewhere, Mumford and Anjum state that ‘We argue that causation is a 
single, unified, and continuous event or process rather than a relation between 
distinct and discrete events, that causes and effects are simultaneous and that 
causes tend towards their effects without necessitating them’ (2013, p.554). 
Mumford and Anjum also describe causation as the passing or shifting of powers 
from one substance to another. So, when fire heats a person, the power to heat 
possessed by the fire is passed to the person, and when a stone breaks a window 
the power to cut that the window comes to possess after this causal transaction 
was drawn from powers possessed by the stone. Mumford and Anjum also 
suggest that this process of passing around powers is more fundamental than the 
substances which possess the powers (p.555). In holding that causation is a 
process, Mumford and Anjum seem to reject Relationalism – which would 
actually make Mumford and Anjum’s theory a fully non-Humean theory of 
causation, although one which is a rival to the fully non-Humean theory of 
causation I will espouse in section 3.3. 
Misgivings about Mumford and Anjum’s metaphysics have been raised by 
Jennifer McKitrick (2013). McKitrick objects that Mumford and Anjum’s theory 
of causation has nothing to say about how dormant powers become active, or 
come to be exercised. Mumford and Anjum’s view identifies causation with a 
continuous process of powers pushing towards an effect, but this presupposes 
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that the powers are already being exercised – they are already making their 
contribution to an effect. Mumford and Anjum respond to this objection by 
claiming that ‘when a power is not doing its work, it is not part of the causal 
story, so it is not something we should be trying to include’ (2013, p.556), and 
by insisting that they do have something to say about how a dormant power 
could become active: a dormant power’s becoming active could be the effect of a 
causal process, it could be something which resulted from the addition or 
removal of some other active power. However, I think that Mumford and Anjum 
underestimate the seriousness of McKitrick’s complaint. According to Mumford 
and Anjum, causal effects are achieved by the accumulation of many powers 
manifesting themselves reaching a certain threshold. One may wonder how, on 
this picture, anything is really produced. On this picture, powers tend towards an 
effect, and once this ‘tending’ reaches a certain magnitude, the effect has come 
into being. The effect seems not to be causally produced so much as constructed, 
in the same way that bringing together the various parts of a statue is a way of 
bringing a statue into being. Mumford and Anjum deny that their view entails 
that causation should be thought of as a kind of ontological construction, but 
this denial seems inconsistent with their proposal that causation is the 
culmination of power-exercises adding together as opposed to the transition 
from a power being dormant to a power being exercised. Anna Marmadoro 
(2013) has also noted that Mumford and Anjum’s view seems to involve two 
distinct metaphysics which are in tension with each other.  
An alternative take on a powers-based theory of causation makes 
substances, or powerful particulars, central (e.g. Harré and Madden, 1975). On 
such a view, powerful particulars stand in production relations to events, and 
coming to stand in such production relations to events is exercising a power. For 
example, when a rock breaks a window, it comes to stand in a production 
relation to a window-breaking event. Thomas Reid thought that causation was 
the production of change by the exertion of power and ‘that which produces a 
change by the exertion of its power we call the cause of that change; and the 
change produced, the effect of that cause’ (1788, pp.12-13). Causes, on Reid’s 
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view are therefore the bearers of powers (rather than the powers themselves as 
on Mumford and Anjum’s view). E.J. Lowe endorses a similar view, ‘a causal 
power, as I shall construe this term, is one whose manifestation or “exercise” 
consists in its bearer’s acting on one or more other individual substances (or 
sometimes on itself) so as to bring about a certain kind of change in them (or it)’ 
(2013, p.158). There are two relations highlighted here: the relation that holds 
between the powerful substance and the event it produces in exercising its 
power (i.e. the change it induces) and the relation between the powerful 
substance and the substance it is producing a change in. It is unclear whether 
Lowe’s view entails that the exercise of power, and thus, causation, can be 
identified with the first sort of relation, or the second, or neither. Reid seems to 
identify causation with the relation that holds between a powerful particular and 
the event it produces in exercising its power. Insofar as powers-based 
approaches attempt to spell out the notion of an exercise of power in terms of 
one or other of the relations mentioned, it seems to me that even powers-based 
approaches succumb to the Humean intuition that giving an account of 
causation is a matter of explaining what a relation must be like to be a causal 
relation. Such powers-based approaches would accept Relationalism.  
3.3 A Fully Non-Humean Approach  
In this last section, I will sketch my preferred non-Humean approach to 
causation. This approach is characterised by two core ideas which set it apart 
from the previous theories discussed. First, the approach rejects Relationalism. 
Causation is not always and everywhere a relation, and giving a full account of 
causation is not merely a matter of explaining what a relation must be like to be 
a causal relation. Put positively, I maintain that causation can be a process 
rather than a relation, of which processes like breaking, crushing, bending etc 
are more determinate species. This view is in line with Anscombe’s (1971) 
suggestion that causation is a ‘highly general’, determinable concept, which is an 
abstraction from the plethora of more specific causal concepts represented by 
verbs of action. I also agree with Anscombe that we come by this concept of 
causation when we directly perceive substances exerting causal power over other 
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substances and associate what we see with the appropriate specific causal 
concept.  
Hornsby has described views like mine as ‘Neo-Aristotelian’:  
Neo-Aristotelians do not treat cause as everywhere a relation — neither as a 
relation between two events, nor between two objects, nor between an 
object and an event […] They take an object’s powers to tell us what kinds 
of processes the object can engage in, so that they connect our 
understanding of causality with our recognition of the display of the 
potentialities of things by the things having those potentialities. Thus they 
defend a metaphysics in which a substance ontology belongs, and to which 
such notions as powers, capacities, liabilities are central. […] Causality, 
then, is present in the world inasmuch as something is actually exercising its 
powers, perhaps affecting something else in doing so. (2015, pp.131-132) 
Obviously, it is no good saying that causation can be a process rather than a 
relation without saying what a process is. In the next chapter, I will provide a 
metaphysical framework which includes processes in its ontology – I will, as 
Hornsby puts it, ‘defend a metaphysics in which a substance ontology belongs, 
and to which such notions as powers, capacities, liabilities are central’ – and 
thereby explain exactly what it means to say that causation is a process.  
The second core idea of my preferred non-Humean approach is pluralism. 
On my preferred view, even though causation is sometimes a process rather than 
a relation, this is not to deny that there is a distinctive sort of relation which 
answers to claims like ‘c is the cause of e’. To reject Relationalism, it is only 
necessary that one deny that causation is exhaustively constituted by a special 
sort of relation. One need not claim that we never think of causation as a 
relation between cause and effect. In my view, we think of causation in two 
ways: as an exercise of causal power and, separately, as a relation obtaining 
between cause and effect.  
Insofar as my view grants that causation can be an exercise of causal 
power, my view has a lot in common with powers-based theories. I also maintain 
that power is a primitive concept, i.e. one which cannot be analysed in other 
terms. So, one cannot say, in other terms, what is meant by ‘can’ in statements of 
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what a thing can do. Thus, I reject Denial of Powers. However, unlike Mumford 
and Anjum, I do not think that powers are entities. Powers do not exist in 
concrete reality; they are not, to borrow a phrase from Lowe (2005b, p.35), 
‘elements of being’. As Anthony Kenny puts it ‘a power must not be thought of as 
a thing in its own right’ (1975, p.10). And as Ryle accepts:  
Potentialities, it can be truistically said, are nothing actual. The world does 
not contain, over and above what exists and happens, some other things 
which are mere would-be things and could-be happenings. (1949, p.119) 
In agreement with Ryle, I deny that ascriptions of powers to things report ‘limbo 
facts’. Ascriptions of power do not ascribe to things strange nearly-properties. 
But as Ryle puts it, ‘the truth that sentences containing words like ‘might’, ‘could’ 
and ‘would…if’ do not report limbo facts does not entail that such sentences 
have not go proper jobs of their own to perform’ (p.120). The concept power, it 
seems to me, is best thought of as a way of thinking about how substances are 
connected to the processes they engage in, not just currently, but possibly in the 
future and in circumstances which may never come to pass. As Ryle contends, 
the job of ascriptions of power is to allow us to make inferences about what 
substances can, will and would do.  
My view also rejects Reductionism. On my view causation is a 
determinable process, but not all processes are examples of causation. Only 
those processes which are (to some degree) ways for substances to be effecting 
change, are species of causation. However, the notion of ‘effecting change’ is 
clearly a causal notion, hence my account cannot be reductive. However, I deny 
that my account is circular: this is because we are acquainted with the 
determinate forms of causation (like breaking and crushing) via direct 
observation. Rom Harré and Edward H. Madden (1975) argue that we directly 
perceive processes in which causal powers are manifested. They argue that 
Hume’s denial that we directly perceive powers being exercised is based on the 
false assumption that our perceptual experience is primarily atomistic. Hume 
assumes that what we directly experience are ‘punctiform’, ‘atomistic’ sensations. 
Once this assumption is made, it follows that it is impossible that a single 
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impression could be the experiential origin of our idea of causal power, and 
hence some story must be told about how the idea of causal power arises from 
multiple impressions. However, why assume that our singular impressions are all 
and only ‘puntiform’, ‘atomistic’ sensations? Why assume that we directly 
perceive the leaf as green and, later, the leaf as brown, but we do not perceive 
the leaf changing from green to brown? Anscombe objects to Hume’s idea that 
we cannot observe causality in the individual case, by pointing out that 
‘someone who says this is just not going to count anything as “observation of 
causality”’ (1971, p.8). Anscombe is, I think, making a very similar point to 
Harré and Madden. If one assumes from the outset that perceptual experience is 
primarily atomistic, then of course it will turn out that ‘all we find’ are 
impressions of events which ‘seem entirely loose and separate’ (Hume, 1975, 
p.74), but that’s because ‘the arguer has excluded from his idea of “finding” the 
sort of thing he says we don’t “find”’ (Anscombe, 1971, p.8).  
My commitment to pluralism, however, sets my view apart from many 
powers-based theories of causation. On my view, even though causation is 
sometimes a process rather than a relation, we also think of causation as a 
distinctive sort of relation. The distinctive sort of relation can be characterised as 
‘difference-making’; it is the relation that obtains between an effect and that 
which made the difference to the effect’s occurring or obtaining. Exactly what 
the nature of the cause–effect relation is, beyond difference-making, is not a 
question I shall seek to answer here. Pluralism leaves this question open – it says 
nothing specific about the nature of the cause–effect relation. It only insists that 
difference-making is distinct from the relation that obtains between a substance 
exercising a power and the event the substance produces in exercising that 
power. To give this latter relation a name, I will call it the agency relation – the 
relation that obtains between an agent and the event that agent is an agent of. 
To be clear, I am not denying that the agency relation cannot truthfully be called 
causal, in the sense that it has something to do with causation. What I am 
denying is that this relation is a relation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. The agent 
relatum of an agency relation (which in my view will always be a substance), is 
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not the cause of the event they bring about in exercising their causal power. 
Substances can be, as it were, causers – but this is just to say they can be, for 
example, movers, or breakers, or crushers, or scrapers; that is, substances can be 
things which engage in causal processes. But, substances cannot be causes, given 
the way I want to use that word. This is because substances cannot be that 
which made the difference to an effect’s occurring, as I shall presently show. My 
view also denies that the relation substances exercising causal power bear to 
substances they are acting upon, a relation I will call the agent-patient relation, is 
causation. Again, we may sometimes call the agent-patient relation ‘causal’ 
because we want to indicate that there is causation going on when the relation 
obtains, but the agent-patient relation is not what causation is.  
Substances cannot be that which made the difference to an effect’s 
occurring because difference-makers must be dated entities. Substances, as I 
understand them, are entities which exist at more than one time by ‘enduring’ – 
entities which, as it were, ‘sweep through’ time. They exist at multiple times 
(most of them anyway), but not by having temporal parts located at each time. 
Proper temporal parts are parts of an object which are cut out of the object along 
temporal dimensions but not spatial dimensions. So, temporal parts are parts 
which can be described as ‘earlier than’ or ‘later than’ other parts but not ‘to the 
left of’ or ‘to the right of’ other parts. On the view I endorse, substances don’t 
have temporal parts at all; they only have spatial parts. Because substances exist 
at more than one time by enduring, this means that substances cannot 
instantiate properties ‘atemporally’. To take an ‘atemporal’ perspective on the 
world is to think about how the world is while ignoring the distinction between 
past, present and future. It is not to think about the world as it is now, or as it 
was in the past, or will be in the future; it is to think about the world as it is 
independently of what time is ‘now’. On the endurantist view of substances, 
substances do not instantiate (at least temporary) properties independently of 
what time is now. If you think about how the world is while ignoring the 
distinction between past, present and future, it will be impossible to say what 
properties substances have. It will be impossible to say, for example, whether I 
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have blonde hair or brown hair – this is because I had blonde hair in the past 
and now I have brown hair. In contrast to substances, events are paradigmatic 
dated entities. Events which exist at more than one time do not ‘sweep through’ 
those times, they are rather ‘spread out’ across those times. That is, events which 
exist at more than one time exist at those times by having temporal parts at 
those times. Events can instantiate properties atemporally. That is, events 
instantiate properties independently of what time is now. For example, the 
passage of time has made no difference to Roger Bannister’s record-breaking 
mile-run taking 3 minutes 59.4 seconds. In 1954, this event took 3 minutes 59.4 
seconds, and today, 3 minutes 59.4 seconds is still how long the event took. 
Difference-makers must be dated entities because, in looking for that which 
made the difference to the occurrence or obtaining of an effect, we are looking 
for a part of the history of the world which stands in a relation to another part of 
the history of the world atemporally.23  
I believe pluralism is the best way to do justice to the diversity of our 
causal thinking. When it comes to explaining why the relation between the 
collision with the iceberg and the sinking of the ship, or the relation between the 
fluttering of the flag and the bull’s charging, are instances of causation, appeals 
to powers and their exercise may not provide the answer. (Appeals to powers 
and their exercise may explain why such relations exist, without explaining what 
the relations actually are.) On my view, there is no demand to provide a 
semantics for all causal discourse in terms of powers. I can allow that the 
conceptual scheme that relates the concepts power, substance, and process, may 
not (and, I suspect, cannot) be sufficient to clarify the content of all our causal 
claims.  
 
 
 
23 Fales offers a similar explanation for why events, and not substances, are the relata of causal 
relations (1990, p.54). 
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The idea that we have more than one way of thinking about causation is 
not such a novel idea. Brian Skyrms has suggested that rather than being a 
single concept, causation is an ‘amiable confused jumble’ of concepts (1984, 
p.254). My view honours this suggestion: on my view the concept causation 
covers an ontologically diverse ‘jumble’, including a distinctive cause-effect 
relation and a special kind of determinable process, which is in turn associated 
with two distinctive sorts of relation, the agency relation and the agent-patient 
relation.  
Ned Hall (2004) has also suggested that we have two concepts of 
causation, one which he calls ‘counterfactual dependence’ and another which he 
calls ‘production’ – although, Hall thinks of production as a relation holding 
between events, rather than a process which substances can engage in. Elliot 
Sober (1984) also argues that we have two concepts of causation, however, my 
view has little in common with Sober’s. Sober argues that our two causation 
concepts are ‘property causality’, which relates properties and can be analysed in 
terms of causal factors raising the probability of their effects, and ‘token 
causality’ which is a ‘physical thing’ connecting token events which has as a 
paradigm case the relation between a parent’s genetic makeup and its offspring’s 
genetic makeup.  
My view is most similar to a position put forward by Taylor (1966). In his 
introduction to Action and Purpose, Taylor distinguishes between two meanings 
which have been attached to the words ‘cause’ and ‘causation’. On the one hand, 
there is a notion of causation which is tied up with notions of power, which was 
once regarded as a ‘basic’ concept ‘more obvious and more clear than any 
concepts by means of which one might try to describe or define it’ (p.16). On the 
other hand, there is the notion of causation as a ‘complex relationship between 
changes or events, analysable in terms of other familiar relations such as 
constant conjunction and not, in any case, one that can be understood only in 
terms of some further primitive notion of active power, or the power to make 
things happen’ (p.16). Taylor then points out that the plethora of ‘theories of 
causation’ which don’t make any essential appeals to the notion of power, do not 
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show that the notion of causation which is tied up with the notion of power is 
not ‘a basic, clear, and unanalysable concept’ (p.17).  
A potential objection to the view I am proposing is that the idea that we 
think of causation in two distinct ways, as a process and separately as a cause-
effect relation, is inconsistent with the fact that we use just one word, 
‘causation’, to cover the worldly phenomenon. As Randolph Clarke presents the 
objection:  
To say that entities of both these categories [substance and event] can be 
causes is to say that causation can work in two dramatically different ways. 
Causation would then be a radically disunified phenomenon. It may be 
claimed, with some plausibility, that this cannot be so. (2003, p.208)  
I think this objection can be dealt with by acknowledging that even 
though we think of causation in two different ways, our two causation concepts 
are not entirely disconnected from each other. One way to spell out this claim is 
to offer a plausible story of how one of the two causal concepts may have grown 
out of the other. The story I find most plausible runs as follows. As I noted in 
section 3.3.3, if substances possess and exercise causal powers, then substances 
with certain powers must behave in certain ways when the conditions for the 
manifestation of the power arise, provided there is nothing interfering. In other 
words, when a power is properly triggered, it will manifest itself in ‘canonical 
ways’, as Nancy Cartwright puts it (2009, p.144). The exercise of powers will 
therefore be the source of regular and stable relations between trigger-events 
and manifestation-events. We can use knowledge of these relations to change 
how powerful substances behave. For example, if one knows that being near 
flowers triggers an allergic reaction, then one can prevent the allergic reaction 
by avoiding flowers; similarly, if one knows that a release of luteinising hormone 
by the pituitary gland triggers ovulation, then one can prevent ovulation by 
preventing the release of luteinising hormone. From this we get the idea that 
events, particularly (but not exclusively) trigger-events, can be devices for 
manipulating later events and can produce later events. However, this is a 
metaphor: events are not literally devices, and cannot literally produce events, 
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because they are not the right sort of thing to be devices or produce events – 
only substances can literally play these roles. This is because producing an event 
is a process. A trigger-event cannot produce a manifestation-event because the 
manifestation-event occurs after the trigger-event is over and done with – the 
trigger-event is in the past when the manifestation-event begins to occur, hence 
the trigger-event is not around at the right time to produce it. Only something 
which endures for the occurrence of an event can produce it. However, that talk 
of events as devices or producers is a metaphor doesn’t mean there aren’t 
conditions under which use of this metaphor is correct and conditions under 
which use of this metaphor is incorrect, just as the fact that feelings can only 
metaphorically, and not literally, be hurt doesn’t mean that it is never incorrect 
to say my feelings have been hurt. This metaphor is thus the source of the idea 
that there is a special sort of relation between events which is causation.  
Because my view has a lot in common with powers-based theories of 
causation it risks falling foul of the same objections. For example, Schaffer 
(2007) objects to the idea that worldly events unfold in a regular way because 
what can occur is limited by what powers entities possess. According to Schaffer 
such a view places implausible limits on what can be. Schaffer regards the view 
that ‘anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy 
distinct spatiotemporal positions’ (Lewis, 1986, p.87), as a ‘plausible principle 
about what is possible’ (2007, p.85). The idea that what can happen is limited 
by what powers things possess entails ‘implausible limitations on recombination’ 
for example: ‘if c is accorded the basic property of causing e, then the intuitive 
possibility of c without e is lost’ (p.85). However, I do not think the limits on 
what can be entailed by the admission that things with certain powers must 
behave in certain ways when the conditions for the manifestation of their 
powers arise are implausible. To borrow an example form Harré and Madden 
(1975), if fire has the power to burn a person, and the conditions for the 
manifestation of this power are met (e.g. a person has stepped into the fire), 
what this means is that, unless something interferes, the person will get burnt. Is 
that an implausible limitation on what can be? And as for Schaffer’s own 
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example, if some substance is engaged in the process of causing e, this does not 
imply that the possibility of the substance existing without e occurring is lost. 
While the substance is engaged in the process whose completion eventually 
constitutes occurrence of e, e has not yet been caused, and may never be caused: 
something could interrupt the process, and e may never come to be.24 As I have 
already said: interventions are nearly always possible, so the manifestation of a 
thing’s power is never metaphysically necessary, not even when the conditions 
are right for the manifestation, because the manifestation can be blocked by an 
intervention.25 So, this objection of Schaffer’s fails.  
Another common objection to powers-based theories of causation, is that 
such theories are ontologically profligate. That is, they posit the existence of 
fundamental sorts of entity, or make use of unanalysable concepts, to no 
explanatory advantage. Schaffer suggests that theories like mine involve a 
‘terrible metaphysical price for a relatively flimsy intuition’ (2007, p.89). It is 
important to be clear on what the metaphysical price of my theory is. The 
metaphysical price of my theory involves an ideological and an ontological 
component. The ideological element is the primitive power concept which I 
think we need to understand causation: I am maintaining that there are facts 
about what substances can do, which we can discover, where the notion of ‘can’ 
here cannot be analysed in other terms. The ontological element is the process 
ontology I am proposing: I am positing the existence of processes; as well as the 
history of events, there is also the bringing about of those events. The task of the 
next chapter will be spell out this process ontology in detail. I will leave it to the 
reader to judge whether the metaphysical price of this theory is terrible.  
And what do we get for this price? One of the desiderata a theory of 
causation should satisfy is, I claim, that the account of causation it provides 
 
 
 
24 This point will, I suspect, seem clearer after I have explained what processes are in chapter 4.  
25 C.f. Mumford and Anjum (2010).  
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facilitates a satisfactory theory of agency. It is my view that Humean approaches 
to causation fail to meet this desideratum. One of the conclusions of the previous 
chapter was that to properly understand the causality of agency we need to see 
it as something that casts the agent as a causal player, rather than merely the 
setting for events to cause other events. As the argument in chapter 2 
demonstrated, a theory of causation which takes causation to be, always and 
everywhere, a relation between events seems to prevent this – to recognise the 
essential role of the agent in the causality of action, we need to think of 
causation as something other than a relation between events. So, the 
explanatory advantage of my non-Humean metaphysics is a theory of agency 
which recognises the essential role of the agent in the causality of action. I will 
leave it to the reader to judge whether the intuition that agency disappears in a 
Humean metaphysics of causation is flimsy.  
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4  
Events and Processes 
In this chapter, I will propose a novel process-ontology which permits us to think 
of causation in the non-Humean, or ‘neo-Aristotelian’ way I described in the 
previous chapter. In chapter 3, I contended that causation can be a process 
rather than a relation, of which processes like breaking, crushing, bending etc 
are more determinate species. My proposal was that causation is on display, not 
only when events make the difference to the occurrence of other events, but also 
when substances exercise causal powers, and what it is for a substance to 
exercise causal power is for there to be an entity, i.e. a process, in which the 
substance engages. The process-ontology outlined in this chapter gives content 
to this proposal by explaining what a process is.  
The orthodox view of processes is that if there are any differences 
between processes and events, they are not significant enough to warrant 
treating them differently in theories of causation. Many philosophers who have 
written extensively on causation have not paid the distinction between events 
and processes much, or any, attention.26 Others have considered the distinction, 
but have explicitly rejected its metaphysical significance.27 I propose a theory of 
 
 
 
26 For example, Kim, Davidson and Bennett. See especially Kim (1976), Davidson (2001), and 
Bennett (1988). 
27 An exception may be Salmon (1984), who does take the distinctive features of processes to be 
important in understanding causation. However, for Salmon ‘the main difference between events 
and processes is that events are relatively localized in space and time, while processes have much 
greater temporal duration, and in many cases, much greater spatial extent’ (p.139).  
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processes which denies that processes belong in the same ontological category as 
events, and instead holds that processes are a special kind of universal. I suggest 
that engaging in a process is analogous to instantiating a property, and that 
events are instances of processes. On this proposal, a substance’s engagement in 
a process is a special sort of state of affairs (namely a dynamic state of affairs).  
In section 4.1, I will summarise an argument put forward by Alexander 
Mourelatos (1978) which shows that an important subclass of verbal 
predications, which Mourelatos calls process predications, do not implicitly 
quantify over particulars which have (or will have) happened. In section 4.2, I 
will suggest that what these predications implicitly quantify over are processes, 
which are a special kind of universal. In section 4.3, I will consider and respond 
to some important objections to my process ontology.  
4.1 Verbal Predications and Progressive Aspect 
Drawing on earlier work by Zeno Vendler (1957) and Kenny (1963), Mourelatos 
(1978) argues that predications can be distinguished into three semantic classes, 
event, process and state, the predications in each class reporting a different sort 
of situation or eventuality. Examples of sentences reporting events include “The 
sun went down,” and “Roger has run a mile.” Examples of process predications 
include “The plant is growing,” and “Roger was running.” And sentences that 
report states include “He knows Paris is in France,” and “Leo loved Lauren.” 
Merely considering these examples is enough to afford an intuitive grip 
on the differences between Mourelatos’s three classes. However, Mourelatos 
offers a more rigorous account of the features of predicative sentences which 
determine which of his three classes a predication falls into. Mourelatos suggests 
that, when it comes to working out what sort of eventuality a sentence reports, 
the most illuminating feature is the grammatical aspect of the main verb. 
(However, semantic and lexical features also play a part.) In Mourelatos’s view, 
process predications typically involve verbs with progressive aspect. In English, 
the progressive is formed by combining the ‘present’ or ‘ing’ participle of the verb 
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with the auxiliary verb ‘be’ as in “She is swimming” or “He was walking”.28 An 
important feature of sentences involving progressive verbs is that these 
sentences do not necessarily imply that the eventuality reported has or will come 
to an end. For example, neither “Roger was running,” nor “Roger was running a 
mile,” necessarily imply that Roger has finished, or will finish, his task. For all 
the first sentence reports Roger may still be running and for all the second 
sentence reports Roger may still be running a mile. In the present tense, this is 
even clearer: “Wendy is walking,” obviously does not imply that Wendy has 
finished walking, it implies the reverse: what Wendy is doing, walking, is still 
going on. Contrast this with sentences such as “Roger ran a mile,” which does 
not have progressive aspect. This sentence necessarily implies that Roger has 
finished his activity. It is because the progressive is often used to indicate that 
something is or was in progress that it is such a reliable indicator of process 
predications.  
The fact that progressive sentences do not necessarily imply that the 
eventuality reported has or will come to an end allows us draw a conclusion 
with metaphysical import: process predications do not implicitly quantify over 
particulars which have (or will have) happened. If process predications implicitly 
quantify over anything, what they implicitly quantify over are not particulars, or 
countable items. We can see this if we transform process predications into 
sentences that involve explicit quantification over the eventuality reported. 
Mourelatos calls this kind of transformation a ‘nominalisation transcription’ 
(1978, p.425). For example, if we nominalise the process predication “Roger 
was running,” we get “There was running by Roger”. This nominalisation does 
not include an indefinite article. Similarly, the gerund “running” couldn’t be 
preceded by a word like “few” or “many” and yield a sensible sentence. In these 
 
 
 
28 There is no consensus among linguists as to whether grammatical aspect is a universal feature 
of languages; it also appears to be encoded differently in different languages. For further 
discussion of grammatical aspect see Filip (2012), de Swart (2012) and Gvozdanović (2012). 
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respects, the sentence “There was running by Roger,” is akin to sentences like 
“There is snow on the roof,” or “There is sand in the bucket,” which involve mass 
nouns. Sentences like “There is snow on the roof,” don’t involve quantification 
over countable items; instead they involve quantification over stuff, or ‘mass 
quantification’. The similarities between the nominalisations of process 
predications and quantifications over stuffs suggest that the quantification 
involved in “There was running by Roger” is also not quantification over 
countable items. As Hornsby points out, the sentence “There was running by 
Roger” ‘tells us that something […] was going on. But it does not say of any 
event, nor of any particular of any other sort, that it was going on’ (2012, 
p.236). What the nominalisation of a process predication says there is (or was), 
is not a particular, and hence not an event.  
In this way, process predications stand in contrast to sentences like 
“Roger ran a mile.” Recall that “Roger ran a mile,” necessarily implies that Roger 
has completed the mile. When we nominalise this sentence, we get “There was a 
running of a mile by Roger”. This nominalisation does involve quantification 
over particulars, and the gerund “running” refers to a particular event. “Roger 
ran a mile,” does say that an event (at least one) has occurred, namely Roger’s 
running of a mile. It is for this reason that sentences like “Roger ran a mile,” are 
classed as event predications by Mourelatos. This is also why it is plausible to 
argue (as Davidson 1967 does) that the sentences Mourelatos classes as event 
predications involve implicit quantification over events.  
4.2 Processes as Universals   
Mourelatos’s (1978) observation that sentences reporting processes do not 
report the occurrence of any specific event, and involve mass quantification 
when they are nominalised, shows that we have a concept of a type of entity 
which is not particular, and hence not an event, but which exists by unfolding 
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over time.29 I submit that what this concept refers to is a special kind of 
universal. Processes, on my theory, are universals. So, running, singing, respiring 
and melting are single repeatable entities; when Usain Bolt is running the very 
same entity is present, or going on, as when Roger Bannister was running. More 
specifically, I propose the following ontological scheme: process, event	and 
substance are three distinct ontological categories; processes are engaged in by 
substances and events are instances of processes, where engagement and 
instancing are primitive concepts.  
The distinctness of the categories process, event and substance, is indicated 
by the differing existence conditions for members of each of these three 
categories. A particular event e exists, or rather happens (happening is an event’s 
mode of existing), only when a substance engages in the process e is an instance 
of, and then completes the process. A process P exists, or rather goes on (going 
on is a process’s mode of existing), only when, and for as long as, a substance 
engages in the process. Substances do not depend for their existence on their 
engaging in any processes or their involvement in any event (although 
substances might need to engage in certain processes to count as a substance of 
 
 
 
29 Although one must attend to verbal predications with progressive aspect to establish that 
English-speakers have a concept of an entity which is not particular and which exists by 
unfolding over time, the presence of a process concept may be less hidden in other cultures. For 
example, Wang (2013) notes that ‘it is well known that Chinese thought lays great stress on 
process’ and ‘an emphasis on becoming is implicitly embodied in its understanding of Tao, the 
ultimate concept in Chinese tradition’ (p.178). Wang describes Tao as ‘the creative advance of 
the world’ (p.178), and notes that although Tao is translated into English as “way” or “path”, i.e. 
as a noun, in Chinese the word serves as both noun and verb – it is the following of a path as 
much as it is a path to follow. Thus, it seems that Tao is best thought of not as analogous to 
Schaffer’s ‘history’ (2007, p.83; see chapter 3, section 3.1.1) which lacks the dynamism essential 
to the Tao concept, and more similar to my concept of a highly determinable process (c.f. 
chapter 32 of the Tao Te Ching). 
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a certain kind). So, processes and events depend for their existence on 
substances, each in different ways, but not the other way around.30  
Engagement and instancing connect entities which fall into distinct 
ontological categories, but it would be wrong to consider engagement and 
instancing as themselves ‘elements of being’, as Lowe puts it (2005b, p.35). 
Entities of different ontological categories never come by themselves: reality is 
substances engaging in processes and thereby bringing about events. Thus, 
entities of different ontological categories exist together. The concepts of 
engagement and instancing are used to explain how the togetherness of entities 
of different sorts is asymmetrically structured, but engagement and instancing are 
not themselves entities of any kind.31 Lowe explains this point by appealing to a 
distinction between ‘ontological content’ and ‘ontological form’: 
Beings, or entities, we may say, provide ontological content. But all beings 
also have an ontological form. The ontological form of an entity is provided 
by its place in the system of categories, for it is in virtue of a being’s category 
that it is suited or unsuited to combine in various ways with other beings of 
the same or different categories. (2005b, p.49) 
Ontological content is exhausted by the entities which belong in the various 
ontological categories. Inter-category ‘relations’ like engagement and instancing 
help us explain how the ontological form of entities in these categories is 
 
 
 
30 In fact, I do not think there are any substances which are not, at some time, engaged in at least 
one process, hence I do not think there are any substances which have not, at any time, 
supporting any processes or events. But I take this to be a contingent truth. Worlds where 
substances exist without engaging in any processes at all seem metaphysically possible. 
31 Denying that engagement and instancing are elements of being allows me to avoid an objection 
akin to Bradley’s regress (1893), namely: does a substance S need to engage in engagement in 
order to engage in a process P, and if it needs to engage in engagement, does it need to engage 
in engagement* to engage in engagement, and so on? The answer is: no, a substance S does not 
need to engage in engagement in order to engage in a process P, because engagement is not a 
process (or an entity of any kind). A similar answer is offered to the question of whether an 
event needs to be an instance of instancing in order to be an instance of a process. I intend this 
sort of response to be parallel to responses to Bradley’s regress offered by Armstrong (1989, 
pp.109-110) and Lowe (2005, ch.3).  
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different. This means that to call engagement and instancing ‘ties’ or ‘relations’ 
or ‘connections’ is misleading – it suggests that engagement and instancing are 
entities, or elements of being, when they are not. Frank Ramsey said, of the ‘tie’ 
between a quality and the thing which possesses the quality, ‘I cannot 
understand what sort of thing it could be, and prefer Wittgenstein’s view that in 
the atomic fact the objects are connected without the help of any mediator’ 
(1925, p.29). This point could equally be made about the tie between a process 
and a substance, or a process and an event. The correct response, I contend, is to 
deny that the tie is any sort of thing at all (and hence not a mediator). 
Although I am claiming that processes are universals, it is important to 
distinguish processes from properties, which are also thought to be universals by 
some philosophers (including Armstrong 1978a, 1978b, 1989). The distinction 
between processes and properties can be drawn in the following way: properties 
concern the static nature of things – they are qualities, ‘ways for things to be’ – 
whereas processes are dynamic, that is, they are connected with how a thing is 
changing over time. My proposal is that processes are ways for a substance to be 
changing, to be resisting change, or to be effecting change (this last sub-group of 
processes are picked out by the concept ‘activity’).  
There are similarities between my definition of a process and Lawrence 
Lombard’s (1986) definition of a ‘dynamic property’. Lombard defines a dynamic 
property as a ‘property of moving from having the one to having the other static 
property’ (1986, p.172). So, for example, when a leaf changes colour, from 
green to red, being green and being red are two static properties, the change in 
colour is an event, and changing from green to red is a dynamic property. All 
Lombard’s dynamic properties would count as processes on my view. However, 
because I hold that processes can be ways for a substance to resist change, a 
substance can be engaging in a process even if no overall change is occurring – 
which is not possible for Lombard’s dynamic properties. For example, on my 
definition of process, keeping still would be a process a person could engage in, 
and thermoregulation is a process many mammalian bodies engage in – when 
these processes are going on, the substance engaging in them is not undergoing 
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any overall change, or ‘moving from having one to having the other static 
property’. The function of these processes is precisely to avoid overall change.  
The bare bones of my theory are summarised in figure 1. In sections 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2 I will explain in more detail what it is for a substance to engage in a 
process and for an event to be an instance of a process.   
 
4.2.1 Engagement  
The existence condition for processes is logically equivalent to the following 
principle: 
Engagement Principle: A process cannot go on without some substance 
engaging in the process.  
The Engagement Principle gives us a better understanding of what it is for a 
process to go on: to go on is to be engaged in (this contrasts with what it is for 
an event to be happening: for an event to be happening a temporal part of the 
event must presently exist).  
The Engagement Principle is analogous to David Armstrong’s 
‘Instantiation Principle’ for properties (conceived of as universals). Armstrong 
claims that there are no properties which are not instantiated by substances. In 
other words, properties must be instantiated by something at some point in time 
to exist; eternally uninstantiated properties don’t exist (Armstrong 1978a, p.113; 
1989, pp.75-82). I do not know whether the instantiation principle is true of 
properties, but something like it is true of processes, or so I claim. (I will 
Process
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Substance
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Activity
ActionSubstance (agent)
Engagement Instancing
Agency RelationFig.1 
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consider potential counterexamples to my Engagement Principle in section 
4.3.2) In fact, I see engagement as similar, in a number of ways, to Armstrong’s 
conception of instantiation. Both are supposed to connect a substance to a 
universal, and both concepts are supposed to be primitive. Furthermore, just as 
Armstrong claims that when a substance is metaphysically bound to a universal 
by instantiation, this unity of substance and universal is a ‘state of affairs’ 
(Armstrong, 1989, p.88), so I want to claim that a substance’s engaging in a 
process is a state of affairs. To distinguish states of affairs constituted by a 
substance’s instantiating a property, and states of affairs constituted by a 
substance’s engaging in a process, I will call the former static states of affairs, and 
the latter dynamic states of affairs. It is dynamic states of affairs which are 
reported by Mourelatos’s process predications.  
4.2.2 Instancing 
In Armstrong’s ontology, everything that exists is either a state of affairs or one 
or other element of a state of affairs, and for Armstrong there are only two such 
elements: particular and universal. On my scheme, there is not one, but two 
distinct ways in which particulars and universals are connected: engagement and 
instancing. Instancing is the manner in which events and processes are 
connected; it should not be confused with either engagement or Armstrong’s 
instantiation.  
I take instancing to be a primitive concept which helps explain the 
ontological form of the entities it relates. Lowe (2005b) also takes the relation 
between a universal and its instance to be primitive. Lowe contends that this 
relation holds between ‘non-substantial universals’ or ‘attributes’, like the 
property redness, and ‘modes’ or ‘property-instances’, which are particularised 
properties like the redness of this particular rose. It also holds between 
‘substantial universals’ or ‘kinds’, like doghood, and ‘objects’ or ‘individual 
substances’ like my dog Fido. Whether or not attributes and modes, and kinds 
and individual substances, really are connected by (what I call) instancing 
depends on whether Lowe’s four-category ontology is coherent, plausible and 
justified. I will not attempt to settle this question. However, I will assume that 
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the following conditional is true: if attributes, modes, kinds and individual 
substances all exist, then modes are instances of attributes and individual 
substances are instances of kinds. Making this assumption enables me to use the 
relationships between attributes and modes, and kinds and individual 
substances, to explain, by analogy, the nature of the relationship between 
processes and events.  
Lowe holds that the relationship between a universal and its instance 
gives rise to a distinctive sort of existential dependence which Lowe calls ‘non-
rigid existential dependence’ (2005b, p.34). When two entities are related by an 
instancing relation the instanced entity non-rigidly existentially depends on the 
instance, according to Lowe. Taking as his example the kind doghood, Lowe 
explains non-rigid existential dependence in the following way: 
The thought here is that, necessarily, this universal exists only if some 
individual dogs exist, even though the universal does not depend rigidly for 
its existence upon any individual dog ‘in particular’ (as we say). Supposing, 
for instance, that Fido and Rover are the only existing dogs, we do not want 
to imply that doghood would not have existed if neither Fido nor Rover had 
existed, but only that it would not have existed if no individual dog 
whatever had existed. None the less, it seems that there is a perfectly good 
sense in which doghood does actually depend for its existence upon Fido 
and Rover, because it depends for its existence on there being some 
individual dogs and it turns out that Fido and Rover are (as we suppose) all 
the individual dogs that there actually are. (2005b, p.37) 
A similar sort of dependence relation can be said to hold between 
processes and events. For example, it is possible to argue that the process 
running cannot exist unless some running event or other also exists. The 
Engagement Principle entails that processes cannot exist unless there is/was 
some substance engaging in the processes, and once some substance has 
engaged in a process and completed it, there exists an event. If we assume that 
all processes are eventually completed, then if the Engagement Principle is true, 
it is hard to see how a process could exist without there being events that are 
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instances of that process.32 To this extent, processes are existentially dependent 
on events which are instances of those processes. But this existential dependence 
is not rigid. For example, suppose the only run that has ever or will ever take 
place is the four-minute run Roger took. The running process does not depend 
on this actual four-minute event ‘in particular’ but, paraphrasing Lowe, because 
the running process depends for its existence on there being some individual 
running event and it turns out that Roger’s four-minute run is (as we suppose) 
the only running event that actually exists there is a perfectly good sense in 
which the running process does actually depend for its existence upon Roger’s 
four-minute run.  
This argument depends on the assumption that all processes are 
eventually completed. There are two difficulties associated with this assumption. 
First, it is not clear what it means to say that processes are the sorts of thing 
which can be completed or why events come into existence only when processes 
are completed. Second, it is not clear what entitles me to assume that all 
processes are eventually completed – for example, it seems possible that 
someone could have been building a house and yet never managed to get the 
house built.  
Taking these three difficulties in turn, what does it mean to say that 
processes are completed? One might reasonably suppose that only processes like 
running a mile, building a house, and painting a picture can be completed. 
These processes are all telic: they have a natural end-point. They are what 
Vendler would call ‘accomplishments’. They all involve a ‘“climax” which has to 
be reached if the action is to be what it is claimed to be’ (Vendler, 1957, p.145), 
or as Mourelatos puts it, accomplishments ‘involve a product, upshot, or 
outcome’ (1978, p.417). There is an obvious sense in which telic processes can 
be completed: telic processes are completed when the relevant product, upshot, 
 
 
 
32 Hornsby (2012, p.237) acknowledges the truth of this claim. 
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or outcome has been attained. For other sorts of processes however, processes 
which do not involve a product, upshot, or outcome, it is more difficult to make 
sense of the idea that they can be completed. Running-a-mile is completed when 
a mile is run – running, in contrast does not have an obvious end-point, so what 
sense can be made of the idea that running can be completed?  
The way to make sense of the idea is to recognise that, as Anthony Galton 
and Riichiro Mizoguchi point out, ‘at sufficiently fine temporal resolution, the 
running process is seen as a succession of alternating leg movements, none of 
which on its own would constitute running’ (2009, p.75). This means that no 
stretch or episode of running can last for only a millisecond: to run, one must 
make the right sort of leg movements – one needs to raise one leg, lift off from 
the other, land on the first, transfer weight, and so on – it is impossible to 
accomplish this in a millisecond. There is, therefore, something which one must 
complete before a running event can be said to exist. And if this something had 
never been completed, then we would say that no running process was ever 
engaged in. For example, if someone made the first movement of running, i.e. 
raised one leg, but got no further than this, then we would deny that that person 
was ever running. However, even though there cannot be a millisecond-long 
run, if there is a running event, then the runner was running, i.e. engaged in the 
process, for that millisecond and a running event partially occupies that first 
millisecond of time. So, even non-telic processes can, in a sense, be completed. 
A key difference between telic and non-telic processes is that in the case 
of non-telic processes, if the process was started but never completed, then it 
was never really engaged in. In the case of telic processes, this is not true: a 
substance could have been engaging in a telic process even if they never 
accomplished the process’s product, upshot or outcome. For example, it can still 
be true to say that Roger was running a mile, even if he never managed the full 
mile. This is the imperfective paradox: if Roger was running a mile, this does not 
imply that he ran a mile. (The imperfective paradox does not apply in the case of 
non-telic processes: if Roger was running, then this does imply that Roger ran.)  
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The idea that a running-of-a-mile event comes into existence only when a 
substance has run a whole mile seems right to me. However, acknowledging this 
creates a problem: it now seems that the running-a-mile process does not non-
rigidly existentially depend on its instances, because a person can be running a 
mile even in cases where they never complete this process, and hence where 
running-of-a-mile events never come into existence. This point relates to the 
second difficulty raised above: what entitles me to assume that all processes are 
eventually completed? This difficulty might mean that the analogy I have tried 
to draw between events and processes on the one hand, and individual 
substances and kinds on the other, cannot be drawn, which would mean that 
this analogy cannot help explain what instancing is. 
The best way to respond to this difficulty is, I think, to claim that not 
every process predication implicitly quantifies over a process. Just as Armstrong 
denied that every property-predicate corresponds to a property-universal, so I 
can deny that every process-predicate corresponds to a process-universal. I can 
claim that processes to which the imperfective paradox applies are non-natural: 
predicates like ‘is running a mile’ do not correspond to universals. What makes it 
the case that, for example, Roger is running a mile, is not that there is a 
distinctive running-a-mile universal. This predication may be true just in case 
Roger is engaged in a running process, and some other facts hold true.33 The 
point here is that non-telic processes do non-rigidly existentially depend on their 
instances, just like kinds – telic processes do not, but perhaps non-telic processes 
are the only processes there really are.  
I think the relationship between events and processes is analogous to the 
relationship between individual substances and kinds. However, it is also 
analogous to the relationship between attributes and modes. Modes are 
 
 
 
33 I do not know what these other facts would be. See Wolfson (2012) for a discussion of what 
the truth conditions for process predications involving imperfective aspect should be.  
  
100 
‘unstructured’. That is, modes are not constructed from entities of other 
categories in the way that I said states of affairs are. An important aspect of the 
thesis that events are instances of processes is therefore that events are 
unstructured particulars.  
Some philosophers have suggested that events just are modes, or property 
instances. For example, Donald Williams (1953, p.172) writes that ‘generally 
speaking any event is a trope’. And Lowe suggests at one point in The Four 
Category Ontology (2005b, pp.80-81) that events are instances of relations. The 
problem with taking events to be modes is that it cannot account for the 
dynamic nature of events. Essential to our concept of event is that events are 
things that happen. Frederick Schmitt (1983) has suggested that a necessary 
condition for something’s being a happening is that it comes into being over its 
duration. So, for example, the relation ‘is colliding with’ is something that two 
objects can exemplify, and an instance of this relation (if there is such a thing) is 
something that exists from the moment the first object starts colliding with the 
second to the moment it stops, but crucially, it doesn’t come into being over this 
duration – it exists complete from the start. For this reason, instances of 
relations are not things that happen. So, an instance of the relation ‘is colliding 
with’ is not an event. Processes, unlike properties and relations, are dynamic, 
that is, they are concerned with how a substance is changing, or resisting 
change, or effecting change – they are entities which essentially unfold over 
time. This means that an instance of a process is precisely the sort of entity 
which comes into existence gradually, temporal part by temporal part, as a 
substance engages in the process.  
Furthermore, it is intuitively more plausible to say that there are instances 
of processes than it is to say there are instances of properties. Jonathan Bennett 
nicely captures this: 	
I used to object to the notion of a quality instance or trope, along these 
lines: “This stone is a particular substance; its shape is a universal property, 
flatness. The friends of tropes are trying to introduce a third item that is 
particular rather than universal but is a property rather than a substance, 
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namely the flatness of this stone. This is a gratuitous, pointless addition.” 
(1988, p.90) 
Of course, most trope theorists are not trying to introduce an additional third 
item, they are instead trying to do away with substances and universals 
altogether, claiming that both are constructed from tropes. However, if one 
already endorses a metaphysics that includes substances and properties as 
fundamental, then also including property-instances as fundamental might seem, 
as Bennett suggests, ‘gratuitous’ and ‘pointless’. But Bennett continues: 
Try the objection again, but this time taking a property that is more 
naturally thought of as constituting an event: “The stone is a particular 
substance; its way of moving is a universal property falling. The friends of 
tropes are trying to introduce a third item that is particular rather than 
universal, but is a property rather than a substance, namely the fall of this 
stone…” – at which point the objection peters out. One cannot confidently 
continue “…and this is a gratuitous, pointless addition”. (1988, p.90) 
What’s right here is the idea that positing a ‘third item’, which is a 
particular, in addition to the stone and the falling (which Bennett calls a 
property, but which I say is a process), does not seem like a ‘gratuitous, pointless 
addition’. This might be because we are already in less doubt about the existence 
of events than about the existence of property-instances. There are several 
reasons why this might be: first, we might think events must exist in order to be 
the relata of difference-making relations; second, we might think events must 
exist because we have singular terms that seem to refer to them; third, we might 
think events must exist to be truth-makers of claims about what has happened. 
We may also be in less doubt about the existence of events than about the 
existence of property instances because events are extended in time: there is a 
dimension of space-time that they fill or occupy, whereas it is unclear whether 
property-instances occupy space-time or not.  
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4.3 Objections and Replies 
4.3.1 The Temporal Profile of Processes 
An important consequence of the view of processes just outlined is that it entails 
that processes are not temporally extended. It is fairly uncontroversial that 
whatever the correct characterisation of universals is, universals do not occupy 
or fill space or time – they are not spatially or temporally extended. So, given 
that I take processes to be universals I am committed to the claim that processes 
are not spatially or temporally extended. This is contrary to the views of many 
philosophers writing about processes; most view processes as a species of 
occurrence and take temporal extension as part of the definition of occurrence. 
Thus, a potential objection to my theory is that it wrongly denies that processes 
are temporally extended.  
One reason to think processes are temporally extended is because 
processes ‘take time’ and surely only entities which are temporally extended can 
take time. That processes are temporally extended is certainly one way of 
accommodating the intuition that they take time, but it is not the only way. If 
processes are ways for a substance to be changing, resisting change or effecting 
change, then it follows that nothing can be going on for only an instant 
(although, of course, it can be true at an instant that something is going on). It 
seems to me that the intuition that processes take time can be saved by 
acknowledging that no dynamic states of affairs can obtain for only an instant – 
the intuition that processes take time need not commit us to anything more than 
this.  
Interestingly, not every philosopher willing to countenance process as a 
distinctive ontological category thinks processes are temporally extended. For 
instance, Rowland Stout thinks that processes are ‘occurrent continuants’ i.e. 
‘things which simultaneously occur and continue or endure’ (2016, p.42). Thus, 
Stout thinks that processes persist by enduring. Stout (1997) writes: 
There is something absurd about saying that at any one time while 
something is happening only part of what is happening is present. What is 
  
103 
happening at any moment during a process is the whole process, not just 
part of it. The claim that what is present at any moment is not the whole 
process but a process part is every bit as bad as the parallel claim that an 
object as a whole is not present at any one moment, but all that is present is 
a time-slice of an object. For it is also a distinctive feature of our conceptual 
scheme of processes that we suppose a process to be both present on one 
occasion and literally identical with a process present as a whole on another. 
The phrase ‘What is happening now’ is naturally taken to denote a whole 
process; and we do want to claim that what is happening now is literally 
identical with what is happening at some other time —the very same 
process. (1997, pp. 25–26) 
Helen Steward (2013a) rightly points out that nothing said here supports 
the conclusion that processes do not have temporal parts. We can say of events 
(entities which do have temporal parts) that while they are happening, what is 
happening at any moment is the whole event, not just part of it (although at 
least one part of the event is also happening). This clearly does not licence the 
claim that the whole event, rather than a part of it, is present at any moment 
during which it is happening. The claim that the whole event is happening at 
some time during which the event is happening can be true, while the claim that 
the whole event is present at some time during which the event is happening is 
false. I agree with Stout that there is something absurd about saying that while a 
process is going on, only part of the process is present at any moment during 
which it is going on. However, merely noting what we can say about things 
while they are happening isn’t enough to show this. Indeed, even though I agree 
with Stout that ‘part of our conceptual scheme of processes is that we suppose a 
process to be both present on one occasion and literally identical with a process 
present as a whole on another’, I think he holds this view for the wrong reasons.  
Stout makes two mistakes. The first is one that Steward (2013a) points 
out. Steward argues that upholding both of the following claims about processes 
is an unstable position:  
(a) Processes are occurrences (things that happen or occur). 
(b) Processes are not temporally extended and do not have temporal parts. 
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The reason for this is: part of what it means for an entity to be an occurrence is 
that it is temporally extended and has temporal parts. Denying this leaves us 
with no clear way of drawing a distinction between things that happen or occur 
and things that exist at more than one time by enduring. The second mistake is 
that Stout assumes that because we think processes can be wholly present on 
multiple occasions this makes them comparable only with objects that persist 
over time by enduring. He doesn’t consider that this also makes processes 
comparable with universals which are instantiated at more than one place and at 
more than one time without being partly present at one place/time and partly 
present at another.  
The charge Stout faces, that his view is unstable because he upholds both 
(a) and (b) is potentially a charge that could be directed at me. If processes are 
universals they are not temporally extended and do not have temporal parts, so I 
accept (b). This means that, on pain of instability, I cannot accept (a). However, 
I am happy to reject (a). I agree that what it is to be an occurrence – to be 
something that happens or occurs – is to be the sort of entity which is temporally 
extended and has temporal parts. Denying that processes are the sorts of thing 
that happen or occur might seem very unintuitive. However, even if we deny 
that processes happen or occur, we can still say that processes are the sorts of 
things that go on, where ‘to go on’ means ‘to be engaged in’. Furthermore, the 
difference between events and processes becomes much clearer if we deny that 
processes are occurrences: events are things that happen, which are temporally 
extended and which have temporal parts; processes are things that go on, i.e. 
things that are engaged in, they are universals, are not temporally extended and 
do not have temporal parts. 
4.3.2 Subject-less Processes  
The Engagement Principle states that a process cannot exist unless there is some 
substance engaging in it. However, some processes appear to be subject-less, 
that is, some processes appear to go on even though there are no substances 
which engage in them. My response to this objection will be, to put it as bluntly 
as possible, to deny that there are such processes.  
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Some putative counterexamples to my view include processes reported by 
predications such as “the water is boiling,” “the forest is dying,” “the country is 
celebrating,” “the university is failing,” “inflation is falling,” “the magnetic field 
is fluctuating,” “his health is deteriorating,” and “it’s raining,”. None of these 
examples seem to report processes engaged in by something which fits our 
intuitive conception of a substance: “the water” refers to a portion of stuff, a 
forest is an ecosystem, “the country” refers to a group of people who share a 
national identity, inflation is the increase in the average prices of goods and 
services, a magnetic field is an area within which magnetic forces act, someone’s 
health is a condition of them, and there is nothing which rains. Although the 
water, inflation, the magnetic field etc are being treated as subjects in these 
sentences, not everything that can be treated as a grammatical subject is, 
metaphysically speaking, a substance (consider Ramsey’s famous ‘Wisdom is a 
property of Socrates’).  
There are two strategies of response available here which I think are 
perfectly reasonable. The first is to reduce the problematic sentence. This 
strategy works best in cases like “it’s raining” or “his health is deteriorating”. In 
these cases, one can deny that raining and deteriorating are really going on. 
Raining is perhaps a useful way to talk about many changes and processes 
engaged in by genuine substances (e.g. water droplets) which would be too 
difficult to directly refer to. And although we may speak of conditions changing, 
one can argue that it is not the condition itself which is engaging in a process of 
change, it is the man who is engaged in a process of change, in this case a 
process of health-deterioration; his health ‘changes’ only in the sense that earlier 
periods of it were good and later periods of it were poor. 
The second strategy is to adopt a liberal conception of substance so that 
things like an ecosystem and inflation count as substances after all, perhaps by 
stipulating that having causal power is a sufficient condition for being a 
substance, i.e. the sort of thing that can engage in a process. I think there are 
advantages to being liberal about what the substances are.	I certainly think it is 
true that we can, and do, make mistakes about what the substances are. With 
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medium-sized things, it is easy to distinguish the substances from the processes: 
the plant is the substance, photosynthesising is the process; the cat is the 
substance, purring is the process. But in other domains I suspect it is much 
harder to determine what are the substances and what are the processes. For 
example, are electrons substances? Or are they ways for areas of space to be 
changing over time? I am also open-minded about the possibility that, in some 
domains or in some cases, there may be no objective answer regarding what are 
the substances and what are the processes. Electrons – and perhaps inflation too 
– are theoretical entities, that is, they are entities which are posited to serve an 
explanatory purpose. It may be that in the case of theoretical entities, whether 
we regard these entities as substances or processes depends on the theoretical 
work we want to put them to. Liberalism about what the substances are allows 
for these sorts of indeterminacy.  
The ontology I am proposing in this chapter involves weighty claims 
about the nature of substances. As well as claiming that substance is a 
fundamental ontological category, and that events and processes depend for 
their existence on substances, my view also entails that substances persist 
through time by enduring. That substances must persist through time by 
enduring follows from two claims: first, that a process exists only when a 
substance is engaging in the process, and second, that no process can be going 
on only for an instant, or equivalently that engaging in a process takes time. The 
first claim entails that substances are what engage in processes, and the second 
claim entails that what engages in a process at each instant during the time a 
process is going on must be the very same entity – if a distinct entity engaged in 
the process at each instant during the time the process was going on, e.g. a 
temporal part of a substance, then this would contravene my claim that 
engaging in a process takes time. Unfortunately, I do not have space to defend 
this view of substances here (although the advantages this ontological scheme as 
a whole confers when it comes to giving a theory of agency constitutes indirect 
evidence that the conception of substances here proposed is worthwhile). 
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Fortunately, an endurantist view of substances has been defended in detail 
elsewhere.34 
4.3.3 Instantaneous Events 
A potential objection to my proposal that events are instances of processes is that 
it would seem to imply that there are no instantaneous events. Processes, I have 
suggested, essentially take time. No process can be going on for only an instant. 
Events, I have suggested, come into existence when a substance engages in a 
process and then finishes or stops the process, which seems to entail that events 
must be temporally extended. However, some events don’t take any time at all. 
For example, William’s winning of the race is an instantaneous change of state. I 
do not wish to deny the existence of instantaneous events. However, I think they 
can be accommodated within my ontological scheme. The Engagement Principle 
entails that it is a contradiction to say that a substance engaged in a process and 
the process did not go on for any time at all, but there is no lower limit on how 
long a process has to go on for. Some processes are engaged in and completed in 
a very short amount of time. For example, when one lights a match, for a period 
of time the match is igniting – but this process probably goes on for only 
milliseconds before it is completed. The most extreme value of the variable 
length of time a process can go on for is zero – in this case, the process doesn’t 
really go on at all, and hence this case is an exceptional one. I take 
instantaneous events to be, to borrow a term from mathematics, degenerate 
limiting cases. They are what happens when the variable length of time the 
process can go on for takes its most extreme value.  
 
 
 
34 See Lowe (1998) especially chapters 4 and 5. See Sattig (2002) and Rea (1998) for defences 
of endurantism against the problem of temporal intrinsics; Gilmore (2007) defends endurantism 
against issues deriving from the possibility of coinciding objects; Lowe (2005a) defends 
endurantism against issues to do with vagueness. See also Haslanger (1994) for a discussion of 
the relationship between the endurance/perdurance debate and the metaphysics of Humean 
Supervenience.  
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4.3.4 Event Individuation 
The ontological scheme I have proposed includes substantive novel claims about 
what events are. One last potential issue with my account is that it is unclear 
what it entails about how events are individuated. Proposing identity conditions 
for events, that is, proposing conditions which stipulate when x is the same 
event as y (where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are event designators), which adequately capture 
our intuitions regarding event identity has proven difficult. Indeed, a strong 
reason for rejecting the property exemplification view of events championed by 
Kim (1976) is that this theory entails that events are more finely individuated 
than we would expect happenings to be.  
On Kim’s view, an event is the exemplification of a property by an object 
at a time. Kim’s theory of events yields the following identity condition for 
events: event x and event y are one and the same if and only if x makes the same 
property attribution to the same object at the same time as y does. According to 
this identity condition, an event e1, which is the exemplification of property F, 
and an event e2, which is the exemplification of property G, could be the very 
same event, even if F and G are distinct, if e1 were also an exemplification of G 
and e2 were also an exemplification of F. But, as Lombard (1986, p.55) argues, 
this cannot be the case on Kim’s view. This is because Kim thinks events are 
things which can explain and be explained, and if e1 and e2 really are identical, 
then one should be able to substitute one for the other in an explanation without 
affecting the truth of the explanation. If F and G are distinct then the 
exemplification of F at a time and the exemplification G at a time are not 
necessarily intersubstitutable in explanations. So, Kim is committed to the view 
that events are constructed entities made up of three constituents, a property, an 
object and a time, and an event which is the exemplification of property P1 by 
object o1 and time t1 is identical with an event which is the exemplification of P2 
by object o2 and time t2 only if P1=P2, o1=o2 and t1=t2. This results in some 
unacceptable event individuations.  
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Bennett (1988) offers the following counterexample. Suppose that at 
noon David kisses Eva just once, doing it tenderly, on her cheek. According to 
Kim’s theory, the following name three events:  
a The tender kiss that David gave Eva at noon 
b The kiss that David planted on Eva’s cheek at noon 
c The tender kiss that David planted on Eva’s cheek at noon.  
Each has the form [(David, Eva), P, noon] with different values of P – “kissed 
tenderly”, “kissed on the cheek”, “kissed tenderly on the cheek” – and because 
the Ps are different the named events are different (1988, p.79). 
Bennett asks: was event b – the kiss David planted on Eva’s cheek at noon 
– tender? And was event a – the tender kiss David gave Eva at noon – planted on 
Eva’s cheek? It would be absurd to say no to either question, and Kim doesn’t. 
But now it seems that there were many tender kisses planted on Eva’s cheek at 
noon. It is no affront to common sense to say that there are many different facts 
about David and his kiss that are true, e.g. that it was tender, that it was planted 
on Eva’s cheek, that it occurred at noon etc. But it is unintuitive to say that there 
was more than one tender kiss occurring at noon if David kissed Eva only once.  
My theory would involve the very same error if it entailed that no event 
can be an instance of more than one process. Fortunately, nothing in the idea 
that events are instances of processes prevents us from accepting that the same 
event can be an instance of more than one process. As I said in section 4.2.2, the 
instancing relationship between processes and events is analogous to the 
relationship between kinds and individual substances, so because individual 
substances can be instances of more than one kind, it seems natural to suppose 
that events can be instances of more than one process. Put more abstractly, on 
my view, an event x, which owes its existence to substance S engaging in process 
P over period of time Dt, and event y, which owes its existence to substance S’ 
engaging in process P’, which is distinct from P, over period of time Dt, can be 
the very same event. This principle allows the single tender kiss David planted 
on Eva’s cheek at noon to be an instance of at least three distinct processes: 
kissing, tender-kissing and kissing-on-the-cheek. It also allows for the thesis that 
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when an agent js by ying, the event of the agent’s jing is the same event as that 
of her ying, as long as the activities jing are ying were engaged in for the same 
length of time.35 So, to borrow an example from Maria Alvarez and John Hyman 
(1998, p.234), when Jean gave the signal to her companions by opening the 
window, Jean’s opening the window and Jean’s giving the signal are one and the 
same event. This principle also allows us to identify an event x, which owes its 
existence to substance S engaging in process P over period of time Dt, with an 
event y, which owes its existence to substance S’ engaging in process P’ over 
period of time Dt, even when S and S’ are distinct substances. So, for example, 
my view would allow us to identify an event of an agent’s jing a patient with 
the event of the patient’s being jed, even though jing and being jed are distinct 
processes (one is active one is passive), and even where the agent is distinct 
from the patient.36  
However, although my view allows that a single event can be an instance 
of many processes (even of processes which are engaged in by different 
substances), my view does not entail any general principles which tell us how to 
decide which processes a single event is and is not an instance of. For example, 
my view allows us to identify an event of an agent’s jing a patient with the event 
of the patient’s being jed, but it does not entail that we must.  
An alternative theory of events, which takes events to be spatiotemporal 
particulars, i.e. entities which occupy both time and space, also suffers problems 
to do with event individuation. In keeping with this theory, Edward Lemmon 
(1967) suggests that an event x and an event y are one and the same if and only 
if event x and event y occupy exactly the same spatiotemporal region. Willard 
van Orman Quine’s theory of event individuation is very similar: 
 
 
 
35 The view that that when an agent js by ying, the event of the agent’s jing is the same event 
as that of her ying was perhaps defended by Anscombe (1963, pp.37-47) and has been endorsed 
by Hornsby (1980) and Davidson (1969). 
36 I will discuss this somewhat controversial idea again in chapter 5.  
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Physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time [i.e. 
conceived of as entities stretched out in time as well as space, and whose 
earlier and later periods of existence count as temporal parts], are not to be 
distinguished from events or, in the concrete sense of the term, processes. 
Each comprises simply the content, however heterogenous, of some portion 
of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered. (Quine, 1960, 
p.171)  
As chunks of space-time, events x and y, on the Quinian view, are one and the 
same if and only if x and y have the same spatiotemporal location.  
However, as Davidson (1967) objects, this view entails that there cannot 
be more than one event happening in the same place at the same time, and 
intuitively there can be many events happening in the same place at the same 
time. Davidson (1967) provides an example: consider a metal sphere which is 
simultaneously heating and rotating, Lemmon’s identity condition would have it 
that the sphere’s rotation and its heating are one single event, because the 
rotation and the heating occur at the same time in the same place, but intuitively 
we want to regard the rotation and the heating as two distinct events which 
occur at the same time in the same place.  
My view does not forbid multiple events from occupying a single spatio-
temporal location. Put more naturally, my view allows that many things can 
happen at the same time and place. However, although my view allows that 
many events can happen at the same time, my view does entail any general 
principles which tell us when we should differentiate simultaneous events. In 
fact, the only constraint on event identity which is entailed by the idea that 
events are instances of processes is that a single event cannot occupy multiple 
temporal locations except by having parts at each location. For example, I made 
tea yesterday, and I made tea today. These are two distinct tea-making events, 
not one; they may be the same type of event, but they are distinct tokens of that 
type. Roderick Chisholm (1970) disagrees with me on this point: he thinks that 
one and the same event can recur. Chisholm’s view is incompatible with what 
my process ontology entails about what events are. This is because, on my 
theory, events are particulars and as such cannot be repeated, and so cannot 
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recur. My theory entails that an event x is one and the same as an event y only if 
x and y occupy the very same temporal location. Furthermore, on my theory, 
events owe their existence to substances engaging in processes and then 
completing those processes, so the temporal extent of an event is determined by 
how long the substance that ontologically supports the event engaged in the 
process the event is an instance of.  
My theory entails that a single event cannot occupy multiple temporal 
locations except by having parts at each location, but it leaves open whether a 
single event can be an instance of many processes, and whether many events can 
all happen in the same place at the same time. My theory does not say that our 
intuitions regarding these questions – that a single event can be an instance of 
many processes, and that many events can all happen in the same place at the 
same time – are wrong, unlike Kim’s (1976) events as exemplifications view, and 
Quine’s (1960) view of events as spatiotemporal particulars. But my theory 
offers no explanation why these intuitions are right either. In short, my theory as 
it stands simply does not tell us enough about the nature of events to allow us to 
put together necessary and sufficient conditions for event identity.  
However, I think this problem demonstrates that my account is 
incomplete, not that my account is implausible. It may be possible to say more 
about the nature of events, without denying that they are instances of processes. 
For example, my causal pluralism holds that events are difference-makers. It 
may be that being the sort of entity that can be a difference-maker entails 
restrictions on what processes a single event can be an instance of, and provides 
a general principle which tells us when we ought to distinguish simultaneous 
events. Perhaps, in line with Davidson’s (1969) suggestion, instances of distinct 
processes should be identified when and only when they occupy the very same 
position in a causal nexus. Davidson (1969, p.179) suggested that event x and 
event y are one and the same if and only if event x and event y have the same 
causes and the same effects. This criterion has been criticised for being 
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circular.37 The problem with Davidson’s proposal is that it individuates events by 
quantifying over causes and effects which are themselves events, therefore 
Davidson’s identity conditions for events individuate events only if there are 
some events already individuated.38 This problem may not be a problem for a 
view which synthesises Davidson’s view with the theory that events are instances 
of processes. This is because if events are instances of processes as well as causal 
relata, then some events are already individuated before we consider the causal 
nexus, namely those events which occupy different temporal locations. To 
conclude, although my account does not offer definitive answers regarding how 
events are individuated, my account does not entail implausible identity 
conditions for events, and I think the idea that events are instances of processes 
could be developed in such a way as to yield identity conditions which are in 
line with our intuitions.   
  
 
 
 
37 See Beardsley (1975) and Wilson (1974). 
38 C.f. Bennett (1988, p.98). 
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5  
A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Agency  
In chapter 3, I sketched a non-Humean theory of causation. According to this 
theory, causation is not always and everywhere a relation, but can be a process 
which substances engage in. In the previous chapter, I presented a novel 
metaphysical framework, which includes processes, conceived of as universals, 
in its ontology. This metaphysical framework gave content to the claim that 
causation can be something substances engage in, rather than merely an 
external relation holding between events (or any other particulars). In this 
chapter, I will argue that this alternative way of thinking about causation, and 
the ontology that permits it, allows us to put together a more successful theory 
of agency, one that avoids the problems facing the causal theory of action. 
Section 5.1 will contain my positive view. Drawing on the process ontology 
outlined in the previous chapter, I will present my view on the metaphysics of 
action, and explain how the agency concept should be analysed. In sections 5.2-
5.4, I will compare my metaphysics of action with some other alternatives to the 
causal theory of action, namely agent-causation-based theories of action, and 
argue that my account has advantages over these theories. In section 5.5 I will 
defend my analysis of the agency concept.   
5.1 A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Agency 
The proposal I have advanced in the last two chapters is that causation can be a 
determinable process. Causation is going on when a substance is engaging in it, 
when a certain sort of dynamic state of affairs obtains. On this proposal, if any 
process is a determination of causation, then it is causal intrinsically, just as if a 
colour is a determination of red (as scarlet is), then that colour is red 
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intrinsically. As to which processes are determinations of causation and which 
aren’t, my answer is that the distinction is not absolute, and can be difficult to 
determine.  
In the previous chapter, I said that processes are ways for substances to 
be changing, to be effecting change or to be resisting change. This means that 
some processes are active, i.e. those which are ways for substances to be 
effecting change, and some processes are passive, i.e. those which are ways for 
substances to undergo change (resisting change, I think, can be both active and 
passive). Ways for substances to be effecting change are causal processes. 
However, as stated in chapter 2, the active–passive distinction is not binary. It is 
therefore more accurate to say that some processes are more active that others, 
and some are more passive than others, but (probably) no process is completely 
active, and no process is completely passive. For example, the process of 
crushing something is mostly active: in crushing something, a substance is 
effecting more change than it is undergoing. The process of dying on the other 
hand is mostly passive: in dying, a substance is undergoing more change than it 
is effecting. And many processes involve ostensibly equal degrees of activity and 
passivity. For example, processes by which we move ourselves about, like 
walking, and running, seem to involve a mix of activity and passivity: when we 
move ourselves about, we effect change on ourselves, so we are both agent and 
patient with respect to those changes. Processes which result in no overall 
change, like thermoregulation or keeping still, also seem to involve elements of 
activity and passivity. When one stands still, for example, one must exert some 
degree of force in opposition to the forces which would cause one to fall to the 
ground (e.g. gravity), but not so much force that one ends up moving. Thus, 
standing still seems to involve a roughly equal mix of activity and passivity.  
I mentioned in chapter 2 that this view of the active–passive distinction 
seems to entail that this distinction is less than fully objective. This is because 
whether what a substance is doing is activity or passivity is relative to the degree 
of change it is wreaking and/or undergoing, and assessing how much change a 
substance is wreaking and/or undergoing may not be a fully objective matter. 
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For example, when some salt dissolves in water, how much change one thinks 
the water undergoes when salt dissolves into it may depend on one’s views 
about the nature of water. Now that I am using this distinction to distinguish 
between processes which are determinations of causation and processes which 
are not, the full scale of this subjectivity problem is apparent. If the distinction 
between activity and passivity is partly a subjective matter, and this distinction is 
key to distinguishing processes which are determinations of causation from 
processes which are not, then it seems that what is and is not causation is itself 
partially a subjective matter. I think that this reasoning is sound, so I accept that 
what is and is not causation is partially a subjective matter. However, I do not 
consider this to be problematic because, while it may be true that how we 
classify the processes being engaged in by substances is partly dependent on our 
own perspective, the existence of dynamic states of affairs, i.e. substances 
engaging in processes, is not mind-dependent.  
The mostly active processes I will call activities. What it is for a substance 
to be causing something is for there to be an activity which the substance is 
engaging in. A substance engaging in an activity is an agent, and the event that 
results once the substance has completed the activity it has been engaging in is 
an action. Actions are thus events of a special kind: they are events which are 
instances of activities, and as engaging in an activity is what it is for an agent to 
be causing something, actions can also be said to be instances of substance or 
agent causation. This metaphysics is summarised in figure 2 (I have also 
represented the agency relation in this figure).  
 
Process
Engagement
Substance
Instancing
Event
Activity
ActionSubstance (agent)
Engagement Instancing
Agency Relation
Fig.2 
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This metaphysics helps us see why the causality of action is something 
that essentially involves the agent. On my theory, the causation exemplified by 
actions is the activity the agent engages in; it is something which goes on, but 
only insofar as it is engaged in by an agent. Furthermore, the dynamic state of 
affairs which is an activity’s going on is something that is partially constituted by 
the agent. A dynamic states of affairs is, as I proposed in chapter 4, a substance’s 
engaging in a process – it is a complex entity composed of a substance and a 
process. So, if we take the causality of action to be a dynamic state of affairs, 
then the agent herself partially constitutes the causality of action – she cannot, 
therefore, be merely the arena within which the causality of action takes place.  
My metaphysics of action also entails a plausible account of the 
relationship between agents and their actions. I proposed in the previous chapter 
that events depend for their existence on substances engaging in processes and 
then completing them. As actions are events on my view, they are subject to the 
same existence conditions. Actions depend for their existence on agents’ 
engaging in activities and completing them. This means that actions come into 
existence because of agents engaging in activities – but this ‘because’ indicates 
existential rather than causal dependence. I have said that the agency relation, 
i.e. the relation that obtains between a substance exercising a power and the 
event the substance produces in exercising that power, is not a cause-effect 
relation or a ‘difference-making’ relation, and that being the agent of an event is 
not the same as being a cause of it. I can now state in positive terms what the 
agency relation is: it is a relation of ontological dependence.   
The theory I have just proposed tells us what sort of entity an action is 
(an event, i.e. an instance of activity). My theory also tells us what sort of entity 
the exercise of power is: the exercise of power by a substance is a dynamic state 
of affairs, i.e. a substance’s engaging in a process. However, providing a 
metaphysics of action is not all that is required for a complete and adequate 
theory of agency. It takes more to provide an adequate theory of agency than 
simply to describe the ontological structure of the worldly entities which are 
picked out by the concepts action, agent and activity. To provide a complete 
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theory of agency one must consider the concept of agency, and provide some 
sort of dissection of this concept. In chapter 2, I claimed that there are two 
distinctions crucial to our concept of agency: the distinction between activity 
and passivity, and the distinction between one-way and two-way powers. Agency 
does not reduce to the exercise of active power, because some substances can 
manifest their agency by remaining passive, and therefore by not engaging in 
activity. Neither does agency reduce to the exercise of two-way power, because 
not all substances which cause things to happen do so by exercising two-way 
powers, but all substances which cause things to happen are agents. My view is 
that agency is a complex, highly abstract concept which incorporates both 
distinctions. Some substances’ agential powers are one-way; these substances 
manifest their agency when they are active, but not when they are passive. For 
these substances, exercising their agential power is to engage in an activity. 
Other substances’ agential powers are two-way; these substances manifest their 
agency when they are active, but also sometimes when they are passive. For 
these substances, in some cases exercising their agential power is to engage in an 
activity, but in other cases exercising their agential power is to allow other 
substances to act upon them.  
This is, in a nutshell, my positive account of agency. I will attempt to 
make this account clearer in the following sections by comparing my 
metaphysics of action with some other ‘agent-causation-based’ theories of action. 
Like my own view, these theories are presented as alternatives to the causal 
theory of action. Also like my view, these theories are ‘non-Humean’ insofar as 
they presuppose that substance or agent causation cannot be reduced to a 
special kind of event-causation. However, I shall argue that these alternative 
non-Humean, agent-causation-based theories suffer problems that my account 
avoids.  
5.2 Agent Causationism  
The first kind of agent-causation-based theory of action I shall compare my 
account to is a kind of theory I shall call ‘traditional agent causationsim’. 
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Traditional agent-causationist theories of action, the kinds of theories put 
forward by Taylor (1966) and Chisholm (1976), hold that an irreducible notion 
of agent causation is essential for understanding agency.39 Traditional agent 
causationists hold that agency is the obtaining of a causal relation between an 
agent, qua substance, and a change which is the action of the agent. For 
example, Chisholm states that ‘whenever an agent performs such an act [as 
raising his arm or stealing the money], he contributes causally to the fact that he 
performs that act’ (1976, p.71). Taylor claims that ‘nothing can be represented 
as a simple act of mine unless I am the initiator or originator of it’, where 
‘initiator’ and ‘originator’ are supposed to be synonymous with ‘that which brings 
about’ or ‘that which has the power to produce’ (1966, p.112).  
Although some agent causationists maintain their view because they think 
it is the only theory that can do justice to the causal role played by the agent in 
action (e.g. Franklin, 2016), traditionally, agent causationism is adopted 
because it is thought to be essential for an adequate treatment of free will. 
Traditional agent causationists subscribe to a libertarian view of freedom, which 
is the combination of two theses: that an action cannot be free if it is 
deterministically caused to happen by a prior event (incompatibilism), and that 
we do indeed act freely. However, agent causationists are also sympathetic to an 
argument which appears to show that simply injecting indeterminism into the 
causal chain leading up to an action cannot secure freedom (Chisholm, 1976, 
pp.58-59).40 The solution, agent causationists claim, is to hold that an action is 
free just in case it is caused to happen by the agent. Now the agent, rather than 
any prior event, is the causal determiner of the action. 
One major problem with agent causationism is that it makes irreducible 
substance causation seem like something unnatural. This is because, on this 
 
 
 
39 Clarke (2003) is a contemporary defender of this kind of theory.  
40 See also Mele (2006, pp.6-9) and Pereboom (2001, pp.38-59). 
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view, most causation in the world is really causation of one event by another, 
and it is only in the case of things done freely by human beings where we find 
irreducible substance causation. On traditional agent-causationist views, most 
causation, including interactions between animals and inanimate objects, is 
nothing over and above causation of one event by another. Only in the case of 
things done freely by human agents, is there something extra – causation by a 
substance. Traditional agent causationism thus entails that animals and 
inanimate objects are not, as I have put it previously, causers – active powers are 
exercised only by human beings. This view entails that there is no continuity 
between causation in the non-human and human world. Active power, and 
hence agency, is made to seem like ‘a relatively rare and exotic exception to the 
rules governing the world’s normal causal functioning’ (Steward, 2012, p.198). I 
have mentioned already that, on my view, substance causation is not unique to 
human doing – it is found wherever there is causation. Animals and inanimate 
objects also exercise active powers, and cause things to happen. I believe such a 
view avoids making substance causation seem unnatural, because on such a view 
there is no discontinuity between causation in the non-human and human 
world.  
The argument for agent causationism can be challenged in several ways. 
For example, one might challenge the agent causationist’s incompatibilism and 
argue that causal determination by prior events is not on a par with the kind of 
compulsion which negates freedom.41 One might also challenge the argument 
that freedom is not secured by making the event-causal chain leading up to the 
action indeterminisitic (Kane, 1999, 2016). However, I think there is something 
to the intuition that there is a kind of causal determination by the agent 
demonstrated in cases where an agent chooses what to do, which is missing in 
 
 
 
41 See McKenna and Coates’s (2016) Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on ‘Compatibilism’ for a 
useful survey of contemporary compatibilism.  
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cases where the agent does not choose what to do. For example, I think Taylor 
(1966) is correct when he claims that an inanimate object, like a match, is such 
that it cannot ‘wreak changes in itself’, unlike a man who ‘can bring about such a 
change as a motion of his arm quite by himself’ (p.122). However, traditional 
agent causationists, like Taylor, confuse being able to wreak changes in oneself 
with agency as such.  
In chapter 2, I claimed that inanimate objects do not possess two-way 
powers. What inanimate objects do is always a response to the circumstances 
they are in and what’s acting upon them. What inanimate objects do is not up to 
them, they are moved-movers not self-movers. Human beings (and many 
animals I think), in contrast, are capable of self-movement; human beings have 
control over some of what they do, and this control consists in the exercise of 
two-way power. I think the notion of ‘wreaking changes in oneself’ is parallel to 
the notion of self-movement. Taylor is quite right that inanimate objects like 
matches are not self-movers – he is right that inanimate objects cannot bring 
about change by themselves. But this does not mean that inanimate objects are 
never truly active and are never agents. Taylor, it seems to me, is confusing the 
exercise of a two-way power with activity and the exercise of a one-way power 
with passivity.  
Another unappealing aspect of traditional agent causationism relates to 
its claim that agents stand in causal relations to their own actions. On the agent-
causationist view, the event of my raising my arm, which is my causing my arm 
to rise, is an action because it is an event which I, qua substance, caused to 
happen. However, there is a well-known problem with this view. If my action is 
an event of which I am the cause, then we can ask of the causing of my action 
whether this is an action of mine or not. If it is, then, on the agent-causationist 
theory, it is also an event of which I am the cause, but now we seem to have 
opened an infinite regress: is the causing of my causing of my action another 
action? However, if we deny that the causing of my action is an action, then it 
seems we have two sorts of ‘causings’, some of which are actions and some of 
which are not. For example, my causing my arm to rise is an action, but the 
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causing of my causing my arm to rise is not – what makes this difference? It is 
unclear what the agent causationist can or should say.42  
On my view, agents do not stand in causal relations to their own actions. 
Rather, actions are the events that come into being once an agent has completed 
the activity she has been engaging in. On my view, actions are instances of agent 
causation, where what it is for an agent to be causing something is for an agent 
to be engaging in an activity. So, actions can be thought of as events of an agent 
causing something, but an agent’s causing something is not an event which the 
agent stands in a causal relation to.  
In summary, there are two key similarities between my view and 
traditional agent causationsim: first, both my view and traditional agent 
causationsim hold that an irreducible notion of agent causation is essential for 
understanding agency; and second, my view, like agent causationsim, entails 
that there is a form of causal determination which cannot be demonstrated by 
inanimate objects. However, there are important differences. Firstly, my view 
does not make substance causation something which is only demonstrated in the 
case of free human action, because animals and inanimate objects as well as 
humans exercise active powers – the form of causal determination which cannot 
be demonstrated by inanimate objects is self-movement, or settling, not agency 
as such. Secondly, my view does not hold that agents stand in causal relations to 
their own actions. In these two ways, my view avoids the problems that beset 
traditional agent causationism.  
5.3 Actions as Causings 
Other agent-causation-based rivals to the causal theory of action do not contend 
that agents cause their own actions. Like traditional agent causationism, these 
alternative agent-causation-based theories maintain that in examples of agency 
 
 
 
42 See Alvarez and Hyman (1998, p.222); Davidson (1971/2001, p.52); Hornsby (1980, p.101).  
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the agent, qua substance, causes something. However, what the agent causes is 
not her own action – an agent’s action is her causing of something, it is not what 
is caused. Most contemporary agent-causation-based theories of agency take it 
that an action is the causing of an event, or sometimes a state of affairs. For 
example, Mayr argues that human agency is an instance of substance causation 
(2011, p.219), and substance causation, for Mayr, should be understood in 
terms of a causal relation obtaining between a substance exercising an active 
power and the effect produced when the substance exercises active power: 
‘when such an “active power” is exercised, the cause of the resulting event is the 
substance which possess the power itself’ (pp.145-146). Similarly, Lowe 
describes agent causation as a species of causation ‘in which the cause of some 
event or state of affairs is not (or not only) some other event or state of affairs, 
but is, rather, an agent of some kind’ (2008, p.121). And even though Alvarez 
denies that the power of agency is one and the same as the power to cause 
events to happen, she admits that ‘the paradigmatic case of agency is the 
exercise of our power to move our body and thus cause change’ (2013, p.107) 
and ‘causing these changes involves causing events’ (p.103). Alvarez and Hyman 
also claim that ‘an action is a causing of an event by an agent’ (1998, p.224), 
where the event caused by the agent is ‘intrinsic’ to the agent’s action, an event 
they call the ‘result’ of the action (p.233). Often, in the case of human action at 
least, the ‘result’ of an action is a bodily movement.  
It is important to remember that the thesis being endorsed by Alvarez and 
Hyman is not simply that agents can cause events to happen by acting, a thesis 
no-one seriously questions. The thesis being endorsed is the stronger thesis that 
action consists in an agent coming to stand in a causal relation to an event. To 
bring out the difference, consider someone who denies the existence of 
irreducible substance causation. Such a person can readily agree that agents 
cause events to happen – they do so when their actions stand in causal relations 
to other events. For example, I caused the explosion to happen when I lit the 
fuse, because my lighting of the fuse, my action, stands in a causal relation (an 
event-event causal relation) to the explosion. The thesis being endorsed is that 
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even in the case of basic action, where I do something not by doing something 
else, my action consists in my causing an event to happen. So, my arm raising 
consists in my causing the rising of my arm. My action is not the cause of my 
arm rising; I am the cause of my arm rising, and my so being the cause of my 
arm-rising is what my action consists in.  
According to Alvarez and Hyman, actions are causings of the bodily 
movements one’s body makes when one acts, so for example the action of raising 
my arm is my causing the rising of my arm. This entails that actions cannot be 
identical with the bodily movements one’s body makes when one acts, so my 
action of raising my arm cannot be identical with the rising of my arm. Alvarez 
and Hyman (1998) provide an argument demonstrating this entailment:   
Davidson is one philosopher who claims that, in some cases, ‘my raising my 
arm and my arm rising are one and the same event’. But my raising my arm 
is my causing my arm to rise. Hence, if my raising my arm is an event, it is 
the same event as my causing my arm to rise. And hence, if my raising my 
arm and my arm’s rising are one and the same event, then my causing my 
arm to rise and my arm’s rising are one and the same event. But it cannot be 
plausible that causing an event to occur is not merely an event itself, but the 
very same event as the event caused. (1998, p.229) 
Spelled out, the argument runs as follows:  
Assume for reductio: 
1. My raising my arm is one and the same event as my arm’s rising.   
Now assume the very plausible:  
2. My raising my arm is my causing my arm to rise.  
And: 
3. If my raising my arm is one and the same event as my arm’s rising, then my 
causing my arm to rise is my arm’s rising.  
Together these premises entail: 
4. My causing my arm to rise is my arm’s rising.  
A conclusion which, when generalised, is revealed to be absurd: 
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5. My causing an event is the event caused.  
In response to this argument, Alvarez and Hyman, and many writers sympathetic 
to agent-causation-based theories of action, have rejected the thesis that one’s 
action is identical with the bodily movements one’s body makes when one acts. 
Alec Hinshelwood calls this ‘the Separation Thesis’ (2013, p.626). 
To explain how the Separation Thesis is compatible with the plausible 
claim that many actions are bodily movements, Alverez and Hyman (1998) 
make use of an ambiguity associated with the word ‘movement’ noted by 
Hornsby (1980). Many verbs can be transitive (i.e. used with a grammatical 
object) or intransitive (i.e. used without a grammatical object). The verb ‘move’ 
is also ergative, which means that it can be transitive or intransitive and that the 
direct object of the verb when transitive becomes the subject of the verb when 
intransitive. For example, ‘move’ is transitive in the sentence “I moved my arm,” 
but intransitive in “My arm moved,” and the object of the transitive ‘move’ is the 
subject of the intransitive ‘move’. This feature of the verb ‘move’ renders the 
nominalisation of ‘move’, ‘movement’, ambiguous. When we speak of, for 
example, my arm movement there are two movements we might be talking 
about. There is one that corresponds to the transitive use of move as in, “I 
moved my arm,” which can be otherwise picked out by the expression ‘my 
moving of my arm’ and the one that corresponds to the intransitive use of move 
as in, “My arm moved,” which can be otherwise picked out by the expression ‘the 
motion of my arm’. To help keep the two senses of ‘movement’ separate I will 
follow Hornsby’s notation and use ‘movementT’ for the first sense, and 
‘movementI’ for the second sense. Alvarez and Hyman (1998) hold that many 
actions are bodily movementsT, which they claim are causings of bodily 
movementsI, and hence cannot be identical with bodily movmentsI.  
Alvarez and Hyman (1998) also argue that actions, i.e. causings of bodily 
movementsI, are not events of any kind. To establish this conclusion Alvarez and 
Hyman assume that there are only two possible sorts of event actions could be:  
i) bodily movementsI; or  
ii) events which are causes of bodily movementsI.  
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Alvarez and Hyman take the first possibility to have been ruled out already by 
the argument outline above. To show that bodily movmentsT are not events 
which cause bodily movementsI Alvarez and Hyman argue as follows:  
[…] if bodily movementsT are events which cause bodily movementsI, then 
either bodily movementsT are events, perhaps neural events, which occur 
inside the agent’s body, as for example Hornsby maintains in her book 
Actions or they are events of another sort, which do not – presumably events 
which have no location at all, if there are such events. The first alternative 
implies that bodily movementsT, unlike their effects, are not normally 
perceptible without a special apparatus. The second implies that bodily 
movementsI are caused both by neural events and by events of another sort, 
and therefore raises the difficult question of how these two sorts of events 
are related. It also implies that bodily movementsT can never be perceived, 
whatever sort of apparatus we are equipped with. But we can and do see 
people and animals moving their limbs without making use of any sort of 
apparatus; and seeing a person or an animal moving its limbs is seeing a 
bodily movementT. Hence neither alternative is tenable; and it follows that 
bodily movementsT are not events which cause bodily movementsI. (1998, 
pp.229-230) 
If Alvarez and Hyman’s argument succeeds, then bodily movementsT are 
not events, so the causing of an event by an agent is some other sort of entity. If 
Alvarez and Hyman’s view is the natural position for anyone who believes that in 
acting an agent causes something, then this theory of agency would seem to 
involve ontological commitment to a novel kind of entity, which is the 
engendering of a causal relation between an agent and an event. To give these 
novel entities a name let’s call them ‘causings’. The proposal that actions are 
causings naturally raises the question ‘what are causings?’. Desire to answer this 
question is, I believe, part of the reason why philosophers sympathetic to agent-
causation-based theories of action have begun to think about whether processes 
are a unique sort of entity. However, the view of processes which has become 
popular is quite different to the view I espoused in chapter 4. I will discuss, and 
criticise, this alternative theory of processes in section 5.4.  
  
127 
As mentioned, I think that actions are events. They are instances of 
processes. I also agree with Davidson that ‘at least where basic actions are 
concerned “my raising my arm and my arm rising are one and the same event”’ 
(1987, p.37; see also Davidson 1967/2001, p.128 and Anscombe 2000, pp.52-
53). That is, I reject the Separation Thesis. On my view, there is the dynamic 
universal raising one’s arm, which an agent engages in, and which is distinct 
from any event, including the event of the agent’s arm going up, but I deny that 
there is any particular arm-raising occurrence distinct from the event of arm-
rising. The agent’s action, which is an instance of an arm-raising process, is the 
event of the agent’s arm going up. The main advantage of this view is that it 
avoids proliferating the number of individual occurrences – we do not have to 
posit ‘causings’. However, I also think that actions are instances of agent 
causation, which means that when an agent acts, the agent, qua substance, 
causes something. One might wonder how it is possible for me to maintain that 
actions are instances of agent causation and reject the Separation Thesis given 
that Alvarez and Hyman’s (1998) argument seems to show that such a position 
is incoherent.  
I believe that Alvarez and Hyman’s (1998) argument is invalid, because it 
wrongly assumes that the expression ‘caused to rise’ means ‘caused an arm-rising 
event to happen’. Alvarez and Hyman assume that when an agent raises her arm, 
a relation of causation comes to obtain between the agent and an arm-rising 
event. My own theory of agency is premised on the idea that causation is not 
always, everywhere a relation. I deny, whereas many contemporary agent-
causation-based views of agency accept, that the Agency Relation, i.e. the 
relation between an agent and the event she is agent of, is a causal relation. As I 
explained in chapter 3, the agency relation is not a difference-making relation, 
and agents are not difference-makers. This is because difference-makers must be 
dated entities: in looking for that which makes the difference to an effect’s 
occurring, we are looking for a part of history which stands in relation to 
another part of the history of the world atemporally; agents are not dated 
entities and as such do not stand in relations atemporally.  
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I accept the platitude that raising one’s arm is causing one’s arm to rise, 
but if agent causation is a dynamic state of affairs as I contend, then an agent 
can be causing her arm to rise without thereby coming to stand in a causal 
relation to an arm-rising event. This means that Alvarez and Hyman’s (1998) 
argument can be resisted. It is implausible ‘that causing an event to occur is not 
merely an event itself, but the very same event as the event caused’ (Alvarez and 
Hyman, 1998, p.229). However, this only falsifies lemma 4 if ‘causing my arm to 
rise’ is taken to mean ‘causing an arm-rising event to occur’. And why should we 
‘Relationalise’ the infinitival phrase ‘causing my arm to rise’? Why should we 
assume that what claims like ‘the agent caused her arm to rise’ mean is that an 
agent is the cause of an arm-rising event? As Stout suggests ‘The phrase “your 
arm to rise” is not really a noun phrase at all and certainly does not encode some 
implicit reference to an entity which is the event of your arm’s rising’ (2010, 
p.104). 
Ursula Coope (2007) outlines a similar response to Alvarez and Hyman’s 
(1998) argument which is available to Aristotle, who also thought that my arm’s 
going up, the arm-rising event, was identical with my action of raising my arm. 
Coope suggests that Aristotle would deny that his view commits him to the 
implausible idea that the causing of an event is one and the same as the event 
caused, because Aristotle would deny that an action is a causing of an event to 
happen. According to Coope’s Aristotle, an action is the causing of a state, or the 
causing of a state of affairs to obtain:  
Aristotle’s view, I shall argue, is that the power that is exercised in an action 
of moving X is a power to produce the end of X’s movement: a power to 
produce a state, rather than a movement. In this sense, what I am causing 
when I move X is the state that X’s movement is directed towards. For 
example, when I raise my arm, what I am causing is my arm’s being up, 
rather than my arm’s going up. More generally, the action of changing 
something towards being F is, for Aristotle, a particular kind of causing of 
the state being F. (Coope, 2007, pp.113-114) 
My suggestion is, in some ways, more controversial. I am suggesting that 
‘causing my arm to rise’ should not be given a relational interpretation at all. 
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That is, I am suggesting that an agent’s causing her arm to rise does not entail 
that the agent stands in a causal relation to any particular. So not only does an 
agent raising her arm not stand in a causal relation to an arm-rising event, she 
also does not stand in a causal relation to the state of her arm being up.  
There is one respect in which I think my response to Alvarez and Hyman’s 
argument fares better than the response offered by Coope’s Aristotle. Coope 
points out a problem facing the theory of action she attributes to Aristotle.  
This difficulty stems from his view that the action of changing something is 
the causing of the end state of the change: raising one’s arm is causing one’s 
arm to be up; walking to the pier is causing oneself to be at the pier. This 
raises an obvious question. There are, surely, different types of action that 
result in one’s arm being up, and also different types of action that result in 
one’s being at the pier. How is Aristotle to distinguish between these? How, 
for instance, is he to distinguish between walking to the pier and swimming 
to the pier? (Coope, 2007, p.132) 
Aristotle’s view seems to suggest that walking to the pier and swimming to the 
pier are exercises of the same agential power (i.e. a power to cause oneself to be 
at the pier). But, intuitively, these actions are exercise of different powers. The 
agency demonstrated in walking to the pier is not the same as the agency 
demonstrated in swimming to the pier. Coope suggested that Aristotle could 
avoid this problem by stipulating that there are different ways to cause the end 
state of the change, and the manner in which an end state is caused determines 
what power a given action is an exercise of. On my theory, an agent’s causing 
something is their engaging in an activity, and an activity is a way for a 
substance to be effecting a certain kind of change, so what powers are exercised 
by an agent when she acts is determined by the activities she engages in. My 
theory thus avoids the problem facing Coope’s Aristotle, but does so without 
having to make an additional stipulation, instead holding that an action of 
changing something is an instance of activity, and not the causing of the end 
state of the change.  
A key difference between my neo-Aristotelian theory of agency and agent-
causation-based theories of agency of the kind championed by Mayr (2011), 
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Lowe (2008), and Alvarez and Hyman (1998) is that these theories accept, 
whereas I deny, that actions are ‘causings’. That is, I deny that action consists in 
an agent’s coming to stand in a causal relation to an event. On my view, when 
an agent engages in an activity and then completes that activity, an event (the 
agent’s action) comes into existence – but the agent does not stand in a causal 
relation to this event.  
5.4 The Temporal Stuff View   
Partly due to Alvarez and Hyman’s argument that actions are not events, the 
idea that actions are a special sort of occurrence, ‘causings’, has gained some 
traction. I briefly mentioned in the previous section that the idea of actions as 
‘causings’ has prompted some philosophers to examine whether recognising 
process as a distinctive ontological category is important for understanding 
action and agency. However, the theory of processes which has become popular 
is different from the theory of processes I advanced in chapter 4. The theory of 
processes which some have argued will be useful to philosophy of action is a 
theory I call the ‘temporal stuff view’ of processes. According to the temporal 
stuff view, processes are the ‘temporal stuffs’ from which events are composed. 
For example, Hornsby suggests that ‘the relation between the stuff of the spatial 
world and the particulars therein is analogous to the relation between the 
activity [a kind of process] of the temporal world and the particulars there’ 
(2012, p.238). And Thomas Crowther maintains that ‘What things are doing 
throughout periods of time and substance stuff are constituents of the same 
basic ontological category; they could be thought of as temporal and spatial 
masses’ and ‘Both substance-stuffs and time-occupying stuffs, respectively, fill 
out space and time in the same way’ (2011, p.17).  
Steward (2013a) also argues that the spatial and temporal realms have 
analogous ontologies. Steward argues that, in the spatial realm, we can 
distinguish two sorts of particular: ‘substances’ and mere ‘lumps of stuff’. 
Substances, Steward argues, are entities which can survive the loss or 
replacement of their spatial parts; they have ‘a certain distinctive form by means 
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of which they are singled out in thought and which underwrites their relative 
independence from the actual parts of which they consist in any particular 
instant’ (p.487). Lumps, in contrast, are such that ‘the merest addition or 
subtraction [of spatial parts], however tiny, makes for a different lump’ (p.804). 
Steward’s view is that we can make similar distinctions between different types 
of occurrences in the temporal realm. She argues that there are analogues of 
substances in the temporal realm, entities which Steward calls ‘individual 
processes’ – these entities have a distinctive form which determines what 
intrusions, shortenings and lengthenings they could and could not have 
survived. The walk to the newsagent’s I took this morning is an example of an 
individual process: my walk to the newsagent’s could have taken a little longer 
than it actually did, as long as this lengthening didn’t change the distinctive 
‘walk-to-the-newsagent’s’ form of my walk (e.g. my walk didn’t take longer 
because I stopped walking and started crawling, or because I stopped walking to 
the newsagent’s and started walking to the gym instead). According to Steward, 
there are also analogues of ‘lumps of stuff’ which Steward calls ‘stretches of 
activity’ – these are occurrences which do not have temporal boundaries 
indicative of any distinctive form; consequently, stretches of activity have their 
temporal parts essentially. In addition to these two sorts of temporal occurrence 
there is also ‘massy’ temporal stuff from which the occurrences are made. 
The temporal stuff view of processes is justified on the grounds that it 
helps resolve certain problems in philosophy of action. For example, Crowther 
suggests that ‘distinctions in the way that things occupy periods of time may 
help us to explain important concepts within the philosophy of mind and action’ 
(2011, p.6). Steward also suggests that the concept of process, as distinct from 
event, ‘promises to do important philosophical work – especially, as others have 
also hoped, in the philosophy of action’ (2013a, p.782). The problem which the 
temporal stuff view is supposed to solve is the very problem I have suggested my 
non-Humean theory of causation and universals theory of processes will help 
solve, namely the problem of providing a theory of agency which casts the agent 
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as a causal player, rather than merely the setting for events to cause other 
events.  
As previously mentioned, Hornsby has argued that to recognise the 
essential role of the agent in the causality of action, we need to think of 
causation as something other than a relation between events. According to 
Hornsby, what’s needed to recognise the essential role of the agent in the 
causality of action is a metaphysical framework which provides intellectual space 
for thinking of causation as something other than a relation between events. 
Without such a framework, it is impossible to see how the causality of action 
might be something other than a causal relation between mental event and 
action, and instead something that casts the agent as a causal player rather than 
merely the setting for events to cause other events. Thus far, Hornsby and I 
agree.  
However, Hornsby’s own suggestion is that adopting a metaphysical 
framework where activity – a kind of process – is the stuff from which actions are 
composed, is what allows us to think of the causality of action as something other 
than a causal relation between mental event and action. Hornsby suggests that 
‘the agent is given her due only when it is acknowledged that she engages in 
activity, where no activity is any particular’ (2012, p.233). She claims that: 
In order to recognise causality as present on an occasion of someone’s 
raising her arm, one needs to think of a person’s raising her arm as a type of 
causal activity in which she engages. (2012, p.234.) 
The idea here is that once we accept that an agent’s causing something (for 
example, an agent’s causing her arm to go up) is an activity or process, i.e. the 
temporal stuff from which her action is composed, we are permitted to think of 
the causality of action as something which essentially involves the agent herself. 
The causality of action is thus thought of as the activity which composes the 
agent’s action, and once we acknowledge this, we are no longer at risk of failing 
to include the agent in an account of the causality of her action – or so Hornsby 
proposes.  
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However, I do not think that the temporal stuff view, and its associated 
notion of temporal composition, successfully explains how the agent of an action 
is necessarily involved in the causality of her action. This is because I do not 
think the relationship between the agent and the causality of her action is made 
any clearer by positing the existence of temporal entities which are distinct from, 
but compose, events, in the same way that matter composes substances. The 
aim, in proposing a process ontology, is to enable an account of agency which 
casts the agent as a causal player, rather than merely the setting for events to 
cause other events. Proponents of the temporal stuff view try to achieve this goal 
by claiming that the agent’s playing her causal role is a unique sort of entity, 
which is related to the agent’s action by something analogous to composition. 
However, why is an entity which is related to an agent’s action by ‘temporal 
composition’ uniquely well-suited to be the agent’s causing of something? What 
makes the entity that composes an agent’s action her causing of something? How 
is the agent attached to, or involved in, the temporal stuff which composes her 
action? What is it to ‘engage in’ a temporal stuff? It is not clear to me that 
answers to these questions are contained within the temporal stuff ontology and 
its associated concept of temporal composition. In short, as long as 
processes/activities are thought of as the temporal stuff which composes an 
agent’s action, the connection between the agent and the process/activity she 
engages in will remain obscure – and this is precisely the relationship we need to 
understand, if we are to understand the agent’s place in the causality of her 
action. Drawing analogies between processes and matter, and invoking the 
notion of ‘temporal composition’, may help with the construction of a 
metaphysical framework where processes and events are clearly distinguished – 
but it seems to me that the notion of ‘temporal composition’ does not help us 
understand the agent’s place in the causality of action.  
My view abides by Hornsby’s suggestion that ‘the agent is given her due 
only when it is acknowledged that she engages in activity, where no activity is 
any particular’ (2012, p.233), but it solves the problem of recognising the 
essential role of the agent in the causality of action without positing temporal 
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stuff or invoking the concept of temporal composition. On my view, the causality 
of action is an agent’s engaging in activity – it is a dynamic state of affairs, and 
as such, is an entity which has the agent as a constituent (just as the state of 
affairs of the rose’s being red has the rose as a constituent). The agent herself 
partially constitutes the causality of her action – she is, therefore, essentially 
involved. For example, the dynamic state of affairs reported by the sentence 
‘Sally is raising her arm’, is Sally’s causing of something because Sally partially 
constitutes the dynamic state of affairs reported; she is the particular element of 
this dynamic state of affairs.  
Steward offers a slightly different account of how the temporal stuff view 
helps us understand agency and action:  
[…] it is natural to think of the cause of an event simply as another event, or 
perhaps a collection of pre-existing events and states which give being to the 
caused event simply by triggering it off. But what is the cause of a token 
process, conceived of as an entity with a robust form, a normal course of 
development, something which can obtain extra temporal parts without 
detriment to its continued identity? Not only what triggers it, but also what 
sustains it, what keeps it on course, what prevents it from ceasing or 
disintegrating. In this observation lurks the promise of an account of activity 
from which the agent does not suffer the disappearance so often complained 
of in event-based views, precisely because she is needed in order to ensure 
the continuation in the right direction of the process which constitutes her 
activity. (2013a, p.810) 
Steward suggests that because individual processes have a distinctive form, to 
cause such an occurrence, there needs to be both a trigger and something which 
can ensure that the individual process continues and develops in accordance 
with its distinctive form. In the case of individual processes which are actions, 
this latter role can only be played by the agent. In other words, because of the 
distinctive forms actions possess, for actions to exist they must be ‘sustained’ by 
agents. On Steward’s view, to understand agency we need to acknowledge that 
agents ensure that the (massy) process which composes their actions takes on a 
specific form.  
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Steward’s view avoids the problem of failing to explain how the agent is 
necessarily involved in the causality of her action, because on Steward’s view the 
agent is required to, as it were, mould the temporal stuff that composes her 
action into its distinctive shape. However, Steward’s view faces another problem. 
The problem with holding that agents cause their own actions, outlined above, is 
also a problem for Steward’s proposal that agents sustain their actions. 
Supposing that agents sustain their actions, keep their actions on course and 
prevent their actions from ceasing or disintegrating, is sustaining one’s action 
itself an action? If it is then it is also presumably the sort of entity that needs to 
be sustained by an agent, in which case we are in danger of requiring that 
whenever an agent acts there is an infinity of ‘sustaining’ actions they must 
perform. However, if sustaining one’s action is not itself an action, then what is 
it? What is it for an agent to ensure than her activity continues and develops in 
accordance with the distinctive form of her action?  
My view avoids this problem as on my view agents are not causally 
related to their actions or to their activities. On my view, agents engage in their 
activities, but engagement is not an ‘element of being’, it is rather the concept by 
which we understand the ontological form of substances and processes. This 
means that the relationship between the agent and the causation exemplified by 
her action, i.e. the activity she engages in, is not a relation at all. The agent does 
not stand in any relation to her activity. Similarly, engaging in an activity is not 
itself an activity, and there are no actions which are instances of engagement. It 
is not the case therefore that whenever an agent acts there is an infinity of 
actions they must perform. Furthermore, as mentioned, on my view, agents are 
not causally related to their actions (which are instances of their activities). 
Rather, actions existentially depend on agents engaging in activities and then 
completing them.  
5.5 Agential Power 
I have compared my metaphysics of action to three different kinds of agent-
causation-based theory: traditional agent causationism, agent-causation-based 
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theories which take actions to be causings, and agent-causation-based theories 
which posit a ‘temporal stuff’ metaphysics to help explain what action is. These 
comparisons focused on issues related to what an action is, what it is for an 
agent to be causing something, and how we ought to think of the relationship 
between an agent, her activity and her action. However, as I mentioned above, 
providing a metaphysics of action is not all that is required for a complete and 
adequate theory of agency. To provide a complete theory of agency one must 
provide a dissection of the concept of agency. In this section, I will defend my 
understanding of this concept.  
On my view, agency cannot be identified with either the exercise of active 
power or with the exercise of two-way power. Instead, both concepts are key to 
understanding agency. Among the agential powers things have are powers like 
the power to bend, the power to crush, the power to fold, the power to build. 
What all these various agential powers have in common is that they are all 
powers to control what transpires, in one way or another. But ‘control’ is an 
ambiguous concept, which is arguably no easier to understand than the agency 
concept. My proposal is that competence with the agency concept demands that 
one have some grasp of at least two distinctions: between activity and passivity, 
and between settling and non-settling. These distinctions capture two important 
ways in which an agent can be said to be controlling what transpires. In this 
section, I will outline my reasons for adopting this view.  
Hyman claims that ‘to act is to intervene, to make a difference, to make 
something happen, to cause some kind of change’ (2015, p.33). On Hyman’s 
view, the connection between agency and substance causation is very tight. 
Agency is a causal concept on his view; the power of agency is the power of a 
substance to be active or to cause change. Agents cause change and should be 
contrasted with patients, who undergo or suffer change (Hyman, 2015, p.34). 
This conception of agency is compatible with acknowledging that ‘action occurs 
throughout the world, some of it voluntary and some of it not, some of it by 
human being and some of it not, some of it by living beings and some of it not’ 
(p.29). According to Hyman, the idea that this concept does not apply in non-
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human, or non-voluntary, contexts is the result of combining the false doctrine 
that matter is inert with the idea that ‘human beings, or in some philosophical 
systems living beings, are not constrained in their behaviour by the same 
conservation laws as the rest of the natural world’ (p.29). Hyman acknowledges 
that human agency is distinctive in many ways, but agency is still a broad and 
highly abstract concept, of which human agency is just a special sub-species.  
Steward (2012) argues that agency is the exercise of two-way power. For 
Steward, a key part of our concept of action is that agents settle heretofore open 
questions (like whether or not they will φ) when they act. What it is to act is to 
settle some matter. On Steward’s view, ‘agents are entities that things can be up 
to’ (p.26). Steward, like me, thinks that the power to settle a question should be 
understood as a two-way power. So, because Steward thinks that agency is 
essentially settling, she thinks agency is essentially the exercise of two-way 
power.43 Not all examples of substance causation count as examples of agency 
on Steward’s view, as not all examples of substance causation are exercises of 
two-way power: inanimate substances, for example, cannot exercise two-way 
powers. Such substances are not able both to cause some change and refrain 
from causing such a change. Furthermore, not all examples of agency are 
examples of substance causation – sometimes when substances demonstrate 
agency they do so by refraining, by not acting, by not causing a change which 
they could have caused.  
I think both views have got something right and something wrong. 
Hyman’s view wrongly entails that refraining from acting is never a 
demonstration of agency (unless it is something which is achieved by performing 
some positive action). Steward’s view wrongly entails that substances which are 
incapable of settling (such as inanimate objects) cannot demonstrate agency. My 
 
 
 
43 Steward’s conception of two-way power is somewhat different to my own, but for the purposes 
of this chapter it is safe to ignore this disagreement. See chapter 2, section 2.1.2.   
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preferred view holds that agential powers are sometimes one-way and 
sometimes two-way. Substances which possess only one-way powers to act are 
agents only when they are active; for such agents their exercising agential power 
is their exercising active power. However, substances which possess two-way 
powers can be agents not only when they are active, i.e. when their exercising 
agential power is their exercising active power, but also when they are passive.  
5.5.1 Agential Power is not Active Power 
Alvarez (2013) acknowledges that there is ‘a pre-theoretical notion of agency 
according to which an agent is something or someone that makes things happen, 
something or someone with the power to cause things. This pre-theoretical 
notion of agency extends to animals and plants, and also to inanimate things’ 
(2013, p.102). However, she argues that human agency should be understood in 
terms of the exercise of a two-way power. Alvarez proposes that, for human 
beings, their agential powers are two-way powers, and every instance of human 
agency is an instance of the exercise of a two-way power, or something done by 
exercising a two-way power.44 Alvarez motivates this view by providing a diverse 
selection of examples of human agency and arguing that what these diverse 
examples have in common is that they are all exercises of two-way power.   
First, Alvarez cites examples where human beings cause an event to occur 
by not doing something: ‘we can cause offence by not greeting someone, cause a 
 
 
 
44 The clause ‘or something done by exercising a two-way power’ is added to cover cases such as 
the following: I press a button, which unbeknownst to me issues an order to launch nuclear 
missiles, and thereby start a war. I did not know pressing the button was a way of starting a war, 
so I did not possess or exercise a two-way power to start a war. Nevertheless, starting the war 
was an action of mine. Alvarez allows for this kind of case by pointing out that in this case 
starting a war was done by exercising a two-way power to press a button.  
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death by not feeding someone, and so on’ (2013, p.104). These are examples of 
allowing something to happen, and according to Alvarez they ‘suggest that not 
doing something itself can be an instance of agency’ (p.104). Alvarez considers 
and rejects the objection that when we causally attribute an event to someone’s 
inaction this is not a genuine causal claim as being unduly restrictive.45 
Importantly, in cases of allowing, the putative agent does not exert any active 
power. For example, in failing to water my plant, I do not actively cause the 
death of the plant. Substances in the vicinity which might have actively caused 
the death of the plant probably include parts of the plant itself (e.g. the plant’s 
chloroplasts may have actively caused the death of the plant by using up what 
water was stored in the plant, thereby causing the plan to wilt, which in turn 
prevented the plant from capturing light etc). In cases of allowing, like the case 
where I allow my plant to die by not watering it, I demonstrate agency by letting 
the active powers of other substances to manifest themselves, rather than by 
exercising any active powers myself.  
Alvarez also cites examples of preventing something from happening. One 
can prevent something from happening either by doing something – ‘for 
instance, I can prevent a paper from flying away by holding it down; doing that 
is not causing but is rather preventing a change by doing something: holding the 
paper down’ (2013, p.106)  – or by not doing something – ‘for example, if I 
stand motionless in front of a laser-beam mechanism that controls a door, and 
thus keep it open’ or prevent it from closing, or ‘an ambassador may prevent a 
diplomatic incident by keeping quiet when provoked’ (p.106). This latter kind of 
example, preventing-by-not-doing, is particularly interesting as this kind of 
example is more obviously a case where the putative agent does not exercise any 
active power.  
 
 
 
45 See also Alvarez’s (2001) argument for the conclusion that an agent who lets an event happen 
causes it. 
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Alvarez thinks that both allowing and preventing-by-not-doing are 
manifestations of agency. I agree: I think these cases count as demonstrations of 
agency, even though they do not involve the agent exercising active power. It 
should be granted, however, that these examples are not descriptions of actions. 
Refraining from acting, or failing to act, is not a kind of action. I agree with 
Hyman that ‘ensuring that something doesn’t change by not changing something 
may be as consequential as an act, but it is not an act, even though not doing 
something can be deliberate and voluntary, and one can try not to do something 
such as bite one’s nails, and either succeed in the attempt or fail’ (2015, p.14). 
Actions are what come into existence when an agent engages in an activity and 
completes that activity. If an agent refrains from, or fails to, engage in an 
activity, then no action will come into being. Some philosophers think that there 
are such things as negative actions (e.g. Vermazen, 1985), but to posit not-
doings in addition to doings, is to proliferate the number of occurrences beyond 
necessity. However, even though refraining from acting, or failing to act, is not a 
kind of action, this does not mean that such cases are not manifestations of 
agency. Agency and action are distinct concepts, even though they are closely 
related. Something can be an instance of agency, or a manifestation of agential 
power, even though it is not an action. I think the agency concept extends to 
cases of allowing and preventing-by-not-doing, in part because such cases are 
ethically important: people can be held morally responsible for refraining from 
acting, and failing to act, and it would be unjust to hold people morally 
responsible for refraining from acting, and failing to act, if these weren’t 
demonstrations of agential power.  
It might be argued that the ethical significance of allowing and 
preventing-by-not-doing does not hinge on whether such cases can be counted 
as an instance of agency, but on whether such cases can be counted as instances 
of voluntariness or intentionality. One might argue that it is voluntariness or 
intentionality which is important for moral responsibility, not agency per se. I 
think there are two problems with this line of argument. First, I am not sure that 
cases of allowing and preventing-by-not-doing can really be examples of 
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voluntariness and intentionality without being examples of agency. More 
specifically, I doubt that something can be counted as an instance of 
intentionality or voluntariness if it cannot be counted as a demonstration of the 
kind of control over the course of events we would want to call agency. (Of 
course, I accept that there can be examples of voluntariness and intentionality 
which are not examples of activity or substance causation – but that is not what 
is at issue.)  
Second, I think that there are some cases of allowing and preventing-by-
not-doing which fall short of being intentional, and hence fall short of being 
voluntary, but where we would still assign moral responsibility.46 For example, 
suppose I am in the kitchen while some pasta is cooking, but I am distracted, so I 
allow the pasta to boil over by not turning the gas down. In this case, I did not 
intentionally let the pasta boil over. However, I think I would be held 
responsible for letting the pasta boil over. A case of non-intentional preventing-
by-not-doing might be not moving out of someone’s way on a busy train. I may 
not have noticed that I am blocking someone’s path, so it would be incorrect to 
say I am blocking their path intentionally. However, I think I can be justly held 
responsible for impeding their progress. In these cases, moral responsibility does 
not depend on the intentionality or voluntariness of the passivity – so what does 
it depend on? Determining a precise answer to this question requires much more 
detailed examination of the concept responsibility than I can undertake here. 
However, I think it is plausible that responsibility for unintentional omissions 
will depend, in some way, on whether agential powers were operational.47  
 
 
 
46 I am taking it for granted that being intentional is a necessary, but insufficient condition for 
being voluntary.  
47 Raz suggests that we are responsible for outcomes ‘which result from failure, due to the 
malfunctioning of our capacities of agency, to complete as intended an action within our domain 
of secure competence’ (2010, p.21). In other words, we are responsible for unintentional 
omissions when our conduct would have been guided by our rational capacities were it not for 
the fact that these capacities were malfunctioning. The concept of agential power thus plays a 
part in Raz’s account.  
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5.5.2 Agential Power is not Two-Way Power 
Alvarez is right that most of the time when human beings exercise their agential 
powers, the power they are exercising is a two-way power. For human beings, 
their agential powers are, in most cases, two-way. (I also think this holds for 
many animals.) Recognising this means that we can explain how agency can be 
demonstrated in passivity as well as in activity: when one’s agential power is 
two-way, one can demonstrate this power by not performing the action one’s 
agential power is a power to do. However, this doesn’t prove that all agential 
powers are two-way powers, or even that all human agential powers are two-
way powers.  
Agency can be found where the power to settle is lacking; that is, there 
can be agency even in cases where what happens is not up to the agent. In 
particular, inanimate objects can be agents even though inanimate objects do 
not possess two-way powers. To claim that our agency concept does not really 
apply to inanimate objects seems inconsistent with the fact that we use the same 
causative verbs to report human actions as to report what inanimate objects 
have done.48 I also think that, in some circumstances, human beings’ agential 
powers are one-way rather than two-way. For example, when I am unconscious, 
my power to crush a crushable object (e.g. by rolling onto it) is one-way. So, 
unlike Alvarez, I do not think that all human agential powers are always two-
way. Human agency is sometimes a matter of two-way powers being exercised 
and sometimes a matter of one-way powers being exercised.  
An example which seems to speak against my proposal that human 
agential powers can be one-way or two-way is Davidson’s example where I spill 
my coffee because you jiggle my hand (1971/2001 p.45). In this case, it was not 
up to me whether my coffee spilled. It was not me who settled whether my 
 
 
 
48 See chapter 2, section 2.2.5. 
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coffee would spill: it was you. In this example, I am a helpless victim. It is even 
legitimate to say that in this example, I did not spill my coffee, you did. I was 
just the conduit for your action. If all human agency is the exercise of two-way 
power, as Alvarez proposes, we can explain why there is no agency in this 
example by appealing to the fact that it was not up to me whether my coffee 
spilled: I did not possess or exercise a power to spill my coffee or not.  
Hyman provides an alternative way to accommodate the intuition that I 
am not an agent in Davidson’s example, which does not depend on the idea that 
all human agency is the exercise of two-way power. Hyman contends that when 
a substance is complex, i.e. has parts, the substance’s status as an agent depends 
on the integrated operation of the substance’s parts. Hyman proposes that ‘all 
animal agency is really collective agency’, and so ‘individual human agency is 
always really collective agency, since a human being, like every other 
multicellular organism with specialised tissues, is in reality a highly integrated 
colony of functionally differentiated but genetically similar cells’ (2015, p.48). 
Therefore, an act can be considered a demonstration of a human being’s agency, 
rather than a demonstration of the agency of some proper part of that human 
being, when it involves the integrated operation of ‘metabolic, motor, and 
cognitive systems’ (p.50). In Davidson’s example, my spilling of my coffee 
doesn’t involve the integrated operation of all my functionally differentiated 
parts: my arm is certainly involved, and perhaps my metabolic and motor 
systems too (or else my arm would not be gripping my coffee cup to start with), 
but my cognitive systems are not involved, therefore, I am not the agent.  
A third alternative is to say that in Davidson’s example, despite intuitions 
to the contrary, I am an agent, it is just that in this example a) I am not 
exercising a two-way power and b) I am also a patient. The case is confusing 
because human beings’ agential powers can be one-way or two-way. The agency 
of human beings is usually a matter of exercising two-way powers – we are 
usually settlers – so on the odd occasion where we cause things to happen 
without settling, we might be inclined to say our agency has disappeared – but it 
hasn’t, it has just been down-graded. Although this last way of dealing with 
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Davidson’s example might seem unappealing, I prefer it. I have considered three 
alternative analyses of the agency concept in this section and all three require 
that we give up an intuition. Identifying agential power with active power means 
that we have to deny that cases of allowing and preventing-by-not-doing are 
demonstrations of agency; identifying agential power with two-way power 
means that we have to deny that inanimate objects are capable of exercising 
agential power. My preferred view, which holds that agential powers are 
sometimes one-way and sometimes two-way, saves both the intuition that cases 
of allowing and preventing-by-not-doing can be demonstrations of agency, and 
the intuition that inanimate objects are capable of exercising agential power, but 
it conflicts with the intuition that in cases like Davidson’s I am not an agent. Of 
the three intuitions mentioned here, I am least attached to the third.  
In this chapter, I outlined a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of action, which 
draws upon the process ontology outlined in chapter 4, and my analysis of the 
agency concept. I contended that what it is for a substance to be causing 
something is for there to be an activity which the substance is engaging in. A 
substance engaging in an activity is an agent, and the event that results once the 
substance has completed the activity it has been engaging in is an action. Actions 
are thus instances of activities, and as engaging in an activity is what it is for an 
agent to be causing something, actions can also be said to be instances of agent 
causation. In sections 5.2-5.4, I compared this metaphysics of action with three 
prominent agent-causation-based theories of action, and argued that my account 
has advantages over each. I also suggested that the agency concept should be 
understood in terms of two distinctions: the distinction between activity and 
passivity, and the distinction between one-way and two-way powers, and I 
defended this analysis in section 5.5.  
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6  
Action Explanation   
As stated in chapter 1, the problem of mental causation is the problem of how to 
reconcile the idea that our mental states have some sort of causal influence over 
how we act, with the principle of causal closure, which entails that every bodily 
movement has a completely physical mode of generation. Few philosophers 
writing on the problem of mental causation are willing to resolve this tension by 
giving up the idea that there is mental causation. There is good reason for this 
reluctance. It is natural to think that some form of mental causation is 
indispensable to our conception of ourselves as agents who act intentionally and 
bear moral responsibility. Our conception of ourselves as agents who sometimes 
act intentionally presupposes ‘the reality of causal processes involving cognitive 
phenomena’, as Menzies (2013, p.58) puts it. Given that we sometimes act 
intentionally, I don’t think it can be doubted that mentality is causally relevant 
in the physical world – but this claim is very vague. What exactly is it for 
mentality to be causally relevant in the physical world?  
In chapter 1, I contended that philosophers writing on the problem of 
mental causation often assume what I called the relational understanding of 
mental causation:  
Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a 
matter of mental items (events, processes or states which are conceived of as 
particulars) standing in causal relations to physical events, e.g. bodily 
movements.   
When philosophers writing on the problem of mental causation claim that the 
possibility of intentional action presupposes the existence of mental causation, it 
is often the relational understanding that they have in mind. For example, in 
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Kim gives the following reason why it is 
important that mental causation is real:  
First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral 
practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal effects in the 
physical world. In voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions 
and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways, 
thereby causing the objects around us to be rearranged. (2005, p.9) 
What Kim thinks is required by the possibility of human agency – and specifically 
voluntary action – is that ‘our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, 
must somehow cause our limbs to move’ which either means that mental states 
are themselves the agents of bodily movements, or that mental states stand in 
causal relations to bodily movements. Later in the same work, Kim claims that 
‘mental phenomena must be capable of functioning as indispensable links in 
causal chains leading to physical behaviour, like movements of the limbs and 
vibrations of the vocal cord’ (2005, p.10). Kim assumes mental causation is a 
matter of mental items (states or events) standing in causal relations to physical 
events.  
The question of whether our concept of intentional action presupposes 
mental causation is related to the question of what an intentional action is, or 
what it is to act intentionally. Many have tried to provide an account of 
intentional action by examining the way we typically explain intentional actions. 
It is commonly held that intentional actions can be explained by the reasons for 
which they were performed, or by citing the motive or aim of the agent. I will 
call such explanations ‘rationalising explanations’. The assumption made by 
philosophers who theorise about what intentional actions are is that we can 
achieve an adequate account of what it is to act intentionally by examining the 
distinctive sort of explanation with which intentional actions are associated.  
Davidson (1963) argues that explanations of intentional actions which 
cite the agent’s reasons are causal explanations. They are true if a mental event 
suitably related to the reason stands in a causal relation to the action. Hornsby 
suggests that many (including Davidson himself) have assumed, on the basis of 
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Davidson’s argument, that reason-giving explanations of intentional actions are 
causal, that ‘beliefs and desires stand to actions as causes to effects (with 
decisions or intentions maybe intervening)’ (2015, p.134). Hornsby’s point is 
that Davidson’s argument is often taken to justify the claim that mental states or 
events stand in causal relations to actions. Davidson’s argument seems to be the 
source of the common view that our conception of ourselves as intentional 
agents presupposes that mentality is causally relevant in the physical world and 
that this mental causation should be conceived of in relational terms.  
In section 6.1, I will look at explanations of intentional action which cite 
the agent’s reasons. I will clarify what I take reasons to be, and how they relate 
to two important sorts of mental state: states of believing and states of desiring. 
In section 6.2, I will outline Davidson’s argument for thinking that explanations 
of intentional action which cite the agent’s reasons are causal. In section 6.3, I 
will consider objections to the idea that rationalising explanations are made true 
by mental events or states standing in causal relations to the actions explained. I 
will conclude that while Davidson’s opponents, whom I shall call ‘non-causalists’, 
make several correct claims about how rationalising explanations work, their 
objections do not successfully refute Davidson’s position. This is because, firstly, 
the idea that rationalising explanations are causal is very appealing, and 
secondly, the availability of a metaphysical theory like Anomalous Monism 
allows the Davidsonian to accept the correct claims made by non-causalists even 
while insisting that rationalising explanations are made true by causal relations 
between events. In other words, I will conclude that the debate between 
Davidson and non-causalists is at something of an impasse. In chapter 7, I will 
explain how my non-Relationalist view of causation, and neo-Aristotelian view 
of agency, provides a way of resolving this impasse.  
6.1 Rationalising Explanation 
We do something intentionally when we do it because, in a very broad sense, we 
want to. ‘Want to’ needs to be understood broadly so that mental states as 
diverse as craving a cup of coffee, having a life-long ambition to climb Everest, 
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and seeing that some otherwise detestable action is necessary in order to achieve 
something valuable all count as wanting to perform the action in question. This 
is because making a cup of coffee to satisfy a craving, climbing Everest to fulfil a 
life-long ambition, and performing a detestable action in order to achieve 
something valuable are all examples of intentional action.  
Often (but not always), when we explain an intentional action, that is, 
say why the agent acted (intentionally) as she did, we do so by giving the 
agent’s reason for acting as she did.49 I will call such explanations ‘rationalising 
explanations’. Rationalising explanations are explanations which work by 
showing why what the agent did seemed, to the agent, like a rational or sensible 
or good thing for the agent to do, given certain facts (e.g. what the agent’s 
preferences or values are). Rationalising explanations explain why an agent 
acted as she did (this is the explanandum) by telling us why, in the agent’s eyes, 
what they did was a rational thing for them to do (this is the explanans).  
Rationalising explanations should be distinguished from what I will call 
‘mere rationalisations’. Mere rationalisations are similar to rationalising 
explanations in that they also tell us why the course of action taken by the agent 
seemed, to the agent, to be a rational course of action to take. However, what 
mere rationalisations explain – i.e. the explanandum of a mere rationalisation – 
is slightly different. Mere rationalisations do not tell us why an agent acted as she 
did – they only tell us why what the agent did seemed, to the agent, to be a 
rational thing for them to do. For example, imagine that Diana is deciding 
whether or not to speak at a conference. She knows that speaking at a 
conference will be good for her career, but in the end, she decides to speak at 
the conference because it will draw praise from her friends, and not because it 
will be good for her career (perhaps she does not really care about her career). 
 
 
 
49 Two examples of an explanation of an intentional action which does not cite the agent’s 
reasons or motives are: ‘Sally bit the policeman because she was drunk’ (Hyman, 2015, p.105) 
and ‘She threw the water at him because she was angry at him’.  
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Diana actually spoke at the conference because she would get praise from her 
friends, not because it would be good for her career. In this context, the 
following statement would be a mere rationalisation of Diana’s action:  
(a) Speaking at the conference seemed rational to Diana because it would be 
good for her career.  
This is a mere rationalisation because it explains why speaking at the conference 
seemed to Diana to be a rational thing for her to do – but it does not explain 
why Diana actually spoke at the conference. Consequently, sometimes citing a 
consideration which, in the agent’s eyes, renders a course of action a rational 
course of action for the agent to take will not explain why the agent took that 
course of action.  
A key question, one which has a bearing on whether rationalising 
explanations are causal or not, is how rationalising explanations explain. How 
does a statement telling us why what an agent did seemed to them to be a 
rational thing to do explain why the agent did as she did? How does the 
explanans of a rationalising explanation illuminate the explanandum? This 
question is especially pertinent given that sometimes a statement telling us why 
what an agent did seemed to them to be a rational thing to do does not explain 
why the agent did as she did. However, before attempting to address this 
question, a prior question needs to be addressed, namely, what exactly is the 
explanans of a rationalising explanation? I have said that it is a statement which 
tells us why what an agent did seemed to them to be a rational thing to do – but 
what sorts of statement are able to do this? I will assume throughout that the 
explanans of any explanation is always a fact. That is, I assume that explanation 
is a relation between facts and only facts can explain other facts.50 So, the first 
question to address is: what sort of facts can tell us why a certain sort of action 
 
 
 
50 Van Fraassen (1980, p.134-153) proposes a theory of explanations as answers to why-
questions where both the answer and the topic of the why-question are true propositions. Raley 
(2007) has also defended the view that all explanation is factive. 
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seemed to an agent to be a rational thing for them to do, and by doing this also 
tell us why the agent performed that sort of action?  
To this question, I think Davidson has essentially the right answer. 
Davidson claims that the explanantia of rationalising explanations are facts 
about what the agent wants to do (or what the agent has an urge to do, or what 
the agent has an ambition to do) and what the agent believes about how to do 
it. Facts about what an agent wants and believes can tell us why a certain sort of 
action seemed to the agent to be a rational thing for them to do and why the 
agent performed that sort of action. Davidson calls the dual possession of a 
desire to perform some type of action and a belief about how performance of 
that action may be achieved ‘the primary reason why the agent performed the 
action’ (1963/2001, p.4). Rationalising explanations don’t typically take the 
form ‘agent A φed because A wanted to φ and believed that ψing was a way to 
φ’. Sometimes this is because it suffices to explain why someone acted as they 
did to only mention what the agent wanted to do. For example, in (b) Beth’s 
action is explained in terms of her desire only: 
(b) Beth is buying flour because she wants to make bread.  
We don’t need to be told that Beth believes or knows that buying flour is an 
essential preparatory action for making bread. We take it for granted that Beth 
possesses this knowledge. Other times it is because it suffices to explain why 
someone acted as they did only to mention what the agent believes, or knows, 
about how to achieve what they want to do. For example, in (c), John’s action is 
explained in terms of his belief only:  
(c) John is adding rosemary to the sauce because he believes it will make it taste 
better.  
We don’t need to be told that John wants to make the sauce taste better – we 
take it for granted that he wants this. Davidson’s point is not that all 
rationalising explanations explicitly give the primary reason why the agent acts, 
his point is rather that for the explanans of a rationalising explanation to 
illuminate the explanandum, ‘it is necessary and sufficient that we see, at least in 
essential outline, how to construct a primary reason’ (1963/2001, p.4). That is, 
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the explanatory power of rationalising explanations rests on our ability to 
construct a primary reason from any rationalising explanation.  
Although I think Davidson is broadly correct in thinking that the 
explanantia of rationalising explanations are facts about what the agent wants 
and believes, there are two complications. Firstly, when an agent acts for a 
reason, the reason for which they act is not usually a fact about the agent’s own 
mental states. For example: 
(d) David took the A-road because the motorway was shut.  
In (d) David’s reason is ‘that the motorway was shut’, not ‘that David believed or 
knew that the motorway was shut’. At least, that is how things seem.  
How does this square with Davidson’s claim that the primary reason why 
an agent acts is a belief-desire pair? Is the appearance that David’s reason is ‘that 
the motorway was shut’ and not ‘that David believed or knew that the motorway 
was shut’ an illusion? Or are there different senses to the term ‘reason’? The 
question of what reasons are or can be has a bearing on the question of whether 
acting intentionally is to act for a reason. Davidson thinks that intentional action 
can be defined as an action done for a reason. However, sometimes we do things 
intentionally but ‘for no reason’ – such as when one hums a tune to oneself, or 
spontaneously decides to take the scenic route home. Davidson responds by 
claiming that ‘for no reason’ means ‘for no further reason’, that is no reason 
besides wanting to do it (1963/2001, p.6). But this response assumes an 
understanding of ‘reason’ where reasons are always facts about the agent’s 
mental states. It ignores the possibility that there may be a sense of ‘reason’ 
where ‘for no reason’ can be taken literally, and consequently where acting 
intentionally and acting for a reason are not the same thing.   
The second complication is that we typically explain an agent’s 
intentional action in terms of what the agent believes only when they are acting 
on a false belief. When the agent is acting on something they know, we typically 
give a rationalising explanation like (d), which does not explicitly mention any 
facts about the agent’s mental state at all. In other words, the form rationalising 
explanations typically take varies systematically in accordance with whether the 
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agent was acting on something they knew or something they falsely believed. 
Rationalising explanations of the form ‘A φed because A believed that P’ are 
typically only given when P is false.   
6.1.1 Reasons-for-acting, Reasons-why and Aims  
The best way to tackle the first complication is, I think, to acknowledge that the 
word ‘reason’ can be used in more than one way. Firstly, the term can be used to 
denote an agent’s reason for acting. I follow Alvarez (2010) in thinking that an 
agent’s reason-for-acting is that which makes the action a sensible or rational or 
good thing to do. As Alvarez puts it, an agent’s reason-for-acting is ‘the 
desirability characterisation’ the action has for the agent. As such, reasons-for-
acting are not usually facts about an agent’s mental states. Strictly speaking, 
Beth’s reason for buying flour is not that she wants to make bread and believes 
that buying flour is a means of doing so. Similarly, David’s reason for taking the 
A-road is not that he wants to get some place and believes that, because the 
motorway is shut, taking the A-road is the only means of getting there. Alvarez 
(2010) explains why one ought not to think that the mental state of wanting to 
φ and believing that ψing is a means of φing is itself the reason for which the 
agent acted:  
This suggestion seems plausible but, on examination, it is unconvincing. 
Remember that my reason for acting is the desirability characterisation that 
an action has for me. But, if I want to φ and believe that ψing is a means of 
φing, what makes ψing desirable to me is precisely that: namely, that my 
ψing is a means of φing (which is something I want). The desirability 
characterisation that my ψing has is that it is a means of φing. (2010, 
pp.109-110) 
The good Beth sees in buying flour is that buying flour is a necessary 
preparatory action for making bread (something that she wants). The good 
David sees in taking the A-road is that, given that the motorway is shut, taking 
the A-road is the only way he can get to where he wants to go. Of course, 
sometimes wanting to do something may be an agent’s reason for acting. For 
example, someone who wants to eat coal may take her wanting to eat coal as a 
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reason to take a pregnancy test. Similarly, sometimes believing something is an 
agent’s reason-for-acting. For example, someone who believes she is being 
pursued by the security services may take her so believing as a reason to see a 
psychiatrist. But such cases are exceptional.51 That you want something and/or 
believe something is not usually what makes an action seem sensible to you. 
Reasons-for-acting are not usually facts about an agent’s own mental states.  
As well as being used to denote the desirability characterisation an action 
has for an agent, the word ‘reason’ can also be used as a synonym for 
‘explanans’. When we give the reason why such and such is the case, we are 
providing an explanans. Reasons-why are explanans of explanations. I think 
Davidson’s claim that primary reasons given by rationalising explanations are 
belief-desire pairs is plausible only if ‘primary reason’ is taken to mean ‘primary 
reason-why’ or ‘primary explanans’, because reasons-for-acting are not usually 
facts about the agent’s own mental states. However, I believe that primary 
reasons-why, i.e. the primary explanantia, of rationalising explanations are facts 
about what the agent wants and believes. That is, I believe that the explanatory 
power of rationalising explanations rests on our ability to construct a belief-
desire pair from any rationalising explanation.52  
If reasons-for-acting are desirability characterisations, then this means 
that (d) explicitly gives David’s reason-for-acting, but (b) does not give Beth’s 
reason-for-acting. Instead of giving Beth’s reason-for-acting, I think that (b) gives 
Beth’s aim, or purpose, or goal, or motive, or intention53:	what Beth wants to do, 
 
 
 
51 This point has been clearly made by Dancy (2000, p.125) and Setiya (2011, p.132).  
52 Or a knowledge-desire pair – see section 6.1.2.  
53 I take these five terms to be synonyms. In some contexts, it may be useful to draw distinctions 
between aims, purposes, goals, motives and intentions. Anscombe, for example, suggests that 
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i.e. to make bread, is Beth’s aim, it is not her reason. It is controversial to 
distinguish between reasons and aims – some would say that ‘to make bread’ is 
Beth’s reason. However, if Alvarez (2010) is correct in thinking that an agent’s 
reason-for-acting is that which makes the action a sensible or rational or good 
thing to do, then the infinitival phrase ‘to make bread’ does not express a reason 
because this infinitival phrase does not state the good Beth sees in either buying 
flour or making bread – it is not a desirability characterisation of either activity.  
Like reasons-for-acting, aims are not facts about mental states of the 
agent. Specifically, aims are not facts about desires. Beth’s aim is ‘to make 
bread’, it is not the fact that Beth wants to make bread. Indeed, aims are not 
facts at all. Aims are expressed by an infinitival phrase, for example, Beth’s aim 
is ‘to make bread’. Facts, on the other hand, are expressed by that-clauses. 
Perhaps one might argue that the infinitival phrases which express aims can be 
translated, without any change in meaning, into that-clauses which express 
facts. For example, perhaps ‘to make bread’ could be translated into ‘that Beth 
will make bread’ or ‘that Beth may make bread’. To this suggestion, I would 
reply that neither ‘that Beth will make bread’ nor ‘that Beth may make bread’, as 
they are normally understood, capture the meaning of ‘to make bread’ when the 
latter is used to express an aim. This is because ‘that Beth will make bread’ and 
‘that Beth may make bread’ are usually taken to be assertions, the first makes an 
assertion about how things will be in the future, the second makes an assertion 
about how things might be in the future.  
 
 
 
there is ‘popularly’ a distinction between ‘motive’ and ‘intention’. A motive is ‘the spirit in which’ 
someone does something; so, when one acts out of pity, pity would be one’s motive (2000, p.18) 
Whereas an intention, in the popular sense, is the end to which one’s action is a means; it is ‘a 
future state of affairs to be produced’ (pp.18-19). Such distinctions are useful, but they do not 
matter for my purposes here. What matters for my purposes here is that rationalising 
explanations like (b) do not give explicitly the agent’s reason-for-acting. Instead they explain the 
agent’s actions in terms of something else, something which is expressed by an infinitival phrase 
like ‘to make bread’.  
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Kenny (1975) suggested that assertions contrast with things like 
commands and wishes. The contrast can be captured in the following way. Grant 
that both assertions and commands can be said to have a content which 
describes a state of affairs. So, suppose the content of ‘that Beth will make bread’ 
describes a future state of affairs where Beth is making bread, and suppose the 
content of the command ‘Beth! Make bread!’ also describes a future state of 
affairs where Beth is making bread. Now suppose this state of affairs does not 
obtain: in the future Beth does not make bread. In the case of the assertion, if in 
the future Beth does not make bread, this means that there’s something wrong 
with the assertion, the assertion is false. In the case of the command however, if 
in the future Beth does not make bread, this means there’s something wrong 
with the world, the world has failed to conform with the command. Aims are 
like commands. They are not statements about what the future is like, or even 
statements about what the future might be like; they are more like private 
decrees one makes to oneself. They are measured against the world in a 
different way to assertions. When the facts fail to conform with them, the fault 
lies with the world.54 
Distinguishing reasons-for-acting from reasons-why also lets us see how ‘I 
acted intentionally but for no reason’ can be literally true. This sentence is 
literally true when ‘reason’ is taken to mean ‘reason-for-acting’. When I hum to 
myself intentionally but for no reason, I hum to myself because I want to, but 
not because humming has a desirability characterisation for me. When Davidson 
claimed that intentional action could be defined in terms of acting for a reason, 
it is likely the first sense of ‘reason’ that he had in mind. But, if it really is the 
first sense of ‘reason’ that Davidson had in mind, then his claim is false. Acting 
intentionally and acting for a reason are not the same thing, because I can act 
intentionally without acting for a reason. Claiming that intentional action is 
 
 
 
54 See Kenny (1975, pp.29-45). 
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action for which there is a ‘reason-why’ is true, but it is no definition of 
intentional action. ‘Reason-why’ just means ‘explanans’, and plenty of actions 
which are not intentional have an explanans (e.g. I ducked because there was a 
ball was coming my way). Claiming that intentional action is action for which 
there is a special kind of ‘reason-why’, namely the kind of ‘reason-why’ given by a 
rationalising explanation, is true but also fails as a definition of intentional 
action. This is because there is likely no way of distinguishing the special kind of 
reason-why from other sorts of reason-why except by saying that the special kind 
are those which explain intentional actions. In other words, such a definition 
would be circular.  
6.1.2 Acting on a False Belief and Acting on What You Know 
The second complication is that rationalising explanations of the form ‘A jed 
because A believed that P’, i.e. those which explicitly reference the agent’s 
beliefs, tend to be given only when it is false that P. We typically only give a 
rationalising explanation of an agent’s intentional action which explicitly 
mentions their belief when the agent is acting on a false belief. So, (c) would 
normally be read as implying that adding rosemary to the sauce will not make it 
taste better (or at the very least that it is not certain whether adding rosemary 
will make the sauce taste better or not).  
(c) John is adding rosemary to the sauce because he believes it will make it taste 
better. 
In cases where an agent acts on a false belief we can still give a 
rationalising explanation of their action, but it is not clear whether such 
explanations give the agent’s reason for acting. For example, (e) is a 
rationalising explanation, because it tells us why Columbus acted as he did by 
telling us why sailing west across the Atlantic seemed, to Columbus, like a 
rational thing for him to do. 
(e) Columbus sailed west across the Atlantic because he thought that was the 
way to India.  
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However, does this rationalising explanation give Columbus’s reason for acting? 
Alvarez (2010) thinks it does not. This is because Alvarez thinks that reasons are 
facts. That India can be directly reached by sailing west across the Atlantic is not 
a fact, hence it could not have been a reason for Columbus to act. Although 
Columbus doesn’t know it, he doesn’t really have a reason to sail west across the 
Atlantic. The false proposition that India can be reached by sailing west across 
the Atlantic was mistakenly judged to be a reason by Columbus. If this is right 
then (e) does not attribute to Columbus a reason-for-acting, instead it tells us 
what he thought his reason-for-acting was. Dancy (2000) in contrast thinks that 
a rationalising explanation like (e) does give Columbus’s reason-for-acting. 
Dancy thinks that reasons do not have to be true. According to Dancy, 
Columbus’s reason is the (false) content of his belief.  
I do not know whether Alvarez or Dancy is right on this point (although, I 
lean towards Alvarez’s position). However, either way, what does the explaining 
in (e) is, I contend, the fact that Columbus believed that India can be reached by 
sailing west across the Atlantic. In other words, the explanans in (e) is a fact 
about Columbus’s mental state, a fact about what he believes. Dancy disagrees: 
he thinks that the explanans of (e) is the false content of Columbus’s belief, 
which is what Dancy takes to be Columbus’s reason-for-acting. This is because 
Dancy thinks that the explanans of a rationalising explanation is always the 
reason-for-acting provided by the rationalising explanation. However, this 
position commits Dancy to the view that explanans do not have to be facts, 
which goes against the plausible assumption that explanation is a relation 
between facts, and that only facts can explain.55 For this reason, Dancy’s claim 
that the explanans in (e) is the false content of Columbus’s belief should be 
rejected. Regardless of whether we think Columbus really has a reason-for-
 
 
 
55 Dancy goes on to use this as an argument against the idea that reason-giving action 
explanations are causal, as causal explanations, according to Dancy, must be factive. 
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acting or not, what explains why Columbus acted as he did is the fact that he 
had a certain (false) belief.  
When an agent acts intentionally on a false belief, the fact that they 
believe some false proposition is the explanans for their action. When an agent 
acts intentionally on something they know, the rationalising explanation we give 
of their action will not typically explicitly mention any belief of the agent. We 
are far more likely to give a rationalising explanation like (d) which does not 
explicitly mention any facts about David’s mental states. 
(d) David took the A-road because the motorway was shut.  
The explanans of (d) appears to be a fact about the world external to David, i.e. 
a fact about the motorway – which is David’s reason for acting – and not a fact 
about David’s mental states. What does this mean for Davidson’s proposal, which 
I have endorsed, that the primary explanantia of rationalising explanations are 
facts about the agent’s mental states, specifically facts about what the agent 
believes and desires?  
The idea that the primary explanantia of rationalising explanations are 
facts about the agent’s mental state is not automatically falsified by the 
observation that, when an agent is acting on what they know, the fact explicitly 
mentioned as explanans is often a fact about the world external to the agent. 
After all, Davidson concedes that rationalising explanations do not always 
explicitly mention the primary reason. In (d)’s case, had David not been aware 
that the motorway was shut, then even though the fact that the motorway was 
shut renders taking the A-road a sensible course of action, mentioning this fact 
would not explain why David took the A-road. This appears to suggest that 
offering a statement like (d) as an explanation of David’s action is only 
explanatory when we take it as read that David knew the motorway was shut. So 
perhaps the fact that’s really doing the explanatory work in (d) is the fact that 
David knew the motorway was shut.  
However, it is unclear what sort of state a state of knowledge is. Perhaps 
knowing that P is just a special sort of belief-state. In this case, the Davidsonian 
idea that the primary explanantia of rationalising explanations are facts about 
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what the agent wants to do and what the agent believes about how to do it is 
correct as it is. However, perhaps knowing that P is a distinctive kind of mental 
state, possession of which is incompatible with believing that P. In this case, the 
Davidsonian idea needs to be amended. We would have to say that the primary 
explanantia of rationalising explanations are facts about what the agent wants to 
do and what the agent believes or knows about how to do it.  
The significance of adding this disjunction is unclear. How important is 
the difference between rationalising explanations which have beliefs as part of 
their primary explanatia and rationalising explanations which have knowledge as 
part of their primary explanatia? Should we treat the two types of rationalising 
explanation differently? Furthermore, because I have assumed, along with many 
philosophers writing on intentional action, that rationalising explanations are a 
guide to the nature of intentional actions, if there are distinct kinds of 
rationalising explanation, then we have to ask if that means anything for our 
understanding of intentional action. Does it mean, for example, that intentional 
action is not a homogeneous phenomenon? Does it mean that there are different 
sorts of intentional action? These questions are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, when I come to put forward a view of intentional action 
in chapter 7, I will try not to pre-empt answers to these important questions.   
To summarise, I believe Davidson is broadly correct in thinking that for 
the explanans of a rationalising explanation to illuminate the explanandum, ‘it is 
necessary and sufficient that we see, at least in essential outline, how to contrast 
a primary reason’ (1963/2001, p.4). Davidson’s idea needs to be modified 
slightly in light of two complications. Firstly, the primary reason-why should be 
distinguished from the agent’s reason-for-acting. The former is a fact about the 
agent’s mental states which must at least be implicitly gestured to by the 
rationalising explanation in order for that rationalising explanation to explain. 
The latter is the good the agent saw in the action she performed, it is a 
desirability characterisation of the action. Usually, reasons-for-acting are not 
facts about the agent’s mental states but facts about the world external to the 
agent. Secondly, although Davidson thought that the primary reason-why an 
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agent acts was always a fact about what the agent wants to do and what the 
agent believes about how to do it, given that we only seem to offer rationalising 
explanations which mention beliefs when the agent lacks knowledge, it is 
possible that when an agent is acting on what she knows, the primary reason-
why is a desire-knowledge pair and not a desire-belief pair. In other words, it is 
possible that there are two different kinds of rationalising explanation. It is 
unclear how significant this difference is.  
There is much more to be said on the topic of rationalising explanations. 
However, I hope that I have said enough to show that the explanatory power of 
rationalising explanations seems to rest on their suggesting the existence of a 
connection between the agent’s mental states and their action. So, when we 
explain why an agent acted as she did by saying why what the agent did 
seemed, to the agent, like a rational thing for the agent to do, the fact that the 
agent acted as she did is explained by facts about her mental states.  
6.2 Are Rationalising Explanations Causal?  
How do rationalising explanations explain? How is it that a statement telling us 
why an agent’s action seemed to them to be rational is able to explain why the 
agent did as she did? One answer is that rationalising explanations explain by 
giving a causal account of the agent’s action. That is, a statement telling us why 
what an agent did seemed to them to be a rational thing to do explains why the 
agent did as she did by giving us causal information. Davidson (1963) favoured 
this answer. Davidson’s (1963) argument is best thought of as a challenge to 
anyone who thinks that rationalising explanations are not causal, as Davidson 
does not offer any positive reason to think that they are.  
In brief, Davidsons’s argument as follows: Some statements which tell us 
why what an agent did seemed to them to be rational do not explain why the 
agent did as she did. This phenomenon was demonstrated in the case of Diana 
described above. Diana believes that speaking at a conference will win her praise 
from her friends and will help her career. But she ends up speaking at a 
conference because of the praise she will receive from her friends rather than 
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because speaking at the conference will help her career. To say only that Diana 
spoke at the conference and believed that doing so would help her career is not 
to have explained why Diana spoke at the conference. This is because even 
though Diana’s action is justified by the fact that speaking at the conference 
would help her career, this was not why Diana spoke at the conference. It is not 
true that Diana spoke at the conference because she thought it would help her 
career. On the other hand, it is true that Diana spoke at the conference because 
she would receive praise from her friends. That Diana would receive praise from 
her friends if she spoke at the conference does explain why Diana acted as she 
did. (Diana’s case focuses on beliefs – but a similar case can be constructed using 
desires.) Because some statements which tell us why what an agent did seemed 
to them to be a rational do not explain why the agent did as she did, those 
statements which do both must achieve this by doing more than simply revealing 
why what an agent did seemed to them to be a rational thing to do. And if the 
extra thing rationalising explanations do is not revealing causal information – 
what is it? Davidson thinks there is no satisfactory answer to this question.  
Dancy (2000) denies that successful rationalising explanations do more 
than reveal why what an agent did seemed to them to be a rational thing to do. 
The difference between statements that rationalise but do not explain and 
statements which rationalise and explain is simply that, in the former, the 
belief/desire mentioned is not the belief/desire the agent acted in the light of, 
and in the latter the belief/desire mentioned is the belief/desire the agent acted 
in the light of. Davidson insists that the explanatory connection between 
beliefs/desires an agent acts in light of and the agent’s action cannot be brute – 
it has to hold in virtue of some other connection between the agent’s 
beliefs/desires and their action. But, Dancy objects, Davidson provides no 
argument against the following view: 
[...] the difference between those reasons for which the agent did in fact act 
and those for which he might have acted but did not is not a difference in 
causal role at all. It is just the difference between the considerations in the 
light of which he acted and other considerations he took to favour acting as 
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he did but which were not in fact ones in the light of which he decided to do 
what he did (2000, p163).  
In other words, Dancy doesn’t think that Davidson provides any argument 
against taking ‘acting in the light of’ as primitive.  
On Dancy’s view, ‘acted in the light of’ performs the function in the case 
of rationalising explanations that truth plays in the case of other sorts of 
explanation. Like truth, ‘acted in the light of’ is a status capable of belonging to 
statements given as explanans, which is a necessary condition for their 
explanatoriness. For example, compare ‘George is the first born of William and 
Kate’ with ‘George is the first born of Elizabeth and Philip’ as putative explanans 
of the following explanandum: why is George heir to the throne? Both 
statements posit the kind of relationship which would guarantee George’s being 
the heir to the throne, but only the first statement can genuinely explain why 
George is heir to the throne because only the first statement is true. There is 
nothing perplexing about the fact that truth can make the difference between 
two statements which both posit something that would make sense of the 
explanans. That only true statements can explain is plausibly a brute fact. 
However, there is something perplexing about the fact that ‘acted in the 
light of’ also seems to be able to perform this function. That ‘acted in the light of’ 
can perform this function seems like something that needs accounting for – it 
does not seem like a brute fact. There must be something about statements 
which tell us the reason the agent acted in the light of which grounds their 
explanatoriness. The question Davidson’s challenge raises is: why does learning 
that Diana’s reason for acting was that she would receive praise explain why 
Diana spoke at the conference? Why does ‘acted in the light of’ bestow 
explanatory power? Tanney (2009) expresses the puzzle well:  
Davidson claims that it would be a mistake to conclude from the fact that 
placing the action in a larger pattern explains it, we now understand the sort 
of explanation involved, and that ‘cause and effect form the sort of pattern 
that explain the effect in the sense of “explain” that we understand as well 
as any’ [(1963/2001, p.10)]. Davidson challenges the opponents of the 
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causal view to identify what other pattern of explanation illustrates the 
relation between reason and action if they wish to sustain the claim that the 
pattern is not one of cause and effect. (2009, p.96)  
The task is to spell out what ‘pattern of explanation’ is demonstrated by 
rationalising explanations.  
I have said that Davidson thought that the pattern of explanation 
demonstrated by rationalising explanations is a causal one. That is, that 
rationalising explanations explain by giving a causal account of the agent’s 
action. But what is the nature of the causal information rationalising 
explanations are supposed to provide? Davidson’s answer is that ‘the primary 
reason for an action is its cause’ (1963/2001, p.4); Davidson’s view is that 
rationalising explanations are true if and only if the belief or desire which 
explains the action (or some mental event suitably related to the belief or desire) 
stands in a causal relation to the action explained. So, for example, the truth of 
(b) depends on there being a causal relation between Beth’s desire to make 
bread (or, at least, the onset of her desire to make bread) and her buying flour. 
If (b) is true, then it necessarily implies the existence of a causal relation 
between Beth’s desire to make bread and her action, or so the thought goes.  
Opponents to Davidson, whom I will call ‘non-causalists’, deny that 
rationalising explanations are causal. Non-causalists deny that true rationalising 
explanations necessarily imply the existence of causal relations between mental 
states/events and actions. Non-causalists object to the idea that the mental 
concepts employed in rationalising explanations point to mental items which 
stand in causal relations to the actions explained. They also question the 
soundness of Davidson’s argument that the pattern of explanation demonstrated 
by rationalising explanations must be causal. According to non-causalists, what 
grounds the explanatory power of statements which tell us the reason the agent 
acted in the light of is not that such statements pick out the cause of the action 
explained, but something else.  
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6.3 Objections to Davidson 
6.3.1 Mental Concepts  
Opponents of Davidson argue that rationalising explanations display features 
which set them apart from typical causal explanations, like ‘the patient 
developed cancer because he was exposed to radiation’, and which challenge the 
plausibility of the idea that mental concepts employed in rationalising 
explanations designate the causes of the actions they explain.  
Firstly, believing (or knowing) that something is the case and desiring to 
do something are not events but states. For example, the explanans given in (a), 
i.e. ‘she wants to make bread’, would be classified by Mourelatos as a state 
predication, not an event predication. On the assumption that causal 
explanations are typically explanations which tell us what event stands in a 
causal relation to the event whose occurrence we want to explain, the fact that 
the explanans of most rationalising explanations is a state predication seems to 
speak against classifying these explanations as causal.  
This first difference does not carry much force. Although it is true that 
believing (or knowing) that something is the case and desiring to do something 
are not events but states, the onset of belief and the onset of desire are events 
and the Davidsonian could argue that it is causal relations between these mental 
events and the action explained which the truth of rationalising explanations 
depends on. As Davidson puts it, ‘In many cases it is not difficult at all to find 
events very closely associated with the primary reason. States and dispositions 
are not events, but the onslaught of a state or disposition is’ (1963/2001, p.12).  
A second difference between rationalising explanations and causal 
explanations is that when we causally attribute one event to another, this is 
usually taken to imply the existence of a law which states that there is an event-
kind F, of which the cause event is a token, and an event-kind G, of which the 
effect event is a token, such that F events always cause G events. However, when 
we say that an agent acted as she did because of the beliefs and desires she had, 
there is no implication that other agents with the same beliefs and desires will 
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(or are likely to) do the same thing, or that the same agent will act in the same 
way when she has the same beliefs and desires on another occasion (Hart and 
Honoré 1985, p.55).  
To deal with this objection Davidson proposes that the laws which cover 
the causal relation rationalising explanations necessarily imply cannot be stated 
in the language of beliefs and desires. This is Davidson’s Anomalous Monism. 
Davidson proposes that when a mental event and an action are causally related, 
these two events fall under event-kinds which feature in a causal law. This 
follows from Davidson’s Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: all 
causal relations are covered by strict deterministic laws. However, the event-
kinds which feature in the causal law, which the mental event and action fall 
under, are physical kinds, not mental kinds. Furthermore, the law that covers the 
causal relation can only be stated in a language of physical kinds. So, it is true 
that when we say that an agent acted as she did because of the beliefs and 
desires she had, there is no implication that other agents with the same beliefs 
and desires will (or are likely to) do the same thing. But this is because in giving 
a rationalising explanation we are picking out the cause of an action using 
mental kinds, and these mental kinds do not feature in any universal regularity, 
not even the universal regularity which covers the causal relation which the 
rationalising explanation owes its success to. As Davidson puts it:  
The laws whose existence is required if reasons are causes of actions do not, 
we may be sure, deal in the concepts in which rationalisations must deal. If 
the causes of a class of events (actions) fall in a certain class (reasons) and 
there is a law to back each singular causal statement, it does not follow that 
there is any law connecting events classified as reasons with events classified 
as actions – the classifications may even be neurological, chemical, or 
physical. (1963/2001, p.17) 
Thirdly, Anscombe pointed out that when ‘one says what desire an act 
was meant to satisfy, one does not identify a feeling, image or idea that precedes 
the act the desire explains: one does not answer the question “what did you see 
or hear or feel, or what ideas or images cropped up in your mind and led up to 
it?”’ (2000 p.17). The desire which an act satisfies is not the ‘mental cause’ of 
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the act in the same way that, to use Anscombe’s example, noticing a face 
appearing at the window might be the mental cause of one’s jumping. Anscombe 
defines a ‘mental cause’ as ‘what someone would describe if he were asked the 
specific question: what produced this action or thought or feeling on your part: 
what did you see or hear or feel, or what ideas or images cropped up in your 
mind, and led up to it?’ (2000 pp.17-18). Giving a ‘mental cause’ of something, 
in the special sense of ‘mental cause’ that Anscombe has isolated, is thus to say 
what prior mental event triggered the effect. We sometimes do explain actions by 
giving their ‘mental causes’. Anscombe provides one example. Other examples 
include explaining why a football fan cheered by saying it is because he saw his 
team score a goal, or explaining why someone is going outside by saying it is 
because she has remembered she needs to put the bins out. But, Anscombe’s 
point is that rationalising explanations are not usually like this – or they do not 
seem to be. Explaining why a football fan cheered by saying it is because he saw 
his team score a goal could be seen as a rationalising explanation because as 
well as being the ‘mental cause’ of his action, that his team scored a goal can also 
be seen as the football fan’s reason for acting. In this case, the distinction 
between reason and ‘mental cause’ is hard to discern. But, Anscombe’s point is 
that many, if not most, rationalising explanations do not seem to be explanations 
which provide a ‘mental cause’. When we explain our actions in terms of our 
beliefs and desires, we are usually not identifying something that occurred at a 
particular time which triggered our action, or which moved us from a state of 
inaction to a state of action. Furthermore, for a rationalising explanation to be 
explanatory it is not necessary that it suggest, or imply, an Anscombian ‘mental 
cause’ attribution. This is not to say that considering what ‘mental causes’ there 
might be for a particular action is completely irrelevant for judging the truth or 
explanatoriness of a rationalising explanation. It is rather to say that considering 
what ‘mental causes’ there might be for a particular action is no more relevant 
than a host of other factors, and the concepts employed in a rationalising 
explanation can be employed correctly even when there is no ‘mental cause’.  
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Tanney makes a similar point. Tanney argues that the concepts that are at 
work in rationalising explanations perform their explanatory role ‘without 
designating anything; let alone causally efficacious states or events; let alone 
causally efficacious states or events whose nature awaits discovery’ (2009, 
p.100). Tanney supports this view by arguing that mental concepts cannot be 
treated as theoretical terms, that is, to terms which purport to refer to or 
designate an event, property, state, fact or condition, whose intrinsic nature is 
up for discovery, which causes the phenomena to be explained. An example of 
such a theoretical term would be ‘gene’: genes are entities we posit on the 
grounds that their existence would explain some observable phenomena; ‘gene’ 
is a term that purports to refer to a hidden, but causally efficacious entity. 
Tanney argues:  
The problem in assuming that the motive, intention or reason is (in principle 
describable as) a logically independent, temporally antecedent, causally 
efficacious event (perhaps identified with its alleged ‘onset’) is that it mis-
assigns the explanatory function of these concepts. The position commits us 
to postulating an event, unobservable to others and possibly even to the 
agent herself that would, if known, provide the sought-after reason-
explanation for the agent’s action. In such cases, as Ryle insisted, an 
epistemological puzzle arises as to how anyone could ever know whether a 
person acts for reasons or what, if she does, her reasons are, since the 
hypothesis is not even in principle testable. Not only do we not, in every-day 
situations have access to these hidden events, but even if we were, say, to 
monitor the neural activity of someone’s brain or access their stream of 
consciousness, we would never be able to set up the kinds of correlations 
that would establish a particular occurrence as an instance of a particular 
reason without already having a way of deciding whether someone acted for 
a particular reason in order to make the correlation. (2009, p.100) 
Tanney has, I think, hit upon an important truth here, which is that 
construing rationalising explanations as explanations which posit an entity 
which is logically independent from, temporally antecedent to and causally 
related to the action which is explained encourages us to think that concepts like 
reason, aim, belief and desire refer to mental items (perhaps mental events, 
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perhaps mental states). This view, I believe, legitimises a metaphysics of mind 
wherein our status as minded creatures depends on the existence of mental 
events and states whose nature we have yet to discover and whose existence 
must, one way or another, be reconciled with the fact that the world is physical 
in all its fundamental aspects. The view also seems to mischaracterise 
rationalising explanations: when we say that an agent acted as she did because 
of the reasons she had, we do not take ourselves to be making existential claims 
about what obtained or occurred (or is obtaining or occurring) which may turn 
out to be false, if there is no way to reconcile the truth of these existential claims 
with the fact that the world is fundamentally physical.  
According to Tanney, we should resist characterising rationalising 
explanations as explanations which identify ‘mental causes’, because in doing so 
we distort mental concepts like reason, aim, belief and desire; we end up taking 
these concepts as designating items whose nature is up for discovery. However, 
there is an issue regarding how we can be sure that taking mental concepts as 
concepts which designate items whose nature is up for discovery represents a 
distortion of those concepts rather than a correction. Anscombe and Tanney may 
be right that the concepts employed in rationalising explanations do not seem to 
function by postulating an event which stands in a causal relation to the 
explanandum. But perhaps the Davidsonian could argue that there is good 
reason to believe that things are not as they appear. Davidson’s Anomalous 
Monism allows one to maintain that the explanatory power of rationalising 
explanations depends on their implying the existence of causal relations between 
mental items and actions, despite the fact that rationalising explanations do not 
appear to have this implication. The anomalousness of mental concepts means 
that the causal nature of mental states and events is not revealed when these 
entities are picked out by mental concepts. So, one can grant that mental 
concepts do not seem to perform their explanatory function by designating 
causes – as mental concepts one would not expect them to – but at the same 
time insist that rationalising explanations would not be true if mental concepts 
did not somehow pick out events which stand in causal relations to actions. After 
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all, what else could the explanatory pattern displayed by rationalising 
explanations be?  
6.3.2 Context-placing Explanations  
Non-causalists have argued that there is no reason to think that the pattern of 
explanation demonstrated by rationalising explanations must be causal. For 
example, Tanney argues that, despite the challenge proposed in Davidson’s 
Actions, Reasons and Causes, ‘there is no obligation to construe the deployment 
of [concepts like reason, aim, belief and desire] as the identification of events or 
standing states’ (2009, p.100). Tanney argues that Davidson’s argument does 
not force us think of rationalising explanations as implying the existence of 
causal relations between mental items and actions because there is another, 
equally acceptable way of understanding how rationalising explanations explain. 
Tanney suggests rationalising explanations ought to be understood as ‘context-
placing’ explanations. The explanans of a rationalising explanation explains the 
action by placing it in a context that makes it intelligible. According to Tanney, 
rationalising explanations are explanations which work by giving us more 
information about what is going on. Tanney provides an example of a ‘context-
placing explanation’ which helps us see why this sort of explanation is not the 
sort of explanation in which one event follows another: 
(f) The teacher has written ‘CAT’ on the board because she is writing 
‘CATALYST’ on the board.  
Tanney says that the explanans in (f) ‘serves to re-characterise what happened 
so that it – as newly described – is no longer puzzling’ (2009, p.98). The 
explanans does not illuminate ‘any mysterious connection between the 
occurrences of two contingently related events – the writing of ‘c’, ‘a’, and ‘t’, on 
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the one hand and the writing of ‘catalyst’, on the other’ (2009, p.98). Tanney 
argues that rationalising explanations are all, essentially, of this kind.56  
Anscombe makes a similar suggestion. Anscombe suggests that 
rationalising explanations ‘interpret’ the action explained:  
To give a motive […] is to say something like “See the action in this light”. 
To explain one’s own actions by an account indicating a motive is to put 
them in a certain light. (2000, p.21)  
George Schueler (2009) also offers an account of rationalising 
explanations which takes them to be ‘interpretive explanations’; they are 
explanations which tell us how to interpret the physical, causally related, events 
we are able to perceive. Mayr (2011, p.269) also endorses the idea that 
rationalising explanations ‘explain actions by making them intelligible’ and not 
by positing an event-causal link between the agent’s action and an appropriate 
mental event. For Mayr, rationalising explanations explain by providing us with 
a way of framing the agent’s actions – a way of seeing the agent’s actions as 
manifesting a certain pattern.  
Tanney argues that Davidson’s point about how some rationalisations 
explain why the agent did as she did and some do not does not provide sufficient 
reason for thinking that rationalisations that do explain the agent’s action must 
function by designating events causally related to the action. Even if successful 
rationalising explanations must ‘do more’ than mere rationalisations, the ‘more’ 
they do need not be designating a cause of the action. When re-characterising an 
agent’s action as an action rationalised by certain reasons fails to explain the 
agent’s action, we may simply need to ‘probe further for a different or more far-
 
 
 
56 Thompson (2008) suggests that ‘the explanation of action as it appears most frequently in 
human thought and speech is the explanation of one action in terms of another’ (p.85, emphasis in 
original). Thompson calls this form of action explanation ‘naïve action explanation’, with action 
explanations that reference reasons, motives, beliefs and desires qualifying as ‘sophisticated’ 
(pp.85-89). Thompson argues that a better understanding of intentional action is achieved if we 
take naïve action explanation as the most basic form of action explanation.    
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reaching context-placing explanation that will succeed or give up the initial 
expectation that the action can be explained by reasons’ (2009, p.100). Other 
writers have also suggested that there is no obligation to think that the 
difference between a rationalisation that succeeds in explaining an agent’s action 
and one that does not is that the former but not the latter designates the cause 
of the action. It may be that the successful rationalising explanation is the one 
that fits better with the agent’s general character, or moral code; or perhaps the 
successful rationalising explanation is one which accords better with how the 
agent has herself weighted the various considerations she takes to favour her 
action (Owens, 1992, pp.164-165; Tanney, 1995, p.110). The point here is that, 
if we assume that rationalising explanations are context-placing or interpretative 
then we have at our disposal several ways to say why some statements which tell 
us why the agent’s action seemed rational to them fail to explain the agent’s 
action without supposing that successful rationalising explanations designate 
events causally related to the action.  
Another observation that speaks in favour of taking rationalising 
explanations to be context-placing or interpretative is that sometimes when an 
agent has more than one reason for performing some action it is genuinely 
indeterminate which of the reasons was the reason she acted for. As Mayr puts 
it, there is not always a fact of the matter about which reason an agent acted for: 
Consider cases where the agent has a bundle of strong motives to do X, but 
it is not clear – even after thorough examination of his action, its 
circumstances, and his general character – on which of these motives he has 
acted. We do not have then to assume that our inability to decide this 
question rests on merely practical grounds – that is, that there is a fact of the 
matter which we are unable to establish only because we lack further 
evidence; for it may well be that we would not even know what kind of 
further evidence would decide the question. Instead, we should accept that 
in such cases our inability may stem from the fact that these cases are truly 
indeterminate, because the criteria for judging whether the agent acted on a 
particular reason have ‘run out’, without unequivocally determining an 
answer. (2011, p.261) 
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The idea that rationalising explanations explain by identifying the cause 
of the action is inconsistent with allowing for this kind of indeterminacy. On the 
Davidsonian view, any indeterminacy regarding what belief or desire the acted 
in the light of is epistemic – this is because an agent acts in the light of a belief or 
desire if and only if the onset of that belief or desire is the cause of the action, 
and the latter relation cannot be indeterminate. Of course, it could be that when 
an agent has many reasons favouring a course of action, their action is causally 
overdetermined by these many reasons. However, it seems possible that an 
agent could have many reasons favouring a course of action, where none of 
these reasons is the reason the agent acted, and where the agent would not have 
acted if the case for acting was not overwhelming. For example, imagine Diana 
is again deciding whether or not to speak at a conference, and because the 
conference is quite far away, Diana vows only to speak at the conference if the 
case for doing so seems overwhelming, where overwhelming for her means that 
there are at least n strong reasons favouring the action (where n is more than 
one). Then suppose Diana discovers n reasons for speaking at the conference, 
and so goes on to speak at the conference, but none of Diana’s reasons stands 
out as the reason for which Diana spoke at the conference. In this case, it does 
not seem like Diana acts in the light of just one of the many reasons favouring 
speaking at the conference, but it is also not plausible to describe this as a case 
of overdetermination by her n reasons, because it is not the case that Diana 
would have acted in the same way had any one of her n reasons been missing.  
The idea that rationalising explanations are context-placing explanations 
is plausible. Furthermore, that there is a difference between mere 
rationalisations and rationalising explanations does not seem to force us to 
accept that rationalising explanations necessarily imply the existence of a causal 
relation between a mental item and the action explained. There seem to be other 
ways to account for the fact that some rationalisations explain an agents action 
whereas others don’t. Davidson’s argument is thus not as strong as it first 
appears.  
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However, the plausibility of the context-placing account of rationalising 
explanations may not be enough to offset the intuition, brought out by 
Davidson’s argument in Actions, Reasons and Causes, that rationalising 
explanation are causal. I think the intuition that rationalising explanations are 
causal explanations is hard to resist. This means that, there is a strong 
motivation to accommodate valid points made by the non-causalists without 
giving up the idea that rationalising explanations are causal. Davidson’s 
Anomalous Monism lets one do this. Anomalous Monism allows us to 
acknowledge the validity of the points made by non-causalists – including the 
observation that we distinguish rationalising explanations from mere 
rationalisations by considering facts like how far-reaching the rationalisation is, 
or how it fits with the agent’s general character – without giving up the intuition 
that rationalising explanations are causal. On Anomalous Monism, the facts that 
we consider when we work out why an agent did as she did are not constitutive 
of what it is to act for a reason. As Mayr puts it:  
For Davidson, the epistemological criteria that we use for determining for 
which reason an agent has acted are the considerations of rationality and 
overall coherence among his mental states that are generally relevant for the 
interpretative enterprise of ‘making sense of the agent’. What makes the 
reasons-explanation true, however, is something completely different: the 
obtaining of an event-causal link between reason and action, which for 
Davidson must be based on a strict causal law. (2011, pp.269-270) 
So, if Anomalous Monism is true, we might expect there to be a gap 
between the facts we consider when judging the veracity of a rationalising 
explanation and the facts that make that rationalising explanation genuinely 
explanatory. Of course, Anomalous Monism might not be correct, but I think 
that the opposition between Davidson and non-causalists on the matter of 
rationalising explanations is at something of an impasse because Anomalous 
Monism is an available position.	 
Perhaps there is another way to accept the non-causalist’s view that 
rationalising explanations are context-placing, and that the mental concepts 
appealed to in rationalising explanations do not discharge their explanatory role 
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by designating the causes of the action they explain, without giving up the 
intuition that rationalising explanations are causal. Non-causalists assume that if 
rationalising explanations reveal causal information, the causal information they 
reveal is that there are mental items, which the mental concepts employed in 
rationalising explanations pick out, which stand in causal relations to actions. 
Tanney is explicit about this assumption:  
[…] the position I wish to bring back into focus says that what it is for an 
action to be in execution of an intention or for it to be explicable by reasons 
is not a matter of there being a causal relation [understood as ‘a relation 
between two logically and temporally distinguishable events’] between 
intention or reasons and action. If causation is to be thus understood the 
pattern in virtue of which a person’s intentions, motives or reasons explain 
her action is not eo ipso causal. (Tanney, 2009, p.95)  
However, is it right to assume that a rationalising explanation is causal only if it 
posits a causal relation between an item somehow picked out by the mental 
concept employed in the explanation and the action explained?  
In the next chapter, I will argue that explanations can be causal even 
when they do not necessarily imply the existence of causal relations between 
certain particulars. If this argument succeeds, then it is possible that 
rationalising explanations could be causal even though the mental concepts cited 
in the rationalising explanation do not pick out items which stand in causal 
relations to the action explained. If so, then it may be possible to grant that 
rationalising explanations are context-placing, and at the same time accept that 
they are causal, without turning to Anomalous Monism, and thus without having 
to accept the physicalist metaphysics Anomalous Monism entails.  
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7  
Causal Explanations and Intentional Action  
In the previous chapter, I examined the debate concerning whether explanations 
of intentional actions which cite the agent’s reasons or aims are causal 
explanations. Davidson (1963) argues that they are. On Davidson’s view, 
rationalising explanations depend for their truth on causal relations between 
mental items, which are picked out by the mental concepts employed in 
rationalising explanations, and the actions which are explained. Assuming an 
action is intentional if and only if what it takes for a rationalising explanation of 
it to be true obtains, if Davidson is right, then the existence of an intentional 
action conceptually entails that there is mental causation and that this mental 
causation should be conceived of in relational terms. However, in section 6.3 of 
the previous chapter, I described objections and arguments which aim to show 
that, as Tanney puts it, the mental concepts in rationalising explanations do not 
‘discharge their explanatory role’ by designating causes of the actions they 
explain (2009, p.100). Instead, rationalising explanations are ‘context-placing’ or 
‘interpretative’: they place the action in a context that makes it intelligible. 
However, I suggested that this position could be resisted by a Davidsonian. This 
is because the Davidsonian can claim that because of the anomalousness of the 
mental, we can judge the appropriateness or correctness of rationalising 
explanations according to criteria like ‘what makes best sense of the agent’, even 
while these rationalising explanations are made true by causal relations between 
events.  
I suggested that the debate between Davidsonians and non-causalists is at 
something of an impasse because both positions have intuitive appeal. On the 
one hand, the idea that when we explain someone’s actions in terms of their 
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beliefs and desires we are giving causal information is very appealing. On the 
other hand, to say that when we attribute beliefs and desires to an agent we are 
positing internal causes of their observable behaviour does seem to misconstrue 
the explanatory function of these mental concepts. In this chapter, I will present 
a view which tries to save both intuitions.  
Non-causalists assume that to show that the mental concepts employed in 
rationalising explanations do not discharge their explanatory role by signifying 
items which are the causes of the actions explained just is to show that 
rationalising explanations are not causal. In other words, non-causalists assume 
that causal explanations are precisely those explanations whose explanandum 
designates an effect and whose explanans designates an item which is the cause 
of that effect. On this view of what makes an explanation causal, the ‘because’ of 
a causal explanation signifies the obtaining of a causal relation. I will call this 
view the Davidsonian view, because it is likely that Davidson held it.57 
In this chapter, I will question the truth of the Davidsonian view. In 
section 7.1, I will discuss counterexamples to the Davidsonian view. I will 
suggest that some causal explanations may depend for their truth not on causal 
relations between events but on facts about dynamic states of affairs. In section 
7.2, I will examine an alternative view of what makes an explanation causal, 
which allows some explanations to count as causal even though they are not 
made true by the obtaining of causal relations between events. I will then 
reconsider the question of whether rationalising explanations are causal in light 
of these more relaxed criteria for an explanation to be causal. In section 7.3, I 
will present a view on intentional action which aims to resolve the impasse 
between Davidsonians and non-causalists by granting that rationalising 
explanations are a unique kind of disposition-citing explanation. 
 
 
 
57 See Evnine (1991 pp. 49-52).  
  
177 
7.1 Causal Explanations 
As mentioned, Davidsonians and non-causalists alike assume that causal 
explanations are precisely those explanations whose explanandum designates an 
effect and whose explanans designates an item which is the cause of that effect. 
As William Child describes the Davidsonian view: 
The general idea, then, is that the truth (or acceptability) of a causal 
explanation rests on the presence of appropriate relations of causation. And 
a natural thought would be to put the point in the following way: a causal 
explanation is one whose explanatory power depends on the assumption 
that there are events mentioned, or pointed to, in the explanans and 
explanandum sentences, between which the natural relation of causation 
obtains; and whose truth (or acceptability) requires that the relation does 
indeed obtain. (Child, 1994, p.102) 
This view assumes that a causal explanation is the statement of a non-
natural, intensional relationship which holds between true propositions. The 
causal relation in contrast is a natural, extensional relation which ‘holds in the 
natural world between particular events or circumstances, just as the relation of 
temporal succession does or that of spatial proximity’ (Strawson,1985, p.115). 
This theory does not demand that the events, whose causal connectedness 
grounds the truth of a causal explanation, should be explicitly referred to or 
mentioned by the sentences which form the explanandum and explanans of the 
causal explanation, or that the explanandum and explanans sentences can be 
transformed into sentences which involve explicit quantification over events.58 
As Child notes, ‘the fact that, in some (or even most) cases, reference to causally 
related events is concealed is compatible with the idea that the truth of an 
explanation depends on the presence of appropriate relations to causality 
 
 
 
58 The process of transforming a sentence like ‘Roger ran a mile’ into a sentence that explicitly 
quantifies over an event (‘Roger’s running of a mile’), is a process Mourelatos calls 
‘nominalisation transcription’. Nominalisation transcription is discussed in chapter 4.  
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between particular events’ (1994, p.102). In this section, I will outline four kinds 
of counterexample to the Davidsonian view of what makes explanations causal.  
7.1.1 Negative Causal Explanations 
The first sort of counterexample to the Davidsonian view is negative causal 
explanations, i.e. causal explanations where either the explanans, or the 
explanandum, or both, is a fact about an event failing to occur.   
(i) Don did not die because his rope did not break. (Child, p.106) 
(ii) The water swept away the fish because the sluice gate did not shut.  
(iii) The policeman wasn’t hurt because the bullet got stuck in his Kevlar vest. 
On the Davidsonian view, these explanations are causal explanations if and only 
if they are made true by a causally related pair of events. But in (i), it seems like 
no events are mentioned or pointed to by the explanation. In (ii), the explanans 
clause does not seem to mention an event. And in (iii) the explanandum clause 
does not seem to mention an event. One might posit so-called ‘negative events’ – 
so that something’s not happening is an event. This allows one to argue that in 
fact the explanans clauses and the explanandum clauses of (i)-(iii) do all 
explicitly mention events whose causal connections serve as truth-makers for the 
explanations. On some theories of events, the existence of negative events might 
be plausible.59 But on any theory which takes seriously the idea that events are 
happenings, this proposal is implausible: something’s not happening is not a 
thing that happens.60  
A more plausible response to negative causal explanations is suggested by 
Child. Child suggests that the Davidsonian could potentially accommodate 
negative causal explanations within his account of causal explanations by 
 
 
 
59 For example, on certain theories of events as property exemplifications it might be possible for 
there to be negative events. Philosophers who have argued for the reality of negative events 
include: Vermazen 1985; De Swart 1996; Higginbotham 2000.  
60 See Mele (2005) for further reasons to reject negative events. 
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allowing the relation between a causal explanation and the causally related 
events which make the explanation true to be opaque (1994, p.106). The 
Davidsonian position is safe if the truth of negative causal explanations depends 
on there being causal relations between events; it is not necessary that the 
negative causal explanation itself mention the causally related pairs of events 
which make it true. The idea would be that ‘Don did not die because his rope did 
not break’ succeeds as an explanation only because rope-breakings are causally 
related to deaths when they occur in circumstances similar to Don’s – the 
explanation depends for its truth on causal relations between rope-breakings 
and deaths. Another way of putting this point is to say that negative causal 
explanations are true when they are backed by a causal law – i.e. a 
generalisation which says that events of one type always (or usually) cause 
events of another type to occur.61  
There is nothing wrong with the idea that the relation between an 
explanation and what makes the explanation true can be opaque. As Kevin 
Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith put it, it is ‘perfectly normal for us to 
know that a sentence is true, and yet not know completely what makes it true’ 
(1984, p.299). However, it seems odd to me to suggest that the truth of a 
negative causal explanation should depend on causal relations between events 
that take place somewhere else (perhaps even on causal relations between 
events that take place in non-actual possible worlds, because even if no rope-
breakings had ever occurred, and so no-one had ever died as a result of one, 
‘Don did not die because his rope did not break’ could still be true, and a 
Davidsonian might say this is because if some rope-breakings had occurred, 
these events would have caused deaths). It seems to me that the truth of 
negative causal explanations should depend on something within the causal 
system the causal explanation concerns. So, for example, ‘Don did not die 
 
 
 
61 C.f. Beebee (2005). 
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because his rope did not break’ should depend, for its truth, on Don, or 
something about Don – or the rope, or something about the rope. This not a 
decisive objection against the response Child gives on behalf of the Davidsonian, 
but it does highlight a cost of the Davidsonian view: on the Davidsonian view 
some causal explanations are made true by causally related events which occur 
outside the circumstances the causal explanation specifically concerns.   
7.1.2 Process-citing Explanations  
A second kind of counterexample to the Davidsonian view is causal explanations 
which cite the continuous operation of causal processes, such as:  
(iv)  The snow is melting because the sun is shining. 
Are causal explanations like (iv) made true by causally related pairs of events? 
As Mourelatos (1978) argued, and as I outlined in chapter 4, process 
predications, of which ‘the snow is melting’ and ‘the sun is shining’ are examples, 
do not implicitly quantify over events. So, (iv) does not say that some melting 
event was caused by some shining event. The tense of (iv) indicates that melting 
and shining are still going on, so it is not completed events, but ongoing 
processes which the explanation references. Nevertheless, it may well be true 
that whenever the sun melts some snow by shining on it causal relations 
between events always obtain. For example, it might be that whenever the sun 
melts some snow by shining on it a series of causally related chemical events 
involving light particles and ice molecules occur. Perhaps it is these causally 
connected events on which the truth of (iv) depends.  
In most cases, when we say some causal process is in operation, we can 
find pairs of causally related events occurring at a finer temporal resolution. 
However, the vocabulary which we use to express the original causal 
explanation does not indicate what pairs of causally related events we should 
expect to find. For example, it is not part of the meaning of ‘shining’ or ‘melting’ 
that instances of shining or melting involve causally related pairs of events of 
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certain types.62 It might be necessary that whenever the sun melts some snow by 
shining on it a series of causally related chemical events involving light particles 
and ice molecules occur, but this is an a posteriori necessity. The idea that an 
explanation must be made true by causally related events falling under types 
which have no connection to the meaning of the predications featuring in the 
explanation seems contrary to the reasonable principle that whatever makes 
some sentence true should be what the sentence is about. The notion of what a 
sentence is about is imprecise. Possibly, a Davidsonian could argue that on a 
loose enough definition of ‘aboutness’ (iv) is about events involving light 
particles and ice molecules. However, for this response to work the Davidsonian 
would have to convince us to adopt his loose definition of ‘aboutness’.  
If one thought, as seems reasonable, that explanations are causal if and 
only if they answer to causal reality, and that all there is to causal reality is 
events standing in causal relations to other events, then it would be natural to 
suppose that (iv) must depend for its truth on causally related pairs of events, if 
it is a causal explanation at all. However, as I argued in chapters 3 and 4, one 
need not think of causation as always, everywhere a relation between events. 
Causation can be a determinable process engaged in by substances. If this view 
of causation is plausible, then facts about what events are causally related to 
what others are not the only causal facts which causal explanations could 
answer to. Some causal explanations may answer to facts about dynamic states 
of affairs. Furthermore, the idea that (iv) is made true by facts about a dynamic 
state of affairs has intuitive appeal. What seems to matter for the truth of (iv) is 
that it is the sun which is causing what the snow is suffering.  
 
 
 
62 C.f. Child (1994, p.108). 
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7.1.3 Stative Causal Explanations 
A third sort of counterexample to the Davidsonian view is stative causal 
explanations. Here are three examples: 
(v) The bridge collapsed because the bolt was weak. (Child, 1994, p.106) 
(vi) The floor is dirty because Mary’s dog was here.  
(vii) My leg is broken because I fell off my bike. (Child, 1994, p.105) 
These examples are problematic for the Davidsonian view because in each of 
them either the explanans clause, or the explanandum clause, or both, seems to 
reference a state, not an event. In (v) that an event occurred is explained by the 
fact that a state obtains, in (vi) that one state obtains is explained by the fact 
that another state obtained, and in (vii) that a state obtains is explained by the 
fact that an event occurred. 
Once again, the Davidsonian can respond by stressing that reference to 
the events, whose causal connectedness grounds the truth of the causal 
explanation, can be concealed. The reply would go like this: when we talk of a 
state as the cause of some event, ‘there is a causal relation between events; the 
state [is] part of the circumstances in which the cause occurred; and mentioning 
that state can help to explain why the cause had the effect it did’ (Child, 1994, 
p.106). So, in the case of (v), something happened to cause the collapse of the 
bridge (e.g. a train went over the bridge), the bolt’s being weak was part of the 
circumstances in which this event occurred and helps explain why the event 
caused the collapse of the bridge. Similarly, when someone offers ‘the floor is 
dirty because Mary’s dog was here’ as a causal explanation, we can suppose 
events occurred which stand in causal relations to each other (e.g. Mary’s dog 
arrived, then ran around the room with muddy feet, and this latter event caused 
the floor to become dirty) and these causally related events are what makes the 
stative causal explanation true. And in (vii), the causal explanation is made true 
by the causal relation obtaining between my falling off my bike, and my leg 
breaking.  
However, to suppose that whenever we offer a stative causal explanation, 
there must be appropriate pairs of causally related events to serve as the grounds 
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for the stative causal explanation seems to me to be metaphysically suspect. 
Events are not included in our ontology for the sole reason that they serve as 
truth-makers for causal explanations. Whether or not certain events exist and 
stand in causal relations, and whether or not a certain stative causal explanation 
is true, can therefore be determined independently. ‘Was there an event which 
triggered the collapse of the bridge?’ and ‘did the bridge collapse because it the 
bolt was weak?’ seem like independent questions, in the sense that an answer to 
the first need not impact an answer to the second and vice versa. Confidence in 
the truth of the stative causal explanation, should not, therefore, govern the 
truth of a claim about what events exist. Steward (1997, pp.173-174) also 
questions the assumption that appropriate pairs of causally related events can 
always be found to serve as the grounds for a stative causal explanation. In the 
bridge case, for example, what if the bridge just collapsed, apparently 
spontaneously? Are we always entitled to assume that there must have been a 
triggering event which stands to the event explained as cause to effect?  
7.1.4 Disposition-citing Explanations 
Stative causal explanations for which Steward’s point seems particularly 
pertinent are stative explanations which seem to cite powers or dispositions. 
Indeed, (v) probably counts as a disposition-citing explanation. Other examples 
of disposition-citing explanations include: 
(viii)  Peter sneezed because he is allergic to flowers. 
(ix) The cat died after eating the lilies because they are poisonous to cats. 
(x) The aspirin relieved Joe’s pain because it is a cyclo-oxygenese inhibitor. 
It is possible that all stative causal explanations are disposition-citing 
explanations. For example, if it could be argued that (1) all stative predications 
attribute properties, and (2) all properties are really powers or dispositions, then 
it would follow that all stative causal explanations are really disposition-citing 
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causal explanations. However, both of these premises are controversial.63 I will 
not attempt to establish that all stative causal explanations are really disposition-
citing explanations, but I will assume that some stative causal explanations are 
disposition-citing explanations. I will also assume that disposition-citing 
explanations are causal explanations. As Hyman puts it:  
[…] explanations that refer to disposition are echt causal explanations, 
whatever kind of disposition they refer to. How they explain, exactly what 
part of a causal story they tell, and whether a disposition is the cause, or 
part of the cause, of its manifestation – these are contentious questions. But 
that explanations that refer to dispositions are causal explanations should be 
beyond doubt. (2015, p.121) 
Do disposition-citing explanations depend for their truth on the obtaining of 
causal relations between events? One might think that disposition-citing 
explanations are causal because they report causal relations between the 
triggering or stimulus event of the manifestation and the manifestation event. 
So, for example, perhaps (vii) ‘Peter sneezed because he is allergic to flowers’ 
reports a causal relation between Peter moving near to a flower (the trigger 
event) and Peter’s sneeze (the manifestation event). For many dispositions, 
when they are manifested, causal relations between trigger and manifestation 
exist. Indeed, if they did not we might wonder whether the disposition has really 
been manifested at all. If there was no causal relation between Peter’s moving 
near a flower and his sneeze, we might doubt that his sneezing was really a 
manifestation of his allergy. This is because to have an allergy is to be liable to 
exhibiting an immune reaction in the presence of an allergen – it is part of the 
meaning of ‘allergy’ that allergic reactions have specific triggers.  
 
 
 
63 Shoemaker (1980), Mumford (2004) and Whittle (2008) are three philosophers who have 
defended (2); Armstrong (1997, pp.69-84) has argued against it. 
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However, there are two problems with this suggestion. First, some 
dispositions do not seem to have triggers at all, either because they are always 
manifested (e.g. the disposition of a massive body to deform space-time) or 
because their manifestation is spontaneous (e.g. radioactive decay). 
Explanations which make reference to these sorts of dispositions therefore will 
not be made true by causal relations between triggers and manifestations, and 
on the assumption that all disposition-citing explanations to have the same sort 
of truth-maker, this makes the idea that disposition-citing explanations are made 
true by trigger-manifestation causal relations doubtful. Second, it is possible for 
there to be a causal relation between two events, the first of which is of the same 
type as the trigger of a disposition’s manifestation, and the second of which is of 
the same type as a disposition’s manifestation, without the disposition being 
manifested at all. For example, suppose the flower Peter moves near is bright 
white in colour, and the bright light reflected off the flower induces a photic 
sneeze reflex in Peter and he sneezes. In this example, moving near the flower 
caused Peter to sneeze, but his disposition to exhibit an immune response to 
flowers wasn’t manifested. For all dispositions where the manifestation of a 
disposition involves a series of causally related events starting with a triggering 
event and ending with a manifestation event, it is possible for this type of causal 
chain to obtain without the disposition being manifested because the causal 
chain is ‘deviant’ in some way.64 This throws into doubt the idea that causal 
relations between trigger-events and manifestation-events are what disposition-
citing explanations report. 
One might think that disposition-citing explanations are made true by 
causal relations holding between the dispositions themselves and the events 
explained. However, I reject this suggestion because I do not think that 
dispositions or powers can be causal relata.  
 
 
 
64 C.f. Hyman (2015, pp.121-127). 
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A number of philosophers have doubted that dispositions or powers 
themselves can be causally efficacious. Debate about the causal efficacy or causal 
relevance of dispositions mirrors the debate about the causal efficacy or causal 
relevance of mental states. Frank Jackson (1995, p.257) argued that because 
part of what it is for a substance to possess a disposition, like ‘fragility’, is for 
that substance to be prone to exhibit the manifestation behaviour, this entails 
that the disposition is non-contingently connected to the manifestation 
behaviour. And because the connection between cause and effect is contingent, 
this entails that the connection between disposition and manifestation cannot be 
causal. This parallels Melden’s (1961, p.52) objection to the idea that desires are 
causes of actions: desires are non-contingently related to actions which satisfy 
the desire. Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter, and Frank Jackson (1982) argued 
that dispositions lack causal efficacy because there is always a ‘causal basis’ of 
the disposition – i.e. there is always a ‘property or property-complex of the object 
that, together with the [triggering or stimulus event] is the causally operative 
sufficient condition for the manifestation in the case of “surefire” dispositions, 
and in the case of probabilistic dispositions is causally sufficient for relevant 
chance of the manifestation’ (p.251). According to Prior et al. this means that 
there’s no ‘causal work’ left for the disposition to do (unless the manifestation 
event is overdetermined). This argument parallels Kim’s causal exclusion 
argument discussed in chapter 1. And, just as philosophers have responded to 
Kim by questioning assumptions about what it means for a mental property or 
state to be causally relevant, philosophers have responded to Prior et al. (1982) 
by questioning assumptions about what it means for a disposition be causally 
relevant (e.g. McKitrick, 2005).  
However, I think that the debate about the causal efficacy or causal 
relevance of powers/dispositions is often misconceived. In chapter 3, I expressed 
support for the Rylean view that powers are not things; they are not ‘elements of 
being’, to borrow a phrase from Lowe. In Ryle’s view, to attribute a power to an 
entity is not to report a state of affairs, it is not to say that the entity has some 
attribute or stands in some relation. For an entity to have a power is for an open-
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ended set of facts about what that substance can do, or can be relied upon to do 
– what processes it can engage in – to be true of it. Powers are ways of thinking 
about how substances are connected to the processes they engage in. In this 
respect, power is akin to concepts like engagement and instancing: it is a concept 
which does not name any kind of being, but instead helps us explain the 
ontological form of entities belonging to the categories the concept concerns. If 
this view is correct, and for a substance to have a power is not for it to have a 
certain attribute or stand in a certain relation, then powers (or the state of 
having a power) cannot be relata of any relation, let alone a causal relation. 
Arguments like Prior et al.’s only have bite if one assumes that powers are the 
sorts of entities that even could ‘do causal work’ – and I do not think powers or 
dispositions are the sorts of entities that even could ‘do causal work’ because I do 
not think they are any sort of entity at all.  
If one thought that causal reality were nothing but events standing in 
causal relations, then explanations which make reference to dispositions, if they 
are causal at all, would have to depend for their truth on the obtaining of certain 
types of causal relations. However, as I mentioned in section 7.1.2, if the non-
relationalist view of causation put forward in this dissertation is plausible, then 
causal reality is more than events standing in causal relations to other events. 
Causal reality is also a matter of substances engaging in processes. The idea that 
it is something about this latter aspect of causal reality which disposition-citing 
explanations answer to is plausible. On the non-Humean theory of causation I 
outlined in chapters 3 and 4, what it is for a substance to be exercising a power, 
or manifesting a disposition, is for that substance to be engaging in a process. 
Therefore, the obvious candidate for what a disposition-citing explanation 
reports is the fact that some dynamic state of affairs is a manifestation of the 
disposition cited. In other words, disposition-citing explanations depend for their 
truth on the relationship between the disposition cited and the dynamic state of 
affairs that is the manifestation of that disposition. This is a relationship rather 
than a relation of any kind (and hence not a causal relation), because the 
disposition is not an element of being, and hence cannot be a relatum of any 
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relation. This means that the ‘because’ in disposition-citing explanations does not 
indicate a causal relation (or indeed a relation of any kind).   
7.2 Causal Explanations and Manipulation 
We have seen that some causal explanations, namely negative causal 
explanations, causal explanations that cite the operation of causal processes, 
stative causal explanations, and disposition-citing causal explanations, do not 
explicitly mention events whose causal connectedness could ground their truth. 
In the face of causal explanations like this, the Davidsonian is forced to maintain 
that reference to the causally related events which make true a causal 
explanation can be opaque. This suggestion is not implausible itself, but in the 
case of negative causal explanations and causal explanations that cite the 
operation of causal processes, it threatens to contravene the reasonable 
assumption that what makes a sentence true must be what the sentence is about. 
Furthermore, even this response seems insufficient in the case of stative causal 
explanations and disposition-citing explanations. This is because, for at least 
some stative causal explanations and disposition-citing explanations, it is not 
obvious that causally related pairs of events can be found to serve as implicit 
referents of explanandum and explanans.  
Child suggests that in the face of counterexamples like those discussed in 
section 7.1, we could ‘give up the idea that what makes an explanation a causal 
explanation is its dependence on the presence of causal relations between 
events’ (1994, p.109). There is more than one way to ‘give up the idea that what 
makes an explanation a causal explanation is its dependence on the presence of 
causal relations between events’. First, we can give up this idea without giving 
up the idea that what makes an explanation causal is its dependence on the 
presence of causal relations of some other kind (perhaps between states). 
Second, we can deny that what makes an explanation a causal explanation is its 
dependence on the presence of causal relations of any kind – what unites causal 
explanations into a single category is something else, perhaps a fact about the 
sort of information they provide.  
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Some remarks of Child suggest that he has sympathy for the second 
option. Child describes the alternative to the Davidsonian account as a view 
where ‘causal explanations are not united by their dependence on a natural 
relation of causality, but rather by the fact that they are all explanations of the 
occurrence or persistence of particular events or circumstances, or of general 
types of event or circumstance’ (p.100). In any case, it should be obvious that I 
prefer the second option. I concede that causal explanations depend for their 
truth on an underlying causal reality, but this underlying reality need not 
involve any causal relations – some causal explanations are not grounded by the 
presence of any causal relation at all. Instead, I think that explanations are 
causal because of the sort of information they provide.  
In chapter 3, I discussed an objection to my view that we think of 
causation in two distinct ways, as a process and separately as a cause-effect 
relation. According to this objection, the idea that we think of causation in two 
different ways is inconsistent with the idea that causation is a single 
phenomenon. I responded to this objection by maintaining that the concept of 
causation as a cause-effect relation is derived from our concept of causation as a 
process which substances engage in. I noted that if substances possess and 
exercise causal powers, then substances with certain powers must behave in 
certain ways when the conditions for the manifestation of the power arise, 
provided there is nothing interfering. The exercise of powers will therefore be 
the source of regular and stable relations between trigger-events and 
manifestation-events. We can use knowledge of these relations to change how 
powerful substances behave. For example, if one knows that being near flowers 
triggers an allergic reaction, then one can prevent the allergic reaction by 
avoiding flowers. From this we get the idea that events, particularly (but not 
exclusively) trigger-events, can be devices for manipulating later events. Events 
are not literally devices, but even though talk of events as devices is 
metaphorical there are still conditions under which use of this metaphor is 
correct and conditions under which use of this metaphor is incorrect. This 
metaphor is thus the source of the idea that there is a special sort of relation 
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between events which is causation. So, the causation concept can cover 
ontologically diverse phenomena because from the concept of causing as 
something substances engage in, we can derive the idea that some relations 
between events are causal, via the intermediary notion of using knowledge of 
stable relations between trigger-events and manifestation-events to manipulate 
powerful substances. The notion of manipulation thus ties the concepts of 
causation-as-a-process and causation-as-a-relation together. I suggest that the 
notion of manipulation is also what explains how many diverse explanations can 
all count as causal. Causal explanations are explanations which provide 
information relevant to the manipulation of an effect. They are explanations 
which provide us with information about how to stop something from 
happening, or how to get something to happen again, or how to get it to happen 
in a different way. Or at least, they are explanations which provide us with 
information about how to make such outcomes more likely.  
One might argue that my proposal gives conditions which are 
unnecessary for an explanation to be causal, because there are some causal 
explanations where the named causal factor cannot be manipulated even in 
principle. For example, one might think that ‘Fido is warm-blooded because he’s 
a dog’ and ‘Sarah didn’t get promoted because she’s a woman,’ are causal 
explanations.65 It is impossible to consider whether or not Fido would have been 
coldblooded had he not been a dog, because any possible being which is not a 
dog is not Fido; similarly, it is impossible to consider whether or not Sarah 
would have got promoted had she not been a woman, because any possible 
being who is not a woman is not Sarah, or so the thought goes. For this reason, 
these cannot be examples of explanations which give information relevant to the 
manipulation or control of an effect.  
 
 
 
65 Holland (1986) considers examples of this kind, arguing that if these really are causal claims 
then they are causal claims which lack a clear meaning (pp.954-956).  
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In response to the first example, it is not obvious to me that this 
explanation is a causal explanation at all. Fido’s being warm-blooded is not 
causally explained by his being a dog – being warm-blooded is part of what it is 
to be a dog. The second example, in contrast, does seem to me to be a causal 
explanation. However, it is not obvious that Sarah’s gender is an essential 
property of her, so it is not obvious that any possible being who is not a woman 
is not Sarah. Furthermore, even if Sarah’s gender were an essential property of 
her, I would argue that social categories like gender, race and class (and perhaps 
also categories like criminal, employee, preacher, grandmother etc) are peculiar 
in that the dispositional properties one enjoys or suffers as a result of being 
placed into one or other of these categories only exist because of certain cultural 
practices and behaviour. Sarah’s being a woman is a causal factor in the 
explanation of her not getting promoted, but only because, as a society, we are 
liable to treat people differently when they fall into different social categories. 
So, even granting that Sarah’s gender is not, even in principle, something we can 
manipulate, the cultural practices and behaviours which turn being a woman 
into a causal factor in the first place certainly are things we can manipulate. In 
other words, ‘Sarah didn’t get promoted because she’s a woman,’ is an 
explanation that provides information relevant to manipulation of an effect after 
all because of the peculiar connection between social categories and changeable 
cultural practices. Of course, exactly how social categories function is a debated 
topic, but this only emphasises the point that ‘Sarah didn’t get promoted because 
she’s a woman,’ is not an uncontroversial counterexample to my proposal.66  
The assumption made by both Davidsonians and non-causalists, that an 
explanation is causal only if it depends for its truth on the obtaining of a causal 
relation, looks questionable. What does this mean for the question of whether 
rationalising explanations are causal? That some causal explanations are causal 
 
 
 
66 See Woodward (2003, pp.114-117) for a good discussion of this issue.  
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even though that are not made true by the obtaining of a causal relation allows 
for the possibility that rationalising explanations are causal even though, as 
Tanney argues, the mental concepts cited in the rationalising explanation do not 
pick out items which stand in causal relations to the action explained. 
Rationalising explanations could be the kind of causal explanation which 
answers to the non-relational aspect of causal reality. 
This thesis, that rationalising explanations are causal explanations which 
are made true by the non-relational aspect of causal reality, is attractive for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, it allows us to save the intuition that explaining 
someone’s actions in terms of their beliefs and desires is to give causal 
information, while at the same time accepting that the mental concepts appealed 
to in rationalising explanations do not refer to items which stand to the action 
explained as cause to effect. In other words, the thesis that rationalising 
explanations are causal, but made true by the non-relational aspect of causal 
reality, allows us to acknowledge what’s intuitive about both the Davidsonian 
and the non-causalist views, without accepting anomalous monism and the 
physicalist metaphysics that theory entails.  
Secondly, there are similarities between rationalising explanations on the 
one hand, and process-citing and disposition-citing explanations on the other, 
which lends support to the idea these three kinds of explanation belong in the 
same general category. Some rationalising explanations appear to be very 
similar to causal explanations which cite the continuous operation of causal 
processes. Causal explanations which cite the continuous operation of causal 
processes are roughly of the form: some effect occurred or is occurring, or 
obtained or obtains, because substance S is or was engaging in causal process P. 
Michael Thompson (2008) outlines a class of rationalising explanations which 
take this form. These rationalising explanations, which Thompson calls ‘naïve 
action explanations’, explain one action in terms of another. (g) would be an 
example of such a rationalising explanation:  
(g) Tom is drilling a hole in the wall because he is hanging a picture. 
  
193 
Tanney’s paradigm context-placing explanation also explains why an agent 
engaged in some activity in terms of something else the agent is doing: 
(f) The teacher has written ‘CAT’ on the board because she is writing ‘CATALYST’ 
on the board. 
Many rationalising explanations are not of this form. For example, none of the 
rationalising explanations given in chapter 6 have this form: 
(b) Beth is buying flour because she wants to make bread.  
(c) John is adding rosemary to the sauce because he believes it will make it taste 
better. 
(d) David took the A road because the motorway was shut. 
(e) Columbus sailed west across the Atlantic because he thought that was the way 
to India.  
However, rationalising explanations like (b) – (e) are similar in form to stative 
causal explanations. Indeed, some have suggested that rationalising explanations 
are a kind of disposition-citing explanation. Hyman (2015, pp.103-132) argues 
that explanations of intentional actions which cite desires are disposition-citing 
explanations because desires are dispositions. Mayr also suggests that that 
explanatory function of rationalising explanations is ‘quite similar to the function 
of explanations in terms of dispositions or tendencies’ (2011, p.295).  
However, even if mental states like desiring, believing and knowing are 
dispositions, they are not ordinary dispositions. Most dispositions are 
dispositions to engage in or undergo a certain specific activity or process. In 
contrast, having a desire to do something or achieve something (for example) 
disposes one to undertake whatever activities are deemed, by the agent, to be 
acceptably good means of achieving what one wants; to deliberately refrain from 
acting should that turn out to be an acceptably good means of achieving what 
one wants; to feel happy or pleased if one’s desire gets satisfied or disappointed 
if it is frustrated; and to use one’s desire as a premise in practical deliberation 
about what to do. Desires are not dispositions to do any one specific thing (or 
even any two specific things) – they are rather dispositions for one’s activities to 
instantiate a certain pattern or goal-directedness, which is made sense of by the 
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content of the desire. Similar claims can be made about other mental concepts. 
As Ryle suggested, it would be wrong to think that just because the verbs ‘know’ 
and ‘believe’ are ‘ordinarily used dispositionally’, that ‘there must therefore exist 
one-pattern intellectual processes in which these cognitive dispositions are 
actualised’ (1949, p.44). Rather, states of believing and states of knowing, if 
they are dispositions at all, are ‘dispositions the exercise of which are indefinitely 
heterogeneous’ (p.44). So, while there are some similarities between 
rationalising explanations on the one hand and process-citing and disposition-
citing explanations on the other, it is important not to forget that rationalising 
explanations are unique: they are very variable in form, and even if we suppose 
that the mental states cited in rationalising explanations are dispositions, they 
are not, by any means, ordinary dispositions. 
There is one more impediment to concluding that rationalising 
explanations are causal explanations, even the kind of causal explanations which 
depend for their truth on something about the non-relational aspect of causal 
reality. When you learn that some agent’s activity is a manifestation of her desire 
or an output of her rational capabilities, you learn that you might be able to alter 
her activity by altering what she believes about the world, or by changing her 
desires, perhaps by changing her environment, but more usually by reasoning 
with her, talking to her, or persuading her. However, learning this information 
only makes it the case that you might be able to alter the agent’s activity. This is 
because reasoning with an agent in an attempt to get them to j, for example, 
does not guarantee that the agent will j – it does not even ensure that it is more 
likely that the agent will j. This is because the agent can ignore you, or remain 
unconvinced, or even just act against her better judgement. In short, 
rationalising explanations do not seem to be the sort of explanations which 
provide us with information about how to stop something from happening, or 
how to get something to happen again, or how to get it to happen in a different 
way, or even how to make such outcomes more likely. They seem only to 
provide information about how we might stop something from happening, or get 
something to happen again, get it to happen in a different way, or make such 
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outcomes more likely. Rationalising explanations do not seem to provide 
information that enables the kind of manipulation or control of an effect which I 
have said causal explanations provide. Thus, it is still unclear what sort of causal 
information rationalising explanations provide.  
As mentioned, it is commonly held that we can achieve an adequate 
account of what it is to act intentionally by examining the distinctive sort of 
explanation with which intentional actions are associated. If rationalising 
explanations are causal explanations which do not designate mental items which 
stand to the action explained as cause to effect, but instead answer to non-
relational causal reality, then the case for thinking intentional actions are 
distinguished from non-intentional actions by their mental causes is significantly 
weakened. However, without getting clearer on exactly what facts about 
dynamic states of affairs rationalising explanations could plausibly be said to 
answer to, it is difficult to offer a positive account of what the distinguishing 
mark of intentional action is. I do not have a fully worked out answer to this 
question. However, in the next section, I will present a view on intentional 
action which grants that rationalising explanations are a form of disposition-
citing explanation, but which respects the two key ways in which rationalising 
explanations are unique.  
7.3 Intentional Action 
7.3.1 Mayr’s Theory of Intentional Action 
Mayr (2011) offers a theory of intentional action which takes seriously the idea 
that intentional action is the manifestation of a special sort of power. According 
to Mayr, ‘intentional behaviour displays a certain characteristic structure of 
“purposefulness”’ (2011, p.271). Mayr proposes that to act for a reason is for 
one’s behaviour to display a particular kind of structure, i.e. ‘the characteristic 
structure of taking something as one’s “standard of success and failure”, or “of 
correctness and incorrectness”’ (p.271). Mayr takes this proposal to be supported 
by the fact that when searching for a rationalising explanation of someone’s 
action the facts we consider relevant are facts about whether the agent’s 
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behaviour, feelings and reasoning display – or would display – a certain pattern. 
For example, when we wonder if Beth is buying flour because she wants to make 
bread, we seek to find out things like ‘will Beth also buy yeast?’, ‘if Beth got 
home and found out her bread tin was missing, would she feel disappointed?’, 
‘would Beth make use of her desire to make bread in a practical deliberation?’. 
For Mayr these facts do not merely constitute the epistemic criteria for 
determining what reason an agent acted in light of, they are also the facts that 
make it the case than an agent acted for a specific reason. There’s nothing more 
to acting for a reason than for this welter of facts concerning the agent’s actual 
or hypothetical behaviour and thinking to obtain.  
What are the facts, the obtaining of which, makes it the case that an 
agent acted for a specific reason? According to Mayr’s theory, there are three 
sorts: 
1. Facts concerning the teleological structure or ‘plasticity’67 of the agent’s actual or 
hypothetical behaviour. Mayr claims that when an agent has a certain goal, they 
will ‘react sensitively to changes in the environment which threaten the 
attainment of that goal or make it otherwise necessary to adopt different means 
for attaining his goal’ (p.271) – or would if such environmental changes 
occurred. Agents with a goal will take ‘corrective measures’ and perform actions 
‘conducive to overcoming obstacles’ should such mistakes or obstacles occur 
(p.271). These ‘corrective movements’ indicate to an observer that the agent has 
a ‘standard by which – at least implicitly – he assesses his behaviour and 
considers himself – in cases of non-conformity of his behaviour to this standard – 
to have “made a mistake”’ (p.273). When an agent does not encounter any 
obstacles or make any mistakes, the agent’s actions may not display plasticity. 
Mayr insists that, in this case, ‘our ascriptions of aims rely on our confidence 
that certain counterfactual conditionals about what the agent would do if 
obstacles arose are true, and that the hypothetical behaviour he would display 
 
 
 
67 Mayr takes ‘plasticity’ to be an alternative term, used by Woodfield (1976), for this pattern in 
an agent’s activity. 
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would have an adequate teleological structure’ (p.274). In other words, the 
plasticity of hypothetical as well as actual behaviour is important.  
2. Facts concerning the agent’s actual and hypothetical success and failure feelings. 
Achieving one’s aim is often accompanied by feelings of satisfaction or joy, and 
failing to achieve one’s aim is associated with feelings of disappointment or 
frustration. For Mayr, what occurrences trigger (or would trigger) feelings of 
satisfaction or disappointment are important for determining what the agent is 
aiming at, or what the agent considers to be a success and what he considers to 
be a failure. Of course, success is not always accompanied by feelings of joy, and 
failure is not always accompanied by feelings of frustration. For example, when 
one achieves something one considers a ‘necessary evil’, one may feel bitter and 
unhappy upon achieving it. In such cases, Mayr thinks that ‘the only success 
feeling of the agent may be a half-hearted or even bitter feeling of “having done 
it” or “being finished”’ (p.277).  
3. Facts concerning whether the agent makes use of their purported aim as a 
premise in the practical deliberation leading to the action, or at least would if 
practical deliberation were called for. According to Mayr, when an agent is 
guided by the requirements he takes to be placed on him by his aims, this 
guidance will express itself in ‘individual or joint practical deliberation about 
what to do, before or during the action, and in ex post justifications of his 
actions. In practical deliberation, the purpose provides the premise in the agent’s 
deliberation, from which he proceeds to the conclusion that he should act in this 
way; and after the action it is to this aim that he appeals in justifying his action 
(as far as he is sincere)’ (p.279).  
According to Mayr, an agent’s behaviour displays the structure 
characteristic of ‘purposefulness’ when facts of these three sorts obtain. Mayr 
claims that it is not necessary that facts of all three sorts obtain for an agent to 
act for a reason. Mayr thinks that sometimes an agent may not deliberate about 
what to do before acting, may be at a loss when asked later why he acted as he 
did, have no success and failure feelings, and yet still act for a reason. For 
example, someone who has an unconscious (or sub-conscious) desire to 
sabotage a rival might give them bad advice. In this case, the agent has an aim 
(to sabotage his rival), but does not deliberate, would not be able to give an ex 
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post justification for his action, and might not feel satisfied once the sabotage 
has been achieved. According to Mayr, ‘what is present in such cases is only the 
(actual or hypothetical) teleological structure of the agent's behaviour’ (p.282). 
Mayr thinks this indicates that facts of type 1 are privileged in the sense that 
where an agent is acting with an aim, facts of type 1 must obtain – something 
which doesn’t hold true for facts of type 2 or 3.  
7.3.2 Expanding on Mayr’s Theory 
There are two issues with Mayr’s account I would like to discuss. Firstly, not all 
intentional activities display a pattern as sophisticated as the one Mayr 
describes. Some intentional actions are not done for reasons. For example, when 
I skip just for the fun of it, I have no aim I want to achieve by skipping. In such 
cases, because I have no aim I want to achieve, I have no aim to use in practical 
deliberation. Similarly, because there’s nothing I want to achieve by skipping, 
there are no success or failure feelings.68 It is also unclear that I would engage in 
actions which are conducive to overcoming obstacles when I skip just for the fun 
of it. When I skip just for fun, it is more than likely that should some obstacle to 
skipping occur – e.g. my path becomes blocked or dangerously slippy – I would 
just stop skipping. I’m doing it just for fun after all, not to achieve anything, so I 
have no motivation to continue skipping when doing so becomes difficult. 
Similarly, some animal behaviour seems to be intentional, in a minimal sense, 
even though it does not display anything as sophisticated as Mayr’s ‘plasticity’. 
For example, it seems to me that when a cat grooms itself, the grooming is 
intentional, but it doesn’t seem that, had the cat’s environment presented an 
obstacle to grooming – e.g. had it started to rain – the cat would try to overcome 
this obstacle and continue grooming itself. In such circumstances, the cat is as 
 
 
 
68 If I go to skip and suddenly find myself unable, this will no doubt incur negative feelings, but 
they are not obviously ‘failure feelings’ – I am more likely to feel surprised and possibly 
concerned that a skill I thought I had has suddenly disappeared!  
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likely to run off and hunt for mice as it is to go inside and continue grooming 
itself there. Many animal actions are, I think, intentional, but few have as 
sophisticated a teleological structure as Mayr describes.  
Secondly, Mayr seems to endorse the context-placing or interpretative 
view of rationalising explanations:  
When we understand acting for a reason as following a standard of success 
[…] it must be the function of reasons-explanations to locate the action 
within the structure constituted by the agent’s behaviour, emotional 
responses, thoughts, and practical reasoning which is constitutive for 
following the relevant standard of success. (2011, p.292) 
But, as mentioned above, Mayr also thinks that rationalising explanations are a 
kind of disposition-citing explanation (2011, p.295). Mayr claims that when a 
rationalising explanation is offered a ‘certain item of behaviour is explained as 
the manifestation of one of the dispositions connected with the welter of material 
and counterfactual conditionals which are responsible for the characteristic 
structure of intentional agency’ (p.294, emphasis added). Mayr claims that the 
power manifested in intentional action is a ‘complex power to act in certain ways 
in specific situations’; it is a power of the agent to structure her own activities 
(which are exercises of her abilities to act), a power which is ‘superimposed on 
the pre-existing active powers of the agent’ (p.295). So, on Mayr’s view, 
rationalising explanations do two things: (1) they place the action explained 
within a specific structure and (2) they explain an action as the manifestation of 
a special sort of power to structure one’s own activities, a power which is 
‘superimposed’ on the pre-existing active powers of the agent. The second issue 
with Mayr’s account I want to draw attention to concerns how rationalising 
explanations can perform both roles, and where this special power of an agent to 
structure her own activities comes from.  
In response to the first issue, one might simply insist that actions like 
skipping for the fun of it and animal actions are not intentional because they do 
not meet the criteria Mayr sets out. However, even though actions like skipping 
for the fun of it and animal actions do not display a teleological structure as 
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complex as the one Mayr describes, it is not true that they display no teleological 
structure at all. Anyone who can skip is able to make all sorts of small 
adjustments to their movements to maintain balance, or to ensure that the steps 
and hops that constitute skipping are executed with the required co-ordination. 
Skipping still involves some ‘corrective measures’ albeit on a smaller scale than 
the kind of corrective measures Mayr talks about. Similarly, when a cat grooms 
itself, it must co-ordinate the movements of its body so that its tongue catches its 
fur in just the right way. Again, there is a form of teleological structure 
demonstrated. In both cases, there is a pattern demonstrated by the agent’s 
actions – a pattern which makes sense once one learns what the agent is trying 
to do. I think that it is more in keeping with Mayr’s core claim, that what makes 
an activity intentional is its characteristic structure of ‘purposefulness’, to grant 
that actions like skipping for the fun of it and animal actions are intentional in 
virtue of the teleological structure they display, than to insist that such actions 
do not count as intentional because they fail to demonstrate a teleological 
structure of the right level of sophistication. If we are content to depart from 
traditional theories of intentional action and instead adopt a theory which ties 
the intentionality of some activity to the plasticity of that activity, then why not 
also accept the phenomenon of intentionality itself is not a homogenous 
phenomenon, but instead something that can be more or less sophisticated?  
The difficulty with weakening Mayr’s view so that all activities that 
display some degree of plasticity count as intentional is that plasticity can be 
displayed in the behaviour of things that do not have mental states and which do 
not really act intentionally, for example, machines and robots. This difficulty 
parallels issues surrounding Daniel Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance theory. 
Dennett proposed that treating objects as rational agents with beliefs and desires 
helps us understand and predict the behaviour of those objects. Treating objects 
as rational agents with beliefs and desires is to take an intentional stance with 
respect to that object. According to Dennett, ‘any object – or as I shall say, any 
system – whose behaviour is well predicted by this strategy is in the fullest sense 
of the word a believer’ (1987, p.15). Dennett goes on: ‘What it is to be a true 
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believer is to be an intentional system, a system whose behaviour is reliably and 
voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy’ (p.15). The problem with 
Dennett’s theory is that we can take the intentional stance to objects which do 
not really have beliefs and desires, like machines and robots.  
It is commonly thought that there is a difference between really believing 
something, and behaving as if you believed something, and that the difference 
lies in there being something extra, something hidden, in the case of genuine 
belief. I think this is the wrong way to capture the difference. True, machines 
and robots do not really have beliefs and desires, but this is not because 
believing something is a peculiar kind of property, or involves engaging in a 
peculiar kind of process. Rather it is because machines and robots do not possess 
and exercise two-way powers. Their behaviour is not up to them. There is a real 
difference between behaviour of machines which seems to instantiate a pattern 
which can be made sense of by attributing mental states and genuine intentional 
action, but the difference does not consist in there being something extra present 
in the latter case. The difference is that machines are not capable of intentional 
action, because they do not possess two-way powers, and possessing and 
exercising a two-way power is a necessary condition for acting intentionally.  
A consideration which supports the idea that intentional agency always 
involves the exercise of two-way power is the fact that when an agent is 
constrained so that they only have the opportunity to φ, and lack the 
opportunity to not φ, if the agent φs in this situation we wouldn’t want to say 
they φed intentionally.69 For example, suppose Ben’s hands have been 
 
 
 
69 Frankfurt cases (Frankfurt 1969) are thought to demonstrate that this claim is false, that an 
agent can intentionally φ, and indeed be morally responsible for φing, even when they could not 
have done otherwise. However, I would argue that even in Frankfurt cases the agents in question 
do, in fact, have the ability and opportunity not to φ. The presence of neuroscientists with fancy 
machinery, who could take control over an agent’s body just in case they start to look like they 
might not φ by themselves, may foreclose the physical possibility that a φing won’t happen, but, 
as I suggested in footnote 13, these facts are not relevant to what is an open agential possibility 
for the agent. 
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temporarily paralysed so that he is denied the opportunity to move his hands. 
Whether Ben moves his hands or not is not up to him. Is it possible for Ben, in 
this situation, to intentionally refrain from moving his hands? Suppose someone 
unaware of Ben’s situation said to him: “if you keep your hands perfectly still I’ll 
give you £10”. Ben may want to comply, but even if not moving is what Ben 
wants, it does not seem like he is remaining still intentionally when his hands 
are paralysed. It seems like being able to both move and not move your hands is 
a precondition for doing one or the other intentionally, and lacking this two-way 
power renders intentionally doing one or the other action impossible. 
Another consideration that may speak in favour of the view that 
exercising a two-way power is a necessary condition for intentional action are 
cases of deviant causation. As mentioned in chapter 2, deviant causal chain cases 
are a well-known problem for causal analyses of intentional action, i.e. analyses 
which attempt to reduce intentional action to causation of bodily movements by 
appropriate mental states and/or events. The most famous deviant causal chain 
case is Davidson’s nervous climber example:  
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding 
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on 
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want 
might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be 
the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it 
intentionally. (Davidson, 1973/2001, p.79) 
There are two potential explanations available for why there is no 
intentional action in this case: 
(1) The causal chain does not follow the sort of causal path that counts as ‘the 
“right” way in which beliefs and desires must yield behaviour for genuine 
intentional action to occur’ (Bishop, 1989, p.135), the ‘right way’ being: …, 
where the ‘…’ has to be filled in without reference to intentional action. 
(2) The agent’s reasons or intentions operate via causal chains which rob the agent 
of the relevant two-way power, most probably by robbing the agent of the 
opportunity to both φ and not φ. For example, in Davidson’s nervous climber 
case, the climber’s nervousness robs the climber of the opportunity not to let go 
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of the rope. Just as extreme grief can render a person incapable of not crying 
out, the climber’s control over his body has been hijacked by the conditions 
responsible for his nervous state.   
The success of (1) as an explanation depends on how the ‘…’ is filled in. One 
promising strategy is the ‘sensitivity approach’ (e.g. Peacocke 1979, Mele 1992, 
2003). This approach suggests that a necessary condition for intentional action 
is that the bodily movement is ‘responsive’ or ‘sensitive’ to the content (or some 
other variable feature) of the mental state that caused it. One way of spelling out 
this sensitivity requirement is in terms of counterfactuals: a bodily movement is 
sensitive to the mental state that caused it if and only if had the mental state had 
a slightly different content, then a slightly different bodily movement – one that 
conformed to the slightly different mental state – would have occurred.70 Smith 
(2010) gives a clear example: suppose a pianist wants to appear nervous to his 
audience and believes he can achieve this end by playing a C# instead of a C 
during his piece. The pianist’s pressing C# is sensitive to this belief-desire pair if 
only if had the pianist thought that pressing B would achieve his goal, then the 
pianist would have pressed B. Cases of deviant causation are thought not to 
satisfy this sensitivity requirement.  
 
 
 
70 The counterfactual version of the sensitivity approach isn’t the only version available. Peacocke 
(1979) offers an alternative version. Peacocke argues that there is an intentional action if and 
only if the bodily movement is caused by an intention and that the intention differentially 
explains the occurrence of the bodily movement (p.69). A state or event differentially explains 
another when there is a law backing the explanation, according to which changes in the intensity 
or value of the explanandum are correlated (one-to-one) with changes in the intensity or value 
of the explanans. For the sake of brevity, I won’t discuss Peacocke’s version of the sensitivity 
approach in this essay. See Sehon (1997) for a convincing argument that Peacocke’s proposed 
criterion for intentional action is neither necessary nor sufficient.  
  
204 
However, this proposal faces a counterexample. Consider Amy and her 
device which can manipulate my brain and nervous system to make me get up 
out of my seat at 4pm. Suppose that I do in fact form the intention to get up at 
4pm because I want to make tea. Suppose further that Amy would only use her 
device if I formed the intention to get up; had I formed a different intention Amy 
wouldn’t have used her device to make me get up, she would have used her 
device instead to make sure my body moved in conformity with my alternative 
intention. Thus, the bodily movement that results from my intention to get up is 
sensitive to the content of that intention. However, where Amy uses her device 
to manipulate my brain and nervous system, I am not performing an intentional 
action: I am not in control over what is going on with my body, Amy is.71 Bishop 
(1989) calls cases like this, where the causal path from intention to bodily 
movement passes through a benevolent second agent, heteromesial causal chain 
cases.72  
One response to this counterexample may be to stipulate that the causal 
chain cannot be heteromesial if intentional action is to occur. However, as 
Bishop (1989, pp.158-159) points out, this cannot be right, as not every 
heteromesial causal chain is such that it blocks intentional action. Imagine 
machinery like Amy’s is used to make sure that an agent’s damaged neural 
pathways carry on functioning as normal (e.g. suppose some synapse isn’t 
functioning properly, Amy’s machinery might work by stimulating the second 
neurone when the first is in the right electrochemical state, just as the first 
 
 
 
71 This counterexample is adapted from an example given by Peacocke (1979, p.87). 
72 A more recent suggested solution to the causal deviance problem, suggested by McDonnell 
(2015), also cannot deal with this counterexample. McDonnell suggests that there is an 
intentional action if and only if the mental cause of the bodily movement is ‘proportional’, in 
Yablo’s (1992) sense, to the bodily movement. My intention to get up is a proportional cause of 
my subsequent getting up if and only if the following counterfactual conditionals are true:  
1. Had my intention to get up been absent, then I would not have gotten up.  
2. Had my intention to get up been absent, then had I intended to get I would have gotten 
up. 
These are both true even in the hetereomesial case.  
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neurone would if it were working properly). Now suppose I’m the one with the 
damaged neural pathways and when I decide to get up at 4pm to make tea, Amy 
has to switch her machine on to make sure that neural signals are transmitted as 
normal thus allowing me to get up. In this case, the causal chain from my 
intention to my bodily movement has to go via an action of Amy’s – were it not 
for Amy, my damaged neural pathways would thwart any bodily movement, 
thus rendering my intention inefficacious. However, it does not seem, in this 
case, that my getting up at 4pm is not intentional. In this case Amy is helping me 
carry out my intention to get up by helping my nervous system remain in 
working order, she’s an essential component of the causal chain that lets me 
carry out my intention, but my action doesn’t fail to be intentional. 
The project of specifying what it is for a causal chain from beliefs and 
desires or intentions to bodily movement to be non-deviant may suffer a similar 
plight to that faced by the project of specifying necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge, namely, that every new proposal faces new 
counterexamples and the project seems nowhere near an end.73 I would like to 
suggest that adequately solving the problem of deviant causal chain cases has 
proven difficult because the correct explanation for why there is no intentional 
action in deviant causal chain cases is because in these cases is the agent lacks 
the relevant two-way power. In other words, I endorse explanation 2 above. This 
is why some heteromesial cases are such that intentional action is blocked, and 
others do not block intentional action: not every heteromesial case is such that 
the agent is stripped of either the ability to φ or not φ or the opportunity to φ or 
not φ. Where Amy is using her machine to keep my nervous system in working 
order, she hasn’t robbed me of the ability or opportunity to not get up. Whereas 
where she uses her machine to control the movements of my body, she has 
 
 
 
73 See Zagzebski (1994) for an argument that Gettier-style counterexamples are inescapable for 
almost every analysis of knowledge.  
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robbed me of the opportunity not to get up. If 2 really is the better explanation, 
then we have further support for the idea that there can be no intentional action 
that is not an exercise of a two-way power. Thus, deviant causal chain cases 
provide conditional support for the idea that possessing and exercising a two-
way power is a necessary condition for acting intentionally. 
The idea that possessing and exercising a two-way power is a necessary 
condition for acting intentionally suggests a possible answer to the second 
problem facing Mayr’s account. It is because we have two-way powers that our 
activities can demonstrate patterns of the kind Mayr describes. When we have 
two-way powers, it is up to us whether we perform the activites these two-way 
powers are powers to do. In virtue of this, the pattern our actions display is also 
up to us. This is where, I think, the special power of an agent to structure her 
own activities, the power which Mayr says is ‘superimposed’ on the pre-existing 
active powers of the agent, comes from. Because we have many two-way 
powers, we also have an extra power to organise our actions in such a way so as 
to meet our aims. The power to act intentionally is thus an emergent power – a 
power that emerges from our possessing two-way powers to act. Having such a 
power does not mean we will always use it – many exercises of two-way powers 
are not intentional, for example absent-minded fiddling. The power may also 
come in degrees: creatures whose powers are mostly two-way will be able to 
organise their activities into a greater variety of patterns than creatures whose 
powers are mostly one-way. For example, it is up to the cat whether it grooms 
itself now or later, but it is probably not up to the cat whether it grooms itself at 
all. For human beings, however, refraining from taking care of one’s hygiene is, 
perhaps unfortunately, under our personal control.  
This view has interesting consequences for the question of what causal 
information rationalising explanations provide. First, the view grants that 
rationalising explanations are a form of disposition-citing explanation. 
Intentional actions are manifestations of a special sort of power, namely a power 
to organise one’s activities in accordance with a certain form (a power which 
depends on having two-way powers to act), and the function of rationalising 
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explanations is to tell us which form the agent was disposed to structure her 
activities in accordance with. Second, the view allows that rationalising 
explanations are context-placing or interpretive: the mental concepts cited in 
rationalising explanations make the form of an agent’s intentional activity 
intelligible. Third, the view can explain why determining whether rationalising 
explanations provide information relevant to the manipulation or control of an 
effect, and hence whether rationalising explantions are causal, is difficult.  
As I mentioned in section 7.2, when you learn that some agent’s activity is 
a manifestation of her desire or an output of her rational capabilities, you learn 
that you might be able to alter her activity by altering what she believes about 
the world, or by changing her desires, perhaps by changing her environment, but 
more usually by reasoning with her, talking to her, or persuading her. However, 
learning this information only makes it the case that you might be able to alter 
the agent’s activity. The view of intentional action sketched in this section allows 
us to explain why this is: reasoning with an agent in an attempt to prevent them 
from jing (or get them to j) doesn’t take away the agent’s two-way power to j. 
Because her power to j is two-way, it is up to her whether she js or not. Of 
course, we can always control someone else’s jing by removing their two-way 
power to j, for example by tying them down so that they no longer have the 
opportunity to j. But, learning about the reasons and motives behind an agent’s 
activity is not relevant for our exercising this kind of control over the agent. If 
learning about the reasons and motives behind an agent’s activity is relevant for 
the manipulation or control of their behaviour at all, then it is relevant for a kind 
of control that leaves the agent’s two-way powers intact.  
Determining whether rationalising explanations provide information 
relevant to the manipulation or control of an effect is difficult because it is 
unclear whether this latter sort of control is a form of causal control. Is 
convincing someone to behave in some way to exercise a causal power? Is it to 
cause something to happen? These questions matter if, as I have proposed, an 
explanation is causal if and only if it provides information relevant to 
manipulation and control, where manipulation and control are causal activities 
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that powerful particulars, such as ourselves, can undertake. I do not know if the 
answer to these questions should be yes. I do not think that the causal concept 
sits comfortably with concepts like convincing, persuading and reasoning with. On 
the other hand, the concept does not feel wholly inappropriate either. In short, 
because the disposition manifested when an agent acts intentionally is one 
which is dependent on their having and exercising two-way powers, learning 
about the reasons and motives behind an agent’s activity does not provide us 
with information that enables us to ensure that the activity is (or is not) engaged 
in. However, it is not obvious that exercising causal control over a situation is 
always a matter of ensuring certain outcomes. The causal status of rationalising 
explanations is unclear. But if something like the account of intentional action I 
have sketched in this section is true, then the dubious causal nature of 
rationalising explanations isn’t an anomaly, it is instead something that should 
be expected given the nature of the agential powers demonstrated in intentional 
action.  
In this chapter, I have sought to show that it is not obviously true that an 
explanation is causal only if its explanandum designates an effect and its 
explanans designates an item which is the cause of that effect. My non-relational 
theory of causation allows that some causal explanations may depend for their 
truth on facts about dynamic states of affairs. Furthermore, it is quite plausible 
that process-citing explanations and disposition-citing explanations are the kinds 
of causal explanation which answer to the non-relational aspect of causal reality. 
In other words, it is plausible that the ‘because’ of these causal explanations does 
not signify the obtaining of a causal relation. There is some reason to think that 
rationalising explanations are also causal explanations which are not made true 
by a pair of causally related events. This view has consequences for how we 
ought to think about the nature of intentional action. It casts doubt over the 
view that intentional actions are distinguished from non-intentional actions by 
their causes. I proposed an alternative view of intentional actions, inspired by 
Mayr (2011), which takes intentional actions to be manifestations of a special 
power of agents to organise their activities into a pattern of determinate form 
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(an emergent power that depends on one possessing two-way powers to act). 
Rationalising explanations reveal this form by attributing mental states with 
certain contents to the agent.  
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8  
Conclusion 
This dissertation challenges the orthodox understanding of the mental causation 
that is on display when an agent acts intentionally. In discussions of the so-
called problem of mental causation, mental causation is typically presented as a 
cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. As I put it in chapter 
1, mentality and physicality are presented as two sides of a causal exchange. I 
called this understanding of mental causation the relational understanding of 
mental causation: 
Relational understanding of mental causation: mental causation is a 
matter of mental items (events, processes or states which are conceived of as 
particulars) standing in causal relations to physical events, e.g. bodily 
movements.   
The clearest endorsement of this understanding of mental causation can be 
found in Kim’s remarks on why it is important that mental causation is real:  
First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral 
practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal effects in the 
physical world. In voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions 
and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways, 
thereby causing the objects around us to be rearranged. (2005, p.9) 
The aim of this dissertation was to show that Kim is wrong to claim that 
‘in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must 
somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways’ (2005, p.9). When we 
say that someone acted intentionally because of what she believed, desired, 
intended or decided, the concepts belief, desire, intention, perhaps even decision, 
do not refer to items which stand in causal relations to limb movements. In other 
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words, in this dissertation I sought to defend the thesis that even if there is 
mental causation on display when we act intentionally, this mental causation 
should not be relationally understood. 
To defend this thesis, I began by arguing that the canonical theory of 
action, the causal theory of action, fails as a theory of agency. I argued that, 
contrary to the claims of the causal theory of action, agency is misconstrued 
when it is taken to be something that can be reduced to a special kind of event-
causation. I endorsed Hornsby’s (2004a, 2012) suggestion that what is needed 
to properly understand agency is a radical departure from the Humean approach 
to causation which the causal theory of action presupposes. Specifically, to 
understand agency we need a metaphysical framework that allows us to think of 
causation as something other than a relation between events. Only then is it 
possible to see how the causality of action might be something other than a 
causal relation between mental event and action, and instead something that 
casts the agent as a causal player, rather than merely the setting for events to 
cause other events. 
In chapter 3, I outlined a non-Humean approach to causation which 
involved rejecting the three core theses of Humean theories of causation: 1) 
reductionism 2) denial of powers and 3) relationalism. According to this 
approach, causation is not always and everywhere a relation, and giving a full 
account of causation is not merely a matter of explaining what a relation must 
be like to be a causal relation. Put positively, I maintain that causation can be a 
process rather than a relation, of which processes like breaking, crushing, 
bending etc are more determinate species. In chapter 4, I outlined and defended 
the process ontology which this non-Humean theory of causation depends on. 
My process ontology maintains that processes are universals which substances 
engage in, and events are instances of processes – they are particular 
occurrences which come into being when a substance has engaged in a process 
and completed it.  
I argued in chapter 5 that this non-Humean approach to causation, and 
the process ontology that accompanies it, allows us to put together a more 
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successful understanding of agency. On my view, agents are substances which 
exercise agential powers, where to exercise a power is for a substance to engage 
in a process, i.e. for a dynamic state of affairs to obtain. Actions are the events 
which come into existence when agents exercise their agential powers – i.e. 
engage in processes – and then complete those processes. I argued in chapter 5 
that there are two distinctions crucial to our concept of agential power: the 
distinction between activity and passivity, and the distinction between one-way 
and two-way powers. Agency does not reduce to the exercise of active power, 
because some substances can manifest their agency by remaining passive, and 
therefore by not engaging in activity. Neither does agency reduce to the exercise 
of two-way power, because not all substances which cause things to happen do 
so by exercising two-way powers, but all substances which cause things to 
happen are agents. My view is that agency is a complex concept which 
incorporates both distinctions. Some substances’ agential powers are one-way; 
these substances manifest their agency when they are active, but not when they 
are passive. Other substances’ agential powers are two-way; these substances 
manifest their agency when they are active, but also sometimes when they are 
passive.  
In chapters 6 and 7, I turned my attention to intentional action. Many 
philosophers have tried to provide an account of intentional action by examining 
the distinctive sort of explanation with which intentional actions are associated, 
i.e. rationalising explanations. Davidson (1963) argues that rationalising 
explanations are causal explanations. They are true if a mental event suitably 
related to the mental concept cited in the rationalising explanation stands in a 
causal relation to the action explained. Davidson’s argument that rationalising 
explanations are causal is often taken to justify the claim that mental states or 
events stand in causal relations to intentional actions. Thus, Davidson’s 
argument is the source of the common view that our conception of ourselves as 
intentional agents presupposes that mentality is causally relevant in the physical 
world and that this mental causation should be conceived of in relational terms.  
  
213 
In chapter 6, I outlined a number of considerations which appear to 
suggest that rationalising explanations do not explain by causally attributing one 
event to another. As Tanney puts it, the mental concepts in rationalising 
explanations do not discharge their explanatory role by designating causes of the 
actions they explain (2009, p.100). Instead, rationalising explanations are 
‘context-placing’ explanations, explanations which place the action explained in 
a context that makes it intelligible. To say that when we attribute beliefs and 
desires to an agent we are positing internal causes of their observable behaviour 
misconstrues the explanatory function of these mental concepts. However, I 
acknowledged that, despite Tanney’s arguments, the idea that when we explain 
someone’s actions in terms of their beliefs and desires we are giving causal 
information is very appealing.  
In chapter 7, I argued to say that a rationalising explanation is causal is 
not thereby to commit oneself to the view that mental items stand in causal 
relations to actions, and that maybe rationalising explanations are causal even 
though they do not function by designating mental items which are the causes of 
the actions they explain. I did this by first examining what makes an explanation 
causal. I argued against the view that causal explanations are precisely those 
explanations whose explanandum designates an effect and whose explanans 
designates an item which is the cause of that effect. My non-Humean theory of 
causation implies that facts about what events are causally related to what 
others are not the only causal facts which causal explanations could answer to; 
some causal explanations may answer to facts about dynamic states of affairs. I 
suggested that explanations that cite the operation of causal processes and 
disposition-citing explanations are amongst those causal explanations which 
depend for their truth on facts about dynamic states of affairs.  
I proposed that rationalising explanations are also causal explanations 
which are not made true by causally related events. The most important 
consideration favouring this view is that is saves two strong intuitions: 1) that 
rationalising explanations are causal, and 2) that the mental states cited in 
rationalising explanations do not denote items which stand in causal relations to 
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the actions they explain. The idea that rationalising explanations are causal 
explanations which answer to the non-relational aspect of causal reality is also 
supported by the fact that rationalising explanations bear some similarities to 
both process-citing and disposition-citing explanations.  
The view that rationalising explanations are causal explanations which do 
not designate mental items that stand to the action explained as cause to effect 
has consequences for how we ought to think about the nature of intentional 
action. Most importantly, it casts doubt on the view that intentional actions are 
distinguished from non-intentional actions by their causes. I proposed an 
alternative view of intentional actions, inspired by Mayr (2011), which takes 
intentional actions to be manifestations of a special power to organise one’s 
activities into a pattern of determinate form. Rationalising explanations reveal 
this form by attributing mental states with certain contents to the agent – in this 
way, rationalising explanations are both context-placing and disposition-citing. 
In other words, intentional actions are manifestations of a power to organise 
one’s activities so that they instantiate a certain structure, and rationalising 
explanations make this structure comprehensible.  
The theory of intentional action I propose relies heavily on two ideas: the 
notion of plasticity, or teleological structure, whose defining characteristic is its 
‘corrective behaviour’; and the concept of a two-way power. Following Mayr, I 
proposed that what makes activity intentional is the fact that it displays the 
characteristic structure of ‘purposefulness’ or ‘of taking something as one's 
“standard of success and failure”, or “of correctness and incorrectness”’ (Mayr, 
2011, p.271). However, I recommended that we be more liberal regarding what 
sorts of structure counts as a structure of ‘purposefulness’ than Mayr proposes, 
so that actions which are done simply because one wants to do them and not for 
any reason and some animal actions count as intentional. To avoid the 
consequence that all activities that display some degree of plasticity count as 
intentional, even activities engaged in by substances which do not really act 
intentionally, like machines and robots, I suggested that only activities engaged 
in by substances which possess two-way powers can be intentional. The activities 
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of machines and robots are not even candidate intentional actions because they 
are exercises of one-way powers. This account requires further defence. One key 
problem with it is that I have said nothing about how we know which substances 
possess two-way powers and which don’t. I mentioned in chapter 2 that I doubt 
that exercises of two-way power come with distinctive perceptual markers. One 
might worry whether an account of intentional action which relies so heavily on 
a concept which suffers this kind of epistemological problem can be successful. 
However, even though the account I have proposed is underdeveloped, I hope it 
is enough to show that what’s distinctive about intentional action need not be its 
cause.  
I think the considerations put forward by non-causalists indicate that our 
concept of intentional action does not presuppose that mental items (states or 
events) stand in causal relations to actions, or physical events (e.g. bodily 
movements). However, I hope that the argument of chapter 7 shows that we can 
deny that the concepts employed in rationalising explanations refer to items 
which stand in causal relations to actions even if we take rationalising 
explanations to be causal. The fact that we causally explain people’s intentional 
actions in terms of their mental states does not justify the contention that 
necessarily, whenever there is intentional action there is a causal relation 
between a mental item and an action or a bodily movement. The causal nature 
of rationalising explanations does not give us any reason to think that 
necessarily, relational mental causation is on display whenever we act 
intentionally. This is not to say that causal relations between mental events and 
physical events do not exist. The conclusion I have argued for is weaker than 
that. My conclusion is that the existence of intentional action does not 
presuppose the existence of mental causation relationally understood. The 
existence of causal relations between mental events and physical events is not 
conceptually entailed by the existence of intentional action. 
Is there anything worthy of the name ‘mental causation’ necessarily on 
display whenever an agent acts intentionally? I believe we can, and should, 
answer this question positively. I have, at various points in this dissertation, 
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mentioned that it is natural to think that some form of mental causation, or ‘the 
reality of causal processes involving cognitive phenomena’ as Menzies (2013, 
p.58) puts it, is indispensable to our conception of ourselves as agents who act 
intentionally and bear moral responsibility. A positive answer to this question is 
possible once we acknowledge that we need not, and should not in this case, 
understand ‘mental’ in ‘mental causation’ as a ‘transferred epithet’ as Crane 
(1995, p.219) puts it. Understanding ‘mental’ in ‘mental causation’ as qualifying 
the cause relatum of a causal relation, rather than causation itself, is a 
prescription of the relational understanding of mental causation.  
In chapter 5, I proposed a theory of agency where to act is to engage in 
an activity. If this theory is correct, then acting is to engage in a process of 
causation (or, more accurately, a determinate form of the process of causation). 
And if, as I suggested in chapter 7, acting intentionally is to manifest a special 
power to organise one’s activities into a pattern that can be made sense of by 
appeal to mental concepts, why not say that the causation that is engaged in 
when an agent acts intentionally is ‘mental’ in virtue of this fact? In other words, 
perhaps the causation on display when an agent acts intentionally is mental in 
virtue of the fact that it is part of a teleological structure whose form is revealed 
by attributing knowledge, beliefs, desires or aims to the agent. As Hornsby 
(2015, p.135) points out, it is wrong to think of instances of human agency as 
occurrences which interrupt idleness. Human beings are not things which just lie 
there until something comes along and prods them into action. This is true 
regardless of whether we think of the thing that is doing the prodding as another 
substance, or as a mental item. Human beings, as Hornsby puts it, are ‘rational 
creature[s], leading a life, equipped with powers of thought and self-movement’ 
(p.135). Why not think of the mentality of the causal processes human beings 
engage in when they act intentionally as consisting in the fact that these 
processes are part of a larger pattern of meaningful, or interpretable, activity?  
This is not the only way in which the truth of the idea that some form of 
mental causation is indispensable to our conception of ourselves as agents who 
act intentionally and bear moral responsibility can be borne out. Human beings 
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are capable of performing activities which we would naturally describe as 
‘mental’, such as imagining and reasoning, and persuading and convincing. 
Exactly what these activities amount to is a difficult philosophical question, one 
which I cannot answer here. However, it seems to me that these activities are 
ways to deliberate (individually or in groups) about what beliefs and desires it is 
best to have, and can be means by which we can alter what beliefs or desires an 
agent has. That we have such capacities is relevant to our bearing moral 
responsibility.  
How it is that we have such capacities is, I think, a very difficult question. 
How are we able to engage in activities like imagining and reasoning? How does 
our capacity to imagine, reason, persuade, or convince relate to the physical 
capacities of our bodies? How is it possible that we can change the action-plans 
and projects an agent is disposed to enact by imagining or reasoning or 
persuading or convincing? I have no idea how to answer these questions. But it 
is these questions – and not questions about how mental items can stand in 
causal relations to physical events – which constitute the real problem of mental 
causation. The real mystery is not how mental items can stand in causal 
relations to physical events, but how it is that we can perform mental activities.  
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